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1 
PREFACE 
Art never ceases to inform, never ceases to please, never ceases to stimulate, never loses 
something of a magical efficacy.  
YRJÖ HIRN, 1900 
Visual art is all around us. Not only in museums, galleries, and books, but also in 
our homes, in our places of work and of worship, in urban landscapes and virtual 
spaces, and even on our clothes and on our bodies. Most people probably take it 
for granted that visual art has been around since the dawn of our species, but 
has it? The material remains left by the earliest of humans indicate that most 
likely this is not the case. Visual art, then, must have a traceable ‘origin’ and 
history of development. How to reconstruct the beginnings and unfolding of 
visual art over the course of human evolution is a topic that has concerned 
scholars of various disciplines for many decades. It is also the central theme of 
this book. 
In the research presented in the pages that follow, I look at different ways in 
which art scholars, archaeologists, and researchers of human evolution have 
approached the problem of explaining the origins of visual art, ever since Charles 
Darwin first pondered about the role of nature/biology in the foundation of the 
human “sense of beauty” and the universal “passion for ornament” observed 
across all cultures and historical periods ([1879]2004:640). I compare these 
views with the evidence of early visual art forms in the archaeology of the 
Pleistocene period, and show that there is a clear gap between current 
hypotheses on the emergence of visual art and the material record. 
This gap, I suggest, may be bridged by understanding visual art in the 
general framework of the study of biological communication and by conceiving 
of visual art as a material signal that displays identity, as has often been 
suggested by archaeologists and anthropologists in the past (e.g. Coe 2003; 
Conkey 1978; Kuhn & Stiner 2007a; Wiessner 1983; White 1992; Wobst 1977). 
Furthermore, by looking at other changes in the archaeological record, related 
for example to social organisation, demography, and resource acquisition 
strategies, it should be possible to suggest a scenario that explains why possibly 
Pleistocene humans would have required and effectively adopted visual art as a 
signal. The proposal presented in the last chapter of this book, in this manner, 
emphasizes the social role of visual art in the context of human cooperative 
behaviour as key to its development. 
As an archaeologist by training, I rely on the available material evidence to 
interpret the events of the past. Thus, I choose to follow a bottom-up analytical 
method that starts from the material artwork itself, examines it and its context, 
and formulates a testable explanation. This approach to explaining the 
production of visual art, originally suggested by Vygotsky (1971:24), is not 
Preface 
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satisfied with enquiring about the aesthetic emotions and motives of either the 
artist or the audience. Instead, it sees the art researcher rather like a judge in a 
criminal court, who must follow the material evidence and compare the various 
statements against the data to come up with a coherent explanation of the 
available facts. Along these lines, my argument is that if we are to achieve a 
relatively reliable account of the evolution of visual art, research should focus 
not only on the content and interpretation of Pleistocene artworks, but also on 
the forms and media that make them up and how these changed and diversified 
over time. 
This book consists of six chapters, the first of which offers a general 
overview of the research history and main issues and challenges of studying the 
origins of visual art. It explores the differences between the terms and 
definitions of prehistoric art and Pleistocene art, which will be preferred here. It 
also describes different perspectives to the origins of visual art, with a special 
emphasis on archaeological and evolutionary views. It also gives a synopsis of 
the way the evolution of human cognition and behaviour are perceived in this 
research. 
Chapter 2 presents a survey of the earliest traces of visual art forms in the 
Pleistocene, while it also deals with the problems of defining and identifying 
visual art, particularly from the remote past. It zooms in on two 
particular periods where novel forms of visual art seem to have developed: 
the mid-African Middle Stone Age and the European Early Upper 
Palaeolithic. The aim is to identify certain emerging patterns in the 
archaeological record of early visual art. 
In chapters 3, 4 and 5, respectively, one particular origins of art model is 
discussed in depth. These proposals, correspondingly by Geoffrey Miller, Ellen 
Dissanayake and Steven Mithen, are representative of three ways of conceiving 
of visual art in an evolutionary perspective. These approaches have been most 
influential over the past two decades but have not yet been reassessed in view 
of recent archaeological finds that have significantly pushed back the dates of 
visual art’s beginnings. In each case I present the model’s key concepts, carry out 
a critical review in light of our present knowledge of human biocultural 
evolution, and check for consistency with the current archaeological evidence. I 
find that even though these three proposals make an accurate description of 
certain effects and developments of early visual art forms, overall there is a 
mismatch between the hypotheses and archaeological data.  
Subsequently, in chapter 6 I sketch an alternative scenario based on the 
premise that visual art is a social communication strategy that uses material 
culture as a medium to signal identity to coordinate action between individuals 
and groups. This perspective, I suggest, is more compatible with current 
archaeological information about the development of visual art in the 
Pleistocene, and is also capable of integrating several aspects of the previous 
three models, in particular regarding the proposed social functions of visual art. 
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Ultimately, the aim of this book is to restate a link between the formulation 
of hypotheses on the origins of visual art and the evidence from the 
archaeological record, which is often taken too lightly even though it is our most 
reliable source for inferring the evolution of human behaviour. To be sure, the 
debate around the evolution of visual art would benefit greatly from 
the production of testable scenarios that could be potentially falsified and 
corrected as new data comes to light. In this sense, my purpose is not to do 
away with existing origins-of-art models, but to identify which of their 
aspects do in fact describe and explain what we see as the development of 
visual art in the early history of our species. Moreover, I suggest that these 
models may become complementary when seen in the greater scope of 
human communication. Therefore, a communication framework offers, on 
the one hand, a way to generate alternative models, and to rethink and 
synthesize existing proposals in a new light, on the other. 
This research, in sum, is a contribution to the on-going interdisciplinary 
debate about the origins of visual art. But more than that, it also is an invitation 
to reflect on the ways in which current scholarship perceives and explains 
the evolution of human cognition and behaviour, and to reconcile these 
with the material record of fossils and artefacts that constitute the pages of 
our species’ early history. 

5 
1. ART UNFOLDING: STUDYING THE ORIGINS OF VISUAL ART
All art is then utilitarian: the sceptre, symbol of royal power, the bishop’s crook, the love 
song, the patriotic anthem, the statue in which the power of the gods is cast in material 
form, the fresco that reminds churchgoers of the horrors of Hell, all undeniably meet a 
practical necessity. The gratuitousness of art does not lie in its motivation but in the 
flowering of the language of forms. 
ANDRÉ LEROI-GOURHAN, 1964 
Ever since the earliest discoveries of artworks from a remote Ice Age came to 
light in Europe in the late 1800s, the corpus of early ‘prehistoric art’ has grown 
remarkably. Specially, over the past couple of decades finds have become more 
frequent, more remarkable, and more ancient. For example, in 1994 the 
discovery of Chauvet Cave, in France, containing the most impressive and oldest 
of figurative paintings (c. 32,000 years old) completely shook our previous ideas 
of the recent age and gradual development of art in the Upper Palaeolithic. 
Similarly, in Germany, examples of ivory figurines depicting animals and humans 
now go back some 40,000 years. By the beginning of this century, finds from the 
South African site of Blombos Cave yielded the “oldest dated art” (Lewis-
Williams 2002:98), constituted by geometric engravings on a piece of red ochre, 
making us reconsider not only the time depth of visual art, but also the location 
of its earliest emergence. Since then, the finds of personal ornaments as old as 
100,000 years in the north and south of Africa, and in the Middle East, have 
again made us rethink the kinds of artefacts that should be included in the 
ca tegory of visua l a rt, a s I review in cha pter 2. In contra st to these ra pid a nd 
somewhat unexpected breakthroughs in the archaeological record, the models 
that explain the origins of art have remained fundamentally the same since the 
first part of the 20th century.1 The emphasis is still being put on the content of 
the artworks (e.g. symbolism, information, ritual, etc.), while pleasure, emotion, 
expression, and religion are still being invoked as the primeval causes for visual 
a rt-ma king, just a s they were over a  century a go (see: Hirn 1900). As a result, 
there is now a certain discrepancy between the dynamism of the record of early 
visual art and the static character of the models that explain it. The time is right 
for revisiting these different views in light of the recent evidence from the 
record, and for exploring novel perspectives that can take research on the 
origins of visual art forward.  
1 Throughout this volume, ‘model’ is understood as the specific – real or assumed – testable 
application of a theory or hypothesis (Read et al. 1978:310). 
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This introductory chapter gives an overview of the situation sketched above 
and suggests a research approach that may make it easier for the models to 
cope with the rapid changes in the material record. The first section briefly 
outlines what the term Pleistocene art entails, and explains why this will be 
preferred over ‘prehistoric art’ throughout this book. The following section gives 
an impression of the diversity of study perspectives to the origins of visual art, 
with a focus on currently influential archaeological and evolutionary models. 
These two sorts of models (archaeological and evolutionary) have been chosen 
over the array of approaches to visual art origins (e.g. art historical, 
psychological, philosophical) because both can more readily make use of and be 
tested against the empirical data provided by the archaeological record. I also 
suggest a possible synthesizing approach based on understanding visual art in 
the broader framework of human communication. In the final section, I explore 
topical research views on the evolution human behaviour which talk about a 
‘human niche’ built upon the coevolution of cognition, communication, 
cooperation and culture with human social interactions. I suggest that this ‘new 
thinking’, 2 which emphasizes feedback processes between these ‘4 Cs’ and the 
biosocial environment of humans throughout evolution, should also be 
incorporated into an explanatory model of the origins of visual art.  
1.1 Pleistocene visual art: An outline of definitions 
Scholars interested in the study of visual manifestations from the distant human 
past have often questioned whether these should indeed be classified as art. 
Many researchers are, perhaps rightfully, suspicious of the term art – 
particularly with a capital A – because it is loaded with connotations of non-
functionality and self-purpose that cannot automatically be assumed for 
prehistory (Berghaus 2004:5; Davidson 2012; Dissanayake 1992:41; Nowell 
2006:244; Soffer & Conkey 1997). Over the past decades, some specialists have 
suggested that, when referring to prehistoric artistic manifestations, one should 
talk of ‘art’ – in quotation marks (Conkey 1987), or even replace the term 
altogether for supposedly less problematic ones, such as ‘systems of 
representation’ (Davis 1984), ‘graphic manifestations’ (Arratia 1987),  ‘visual 
cultures’ (Soffer & Conkey 1997), ‘material forms of representation’ (White 
2 A recent special issue of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B  (2012, vol.367, no. 
1599) has called attention to the ‘new thinking’ in research on the evolution of human cognition and 
behaviour. A field that over the past 25 years has been dominated by evolutionary psychology, with 
its concept of an innate and relatively fixed human mind compartmentalized in modules shaped to 
solve Stone Age problems. This ‘new thinking’, in contrast, “(i) takes a longer historical perspective, 
and therefore a more comparative approach, (ii) highlights the importance of co-evolution and 
cultural evolution in generating gradual, incremental change and (iii) suggests that humans are 
endowed with uniquely powerful, domain-general cognitive-developmental mechanisms, rather 
than with cognitive modules” (Heyes 2012:2095). 
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1992, 1997), ‘depictions’ (Ingold 2000), or ‘markings’ (Davidson 2012). These 
alternative terms, however, have not managed to replace ‘art’ in the literature 
rather, they have become its synonyms. Instead of getting rid of the word art, 
most anthropologists, archaeologists, art historians and other scholars 
concerned with ancient and contemporary ‘traditional’ arts have recently 
insisted on adopting a broad art concept that allow for the inclusion of all visual 
art practices across time and space (Morphy 1999:443; van Damme 2008:27). In 
this perspective, art “may then be deployed as an umbrella term to refer to the 
human tendency to create, use, and respond to arresting visual images” (van 
Damme & Zijlmans 2012:218). This inclusive designation becomes stronger when 
we recognize, as the celebrated art historian Ernst Gombrich did at the very 
beginning of his Story of Art, that art is a man-made construct (1995[1950]:15):  
There really is no such thing as Art. There are only artists. Once these 
were men who took coloured earth and roughed out the forms of a 
bison on the wall of a cave; today some buy their paints, and design 
posters for hoardings: they did and do many other things. There is no 
harm in calling all these activities art as long as we keep in mind that 
such a word may mean very different things in different times and 
places, and as long as we realize that Art with a capital A has no 
existence.  
Certainly, art is a socially constituted and socially defined practice (Wartofsky 
1980:239). Consequently, ‘being art’ is not an intrinsic property of objects or 
actions, but a cultural categorization (Levinson 2002:377), and the art concept is 
historically determined and dynamic. So, for now, we will continue to use the 
term art, partly because it is familiar, and partly because, in the words of 
archaeologist David Lewis-Williams, “art is a handy monosyllable” and provided 
we are aware of its problems and limitations, “we can use it with caution” 
(2002:41).  
In either a narrow or a broad sense, the term ‘art’ is frequently meant to 
refer to a number of manifestations included in the so-called plastic or visual 
arts (e.g. painting, sculpture, ornamentation, architecture), and the performing 
arts (e.g. dance, music, theatre, storytelling, poetry). In this work, however, I 
focus exclusively on the earliest evidence for the production of visual art, for 
which I offer two reasons. The first is preservation. Whereas, for instance, the 
performing arts leave only indirect traces in the archaeological record, the 
production of visual artworks more frequently endures the passing of time, 
rendering them accessible for direct research. The second and more important 
reason is that, as I discuss with more detail in Chapter 4.3, recent evidence 
indicates that the various ‘arts’ did not evolve in unison, and might be 
phylogenetically and cognitively distinct. The variety of behaviours we usually 
identify as ‘the arts’ seem to each have followed a unique development, with 
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visual art flourishing only over the past 130,000 years (see: Chapter 2).3 The 
clearest example of the heterogeneity of the arts is provided by evidence that 
the processes involved in music-making and visual art production make use of 
quite different neurological mechanisms and brain structures (Brown et al. 2006; 
Fitch 2005b; Zaidel 2010; Zeki 1999). This strongly suggests that the various 
‘arts’ truly are dissimilar faculties and so, for the purposes of clarifying their 
particular evolutionary history and functions, they should be studied separately 
(Lewis-Williams 2002:67). 
The visual artworks treated in this book are colloquially referred to as 
‘prehistoric art’. But the term ‘prehistoric’ can be problematic. Strictly speaking, 
prehistory refers to a time before written accounts (history), which varies in 
different regions (e.g. 5,000 BC in the Middle East, 200 BC for Central Europe). 
Moreover, the term is applied in diverse contexts to denote different ideas. 
Particularly in parts of the world where writing arrived late or was never used at 
all, ‘prehistory’ may allude to very different time periods or circumstances 
(White 2003:9). In the Americas for instance it is commonly used to refer to the 
archaeological phases before the systematic practice of agriculture around 2,500 
BC (Cassiano 1992:105), while in Australia, prehistory in the strict traditional 
sense continued up to the arrival of European settlers only some 300 hundred 
years ago (Layton 1992:257). Thus ‘prehistoric art’ can hardly be defined 
explicitly and may easily lend itself to confusion. Locally, archaeologists prefer 
specific terminologies such as Palaeolithic (Eurasia), Stone Age (Africa), 
Paleoindian (North America), etc. to indicate particular time periods in regional 
prehistory. These local terms, however, are not suitable to talk about the 
earliest art at a panhuman scale.  
In contrast to the term ‘prehistoric art’,  ‘Pleistocene art’ has global 
applicability (Nowell 2006). Pleistocene is the name given to the previous 
geological era, which started some 2.5 million years ago and concluded 12,000 
years ago with the end of the last Ice Age, which marks the beginning of our 
current geological epoch, the Holocene. And it is to the Pleistocene period that 
the earliest evidence for the emergence of visual art  belongs. Pleistocene visual 
art is used in this book to refer to all of the evidence of artistic activities present 
globally in the archaeological record up to 10,000 years before our current era. 
As explained by April Nowell, this category typically contains (2006:239): 
A large and varied corpus of paintings and engravings on the walls, 
ceilings and floors of caves and rock shelters throughout the regions of 
Australasia, Africa and Europe that predate the Holocene. It also 
includes items of personal adornment such as beads, pendants, 
bracelets and rings as well as engraved and incised bone, antler and 
3 In this book, I understand behaviour as a recurrent action pattern within a cohesive population 




stone. Ivory and, more rarely, clay sculptures of animals and human 
figures form part of this corpus as well.  
The earliest occurrences of each of these forms and their implications for 
reconstructing the development of visual art will be examined in the following 
chapter.  
1.2 Research approaches to the origins of art 
The study of Pleistocene visual art and the related issue of its origins came of 
age during the 20th century. The history of the discovery, recognition, and 
scholarly reception of Pleistocene art has been traced in detail by various 
authors, and therefore will not be recounted in this review. The narratives of 
this history usually take us from the early finds of Palaeolithic ‘portable’ art 
pieces, to the discovery of the painted cave of Altamira in Spain and its initial 
dismissal by the academic community, up to its final recognition in 1902 as a 
true ‘masterwork’ of prehistory, leading to a re-evaluation of the cave paintings 
as humankind’s ‘first art’ (Bahn & Vertut 1997; Cartailhac & Breuil 1903; Conkey 
1987; Grand 1967; Lewis-Williams 2002; Pfeiffer 1982).  
What will be reviewed in this section is the context and contents of the 
hypotheses that have attempted to answer the question of why humans began 
and kept on producing artworks, i.e. the origins of (visual) art. As mentioned in 
the introduction to this chapter, I will focus particularly in archaeological and 
evolutionary models because they make themselves available for testing against 
the material archaeological and palaeoanthropological records. The guiding 
questions of this research, then, can be formulated in the following manner: 
• What are the models and hypotheses that have been used to explain
the origins of art (from an archaeological/ evolutionary perspective)?
• Are these models consistent with the evidence from archaeology and
evolutionary science?
In order to answer these questions, I first do a selection of representative 
models on the basis of their relevance and impact in the field, and then I set out 
to test the pronouncements made by these models against available empirical 
data from archaeology and various evolutionary disciplines. 
In brief, the research problem can be summarized as follows: A) There are 
various models that aim at explaining the emergence of visual art in the 
Pleistocene (i.e. ‘the origins of visual art’); B) There is a growing corpus of 
archaeological evidence for Pleistocene visual art; C) There are various 
hypotheses about human evolution that account for the development of 
patterns of modern human behaviour in phylogeny and ontogeny. The aim of 
this investigation is to assess whether A is consistent with the information 
provided by B and C. 
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Perspectives from archaeology 
In the pioneering period of the early decades of the 1900s, scholars started to 
systematically record and describe hundreds of examples of ‘portable’ and cave 
art found all over Europe, known to have originated in a remote Ice Age. In the 
first instance, these artworks were thought to have been produced ‘for their 
own sake’.  Most writers assumed that the prehistoric artists were driven by an 
‘artistic impulse’ to embellish their environment and to depict elements from 
their surroundings that were important to them; hence the recurrence of 
‘primeval’ naturalistic themes (Breuil & Windels 1952). Inspired by a growing 
ethnographic record, however, some scholars related prehistoric art to 
‘primitive’ ceremonies, rituals and religious practices like ‘picture magic’, which 
referred to the use of representation to gain power over the depicted things and 
beings (Bégouen 1929). Hunting and fertility magic then became the ‘standard’ 
explanation for the beginning and continuation of visual art in prehistory, and 
remained popular well into the second half of the century (Grand 1967:22).  
By the 1950s, a large corpus of Palaeolithic portable art and cave paintings 
had accumulated, and archaeology had adopted an array of interpretive 
perspectives that encouraged scholars to start offering explanations in terms of 
the ‘meaning’ of prehistoric artefacts. One of these perspectives became known 
as the ‘structuralist’ approach. Highly influenced by the linguistic theories of 
Ferdinand de Saussure and the work of French anthropologist Claude Lévi-
Strauss, the structuralist school proposed that most human institutions (e.g. 
kinship, religion, exchange, art) may be conceived of, described, and analysed as 
if they were ‘languages’ in order to uncover the hidden universal rules that 
structure them. This approach also highlighted the role of beliefs and symbols as 
fundamental aspects of human mental and social organisation (Renfrew & Bahn 
1996:426). The mid-century interpretive turn that approaches such as 
structuralism triggered in anthropology and art studies was captured by 
anthropologist Morton Levine (1957:143):  
Students of primitive art have come to believe that this realm of 
expressive behavior provides another avenue to the values of the 
culture or the cultural ways of apprehending reality. This relatively new 
emphasis in the anthropological study of art has opened our eyes to 
yet another fascinating possibility, namely, the use of prehistoric art as 
documents from which we may someday be able to derive a plausible 
idea of the ideological culture of peoples dead and gone.  
Seen in this light, scholars began to perceive Palaeolithic visual art as a coded 
system whose interpretation could give us a glimpse into the social life and 
ideology of prehistoric peoples. In addition, it was in the realms of social and 
belief systems that they searched for an explanation of the origins of artistic 
practices. French prehistorian André Leroi-Gourhan is best known among rock 
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art researchers for his structuralist analysis and interpretation of Palaeolithic 
motifs in terms of ‘mythograms’ and allusions to the male/female duality of 
nature and society (Bahn & Vertut 1997:191; Lewis-Williams 2002:63).4 However 
he also outlined an important hypothesis regarding the origins of visual 
representation, namely that visual art evolved as a human medium of 
expression. He argued that visual art, like writing, involved “the capacity to 
express thought in material symbols” ([1964]1993:187). Thus, Leroi-Gourhan 
called Palaeolithic art a ‘language of forms’, that is, an early type of graphism not 
very different from script: “in its origins figurative art was directly linked with 
language and was much closer to writing (in the broadest sense) than to what 
we understand by a work of art. It was symbolic transposition, not copying of 
reality” ([1964]1993:190). An important implication of his reasoning was that 
visual art could be seen as evidence for language, which in turn could be 
interpreted as evidence for the mental abilities to abstract and symbolize 
([1964]1993:365). The link that Leroi-Gourhan established between speech, 
visual art and symbolism is still one of the guiding principles in Pleistocene art 
research to date (Nowell 2010:441).  
From this point onward, scholars explicitly or implicitly acknowledged that 
Pleistocene visual art contained information, that some of its manifestations – 
e.g. cave paintings – had sense and structure, and that the motifs and 
compositions most likely expressed specific ‘messages’. As a result, an array of 
research approaches developed in the archaeology of art. Several focused on 
trying to ‘decode’ the depicted symbols and figure out what they might have 
stood for (e.g. totems, maps, constellations, time-keeping notations, hunting 
tallies, shamanic visions, etc.).5 Some attempted to ‘measure’ the complexity 
and flow of the information contained in the art in order to outline potential 
clusters or networks of communication according to the frequency and location 
of certain motifs (e.g. information theory; landscape archaeology).6 Finally, 
others looked into inferring possible social contexts rather than the contents of 
the images. Often drawing on the ethnographical record, researchers working in 
4 “Statistical analysis of several thousands of cave paintings or art objects reveals the existence of a 
central theme: man/woman and (or) horse/bison, expressed in a manner that met the prescribed 
conditions for rendering what was probably the content of a myth” (Leroi-Gourhan [1964]1993:371). 
5 For example, Alexander Marschack has interpreted geometric marks in Palaeolithic art as a system 
of notation to keep track of a lunar calendar (1991), whereas David Lewis-Williams has interpreted 
them in terms of ‘entopic’ signs, or visual hallucinations that a person may experiment during 
altered states of consciousness (2002:126). 
6 This became a strong framework, for example, in rock art studies (e.g. Schaafsma 1980), where 
quantifying the information contained in art motifs became a research aim: “information in its 
fundamental sense, is what people seek and exchange to reduce uncertainty about physical and 
social reality. Meaning is the interpretation of the information a message contains. A message is 
simply the means by which information is obtained. With these definitions in mind we envisage 
information, and developed by communication theorists, to be the aspect of messages that 
increases or reduces uncertainty. Information is measurable, and rock-art – apart from whatever 
meaning it was assigned in prehistoric socio-cultural systems  – is subject to this measure” (Hartley 
& Vawser 1998:195). 
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this last framework suggested potential settings in which art could have been 
produced and used (e.g. ritual, pedagogical, narrative), and noted that visual art 
generally mediates social interactions and can be used to transmit and reinforce 
norms, bonds, and identities.7 But whereas these diverse approaches have 
contributed much towards the potential interpretation and understanding of the 
social roles of Pleistocene art, few have examined the problem of why and how 
visual art-making should have developed as a standard human practice in the 
first place (Conkey 1987:422; Soffer & Conkey 1997).  
In fact, after having been a ‘hot’ topic during the first half of the 20th 
century, archaeologists almost gave up on the matter of the origins of art during 
the second half. It is only recently that the issue of the emergence of visual art 
has become topical again, however not in its own right but to the extent that, as 
‘evidence of symbolic capacities’, it can be used to submit and test ideas about 
human cognitive and behavioural evolution. Over the past two decades, for 
instance, there have been relevant archaeological works dealing with the origins 
of image-making (i.e. figurative art) in the European Palaeolithic (e.g. Guthrie 
2005; Lewis-Williams 2002:99), and the origins of ‘symbolism’ as a cognitive 
capacity, which is supposed to be the source of visual art (e.g. D’Errico et al. 
2003; Mithen 1996b; Power 1999; Zilhão 2007, 2011). However, some of the 
currently most influential models for the origins of art, as such, have been 
developed outside archaeology, by evolutionary scholars (e.g. Miller 2000a; 
Dissanayake 1992). 
As mentioned, the conception of visual art as an indicator of the ability to 
use symbols can be traced back to the work of Leroi-Gourhan, for whom even 
the simplest art “implies a conventionality inconceivable without concepts 
already highly organized by language” ([1964]1993:191). Therefore, scholars 
interested in the evolution of human cognition have turned their attention to 
Pleistocene visual artworks “as products of the human capacity for symboling 
and in their possible relation to the origins of language” (Marschack 1976:278). 
Because of this association, it is frequently assumed that the presence of visual 
art in the archaeological record “demonstrates the use of modern language” 
(D’Errico et al. 2003:31) and that, in turn, modern language testifies to 
‘behavioural modernity’, i.e. a set of common behaviours that generally 
characterize humans today. 
Although researchers disagree as to which faculties and activities should be 
considered exclusive to modern humans, most agree that modern behaviour 
“has symboling at its core” (Nowell 2010:447), and often this is implicitly meant 
as the ability to communicate through vocal or visual conventional signs. 
7 For example, the explosion of art in the European Palaeolithic has been explained from this 
perspective not as a consequence of the emergence of modern cognition but as a social mechanism 
to cope with changes in the environment (Jochim 1983), establish alliance networks (Gilman 1984), 




Explicitly, symbolic behaviour is generally understood in archaeology as “the 
ability to represent objects, people, and abstract concepts with arbitrary 
symbols, vocal or visual, and to reify such symbols in cultural practice” 
(McBrearty & Brooks 2000:492).8 The main current questions about the origins 
of ‘modern’ cognition have changed as a result of the recent decoupling of 
human anatomical and behavioural ‘modernity’, as April Nowell explains 
(2010:438):  
Two decades ago it was widely accepted that ‘modern’ behavior and 
modern anatomy evolved in tandem in Europe approximately 40,000 
years ago at the start of the Upper Paleolithic. It was argued that the 
emergence of [anatomically modern humans] (Homo sapiens sapiens) 
coincided with an explosion of modern behaviors (e.g., language, cave 
art, specialized tools, complex social organization, extensive trade 
networks, etc.). However, the intensification of paleoanthropological 
research outside of Europe began to paint a different picture of our 
origins. As mounting evidence (an important point of contact between 
genetics and fossils) pointed to an African origin for modern humans at 
130,000 years before present (BP) there appeared to be a ‘lag’ 
between the emergence of modern anatomy and the emergence of 
modern behavior. Recent studies suggest modern anatomy evolved 
even earlier by at least 160,000–195,000 BP. 
So, the backdrop for the discussion on the development of human biological and 
cognitive changes and their implications has deepened in time and moved from 
Europe to Africa, and other important questions have arisen, particularly, 
whether the appearance of modern behaviour “is sudden (revolutionary and 
continuously built upon) or gradual (appearing and disappearing at different 
times and places – more mosaic in character and only gradually becoming more 
generalized”; and the extent to which it is “the result of new cognitive abilities 
or cultural, historical, social, and demographic factors”. (Nowell 2010:438-9). 
Another point of contention among scholars has been “whether particular 
8 Whether the objects discussed in this book should be considered symbolic or not is an on-going 
debate in archaeology, palaeoanthropology and related disciplines. Although the commonly used 
concept of the symbol –as a sign that arbitrarily stands for something else– is namely rooted in 
linguistics and semiotics, archaeologists (and often anthropologists) typically understand symbols 
differently, as meaningful artefacts that evoke ideas and command interpretation (Gärdenfors 
2011:383). This has generated a great amount of confusion in discussions within and across fields 
(Corbey & Roebroeks 2007). To be clear, in this research, I do not adhere to the classic Peircean 
semiotic model of ‘icon, index and symbol’. Instead, I take on Vygotsky’s view –closer to the 
Saussurian model (Daniels 2012:68)– where it is understood that all human-made (artificial) signs 
involve assigning meaning to an object or behaviour (Holland & Valsiner 1988:249) and are in 
principle conventional, thus symbolic. These include, for example, language, counting systems, 
writing, algebra, and visual art. More specifically, I adopt Mario Bunge’s definition of symbol: “An 
artificial sign, or symbol, may be characterized as a sign produced or used to either designate a 
concept, such as that of language, or denote an extraconceptual item, such as an individual material 
thing or another sign”. Symbols “can be read only with the help of (explicit or tacit) semiotic 
conventions”. In other words, “symbols are material artefacts together with (explicit or tacit) 
designation rules” (2003:58-59).  
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aspects of cognition are uniquely derived for H. sapiens, or shared derived traits 
present in other, extinct hominins as well” (Langbroek 2012:7).9 Visual art 
remains at the centre of these debates, as a tell-tale sign of modern human 
activity. 
It is true that although cognitive abilities do not fossilize, by analysing the 
archaeological signature of some behaviours archaeologists are able to infer the 
kinds of mental and technical abilities involved in them (Davidson 2010:215). 
Take for example the implications of the colonization of the Australian 
continent. The evidence now indicates that by 50,000 years ago, modern 
humans had settled in Australia and New Guinea. It is also known that even 
during glacial periods when sea levels were lower than today, these territories 
were separated from mainland Asia by ocean stretches of at least 80 km. Thus, 
we may conclude that the early colonisers arrived to these territories by boat 
(Erlandson 2010:199). And from this conclusion, we can infer that they 
possessed all the necessary abilities (cognitive and technological) for maritime 
navigation, like planning, ‘reading’ environmental signs, teamwork, 
woodworking, etc. (Davidson & Noble 1992). However, these inferences can only 
be made after the fact. So, we cannot reverse the argument and assume that 
people lacked those abilities before the colonisation of Australia, or that they 
sailed to Australia because they acquired such abilities.10 A similar confusion of 
correlation and causation occurs in some cognitive hypotheses for the origins of 
art, when it is assumed for example that before the earliest evidence of 
figurative art, people lacked the capacity for ‘image-making’ (e.g. Mithen 
1996b). To avoid such mistaken conclusions, Olga Soffer and Margaret Conkey 
have pointed out that we must take into account the fundamental difference 
between the ‘capacity for’ and the actual ‘performance of’ a behaviour (1997:6). 
This means that even when some behaviour is potentially accessible, it only 
becomes manifest in a relevant context (i.e. when it is needed or relevant), and 
it is only by working out those contexts that we will understand why and how 
9 Since the year 2000, a new taxonomic classification for humans has been in use. Accordingly, the 
term ‘hominid’ that had been employed up to that point is no longer applicable. This means that the 
human line “can no longer be described as containing ‘hominids’, for the family Hominidae has 
become more inclusive, and now refers to the common ancestor of the living African apes (i.e. 
Homo, Pan, and Gorilla) and all of its descendants. The appropriate vernacular term for a member of 
the human clade is now ‘hominin’, for this is the way to refer to members of the tribe Hominini, and 
its 2 component subtribes, the Australopithecina and the Hominina. Thus, ‘hominid evolution’ 
becomes ‘hominin evolution’” (Wood & Richmond 2000:20).  
10 Richard Klein has challenged the early dates of the colonization of Australia arguing precisely 
that it could not have taken place before 50,000 years ago (Klein and Edgar 2002:247) because prior 
to that date, “people possessed limited ability to innovate” (Klein & Edgar 2002:269). Only 
afterwards, when some neural change had taken place, did people become behaviourally modern 
and this allowed them to spread out of Africa (Klein & Edgar 2002:273). For their part, Frederick 
Coolidge and Thomas Wynn, who place ‘mental modernity’ even later at 32,000 BP, maintain that 
the colonization of Australia is not evidence of advanced cognition, since it could have been 
unplanned or just happened by accident! (2009:230). 
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the behaviour becomes patent.11 Furthermore, some of the cognitive models 
might rightly point to a correlation between art-making and some mental 
capacity, but this does not answer any evolutionary questions about either one 
of them. As stated by Antonio Gilman (1984:119):  
Even if, for the sake of argument, one were to allow that Homo sapiens 
sapiens was biologically more capable of cognitive representations 
such as language than his immediate predecessors, however, one 
would still not be able to use his increased abilities as a sufficient 
explanation for the new elements in his cultural repertoire. To say, for 
example, that Cro-Magnons were capable of painting caves (and that 
Neanderthals were not) does not explain why they painted them. 
Conversely, if painting caves is part of a more effective adaptive 
system, the one need not appeal to the capability of painting them in 
order to explain why the painting took place.  
It is therefore reasonable to argue that the evolution of human cognition and 
the origins of visual art should be treated as two separate archaeological 
problems, clearly “we do not need to invoke new capacities or creativities to 
explain [art], and conversely, in itself it cannot be used as evidence for the 
emergence of new capacities or creativities” (Davis 1986:201). Thus, it would be 
better to seek alternative explanations for the emergence of art-making beyond 
cognition. In any case, it is evident that we need to look for a framework able to 
explain changes “with reference to social, cultural, historical, and demographic 
factors instead of (or in addition to) cognitive ones arguing this is most 
parsimonious with archaeological, paleoneurological, and life history data” 
(Nowell 2010:445). So even though scholars do not yet agree on exactly where 
we should be searching, many now realize that looking into the evolution of 
social organisation might move research in the right direction. 
Perspectives from evolutionary disciplines 
The study of visual art from an evolutionary point of view has a rather long 
tradition going back to Darwin’s The Descent of Man, where he discussed the 
evolution of the ‘mental powers’ and the aesthetic preferences of humans, in 
general and in regards to art ([1879]2004:114). Since then, several scholars have 
attempted to account for the place of art in human biology, and vice versa, (Hirn 
1900) and to explain art-making “as a biological, or behavioural, phenomenon” 
(Morris 1962:141). 
Anthropological data from across the globe show that some sort of visual 
art is present in every known human culture (Anderson 1992). Its wide-ranging 
presence led scholars to classify visual art as a ‘universal’ human behaviour that 
involves a propensity to make and/or mark objects with certain visual patterns 
11 For example, despite understanding the technologies and potential ‘advantages’ of food storage, 
Australian hunter-gatherers rarely engaged in this practice, since their economic system of 
generalized food-sharing made it redundant (Testart 1982:524). 
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(Davidson 2012; Dissanayake 2010).  Two main lines of thinking have prevailed 
within this view: the first suggests that visual art may indeed have been 
selected, although not because it had a value in itself, but by being coupled to 
other actually adaptive traits, or ‘piggybacking’, for instance on general 
intelligence, or as a side-effect of visual and perceptual biases (De Smedt & De 
Cruz 2010; Verpooten & Nelissen 2010), and was retained only because it was 
pleasurable, in Steven Pinker infamous words, as “cheesecake for the mind” 
(1997:524). The second view maintains that art most likely has had a genuine 
‘adaptive value’ throughout human evolution, meaning that it was shaped by 
natural selection because it contributed towards the survival and reproduction 
(i.e. fitness) of the individuals that displayed it, so that it may be thought of, and 
studied, as a veritable human adaptation (Dissanayake 1982:146).12  
I will focus primarily on this second line of research, since it is the one that 
has generated more narratives about the origins of art. To explore the issue of 
art as an adaptive trait, scholars have often followed the methods of ethology 
(the biological study of behaviour), which analyses action patterns, or 
behaviours, as if they were ‘organs’ – “as attributes with special functions to 
which they were intricately adapted” (Tinbergen 1963:413) and, like physiology, 
aims to infer adaptive value by examining the trait’s function (Lorenz 1981). 
Along these lines, the guiding research question in the evolutionary study of art 
has often been: what did art evolve for? The answers have been varied,13 but 
three themes seem to be recurrent: 1) Sexual selection; this relates to the idea 
that art, “like the peacock’s tail” can indicate the genetic quality of the individual 
that displays it (Dutton 2009; Miller 2000a; Thornhill 2003; Zahavi & Zahavi 
1997). 2) Social cohesion; where art is thought to bring individuals together by 
reinforcing in-group norms, badges, and bonds (Boyd 2005; Coe 2003; Cooke 
1999; Dissanayake 1992). 3) The enhancement of cognitive abilities; implying 
that through art, people can express, discuss, exchange and expand concepts 
and ideas, and ‘tune in’ their perceptual senses (Ludmany 1999; Mithen 1996a; 
Smith 2005; Tooby & Cosmides 2001; Zeki 1999). These three themes will be 
explored thoroughly in separate chapters through the work of their most 
representative authors (see Fig. 1). In this manner, chapter 3 will consider 
Geoffrey Miller’s argument that art is fundamentally a sexually selected trait. 
Chapter 4 will discuss Ellen Dissanayake’s view of art as an adaptive behaviour 
12 In biology, “a trait that exists because natural selection has favored it is called an adaptation … 
Each adaptation was selected for some effect or effects that influenced the fitness of its bearer” 
(Sterelny & Griffths 1999:217). 
13 In a recent review, Ellen Dissanayake identified at least nine of these proposals (2007), each 
suggesting that art evolved for some specific purpose: pattern recognition (Zeki 1999); mental 
problem-solving (Ramachandran & Hirstein 1999); adaptive decision-making (Thornhill 1998);  
increasing mating opportunities (Miller 2000a); supporting religious behaviour (Irons 2001); 
providing fictional scenarios for action-planning (Tooby & Cosmides 2001); social manipulation 




selected to reinforce social cohesion in ritual ceremony. Then, chapter 5 will 
examine the work of Steven Mithen and his view of art as a medium for 
exchanging ideas and its origin in ‘cognitive fluidity’. Each of these prolific 
scholars are regularly cited in the literature on art’s origins, and their work 
continues to be a starting point for studies on the emergence of art, including 
the present one. 
Figure 1. Theoretical structure of the origins-of-art models examined in chapters 3, 4 & 
5, respectively. 
The origins-of art-models by Miller, Dissanayake and Mithen will be the subject 
of a theoretical analysis that includes, in each case, an exploration of the 
model’s background, an examination of its main arguments, a critical review, 
and the formulation of some predictions (derived from the model) to be tested 
against the data from the archaeological record of visual art, presented in 
chapter 2. This analysis will, evidently, be carried out from my own personal 
reading of the models and the assessment will be done according to my own 
position which, regarding issues of ontology and epistemology, is compatible 
with scientific realism, as outlined by philosopher of science Mario Bunge (2003, 
2010; Cordero 2012; Mahner & Bunge 1997), whose definitions and terminology 
will be used and often cited throughout this study. The guideline of this position 
is that “science provides the best possible factual knowledge”, and therefore “it 
requires every proposition, be it hypothesis or datum, to be ultimately justifiable 
either theoretically or empirically” (Mahner & Bunge 1997:134-5). That is, it 
requires that our (scientific) pronouncements (i.e. hypotheses) about how the 
world works be formulated in terms of (real) material entities or processes in 
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those entities, and be testable, which means that ideally they “can be checked 
for truth by contrasting [them] with data or with the bulk of accepted 
knowledge” (Mahner & Bunge 1997:78). These are the principles that will guide 
my theoretical analysis of the evolution-based models that I will review in 
chapters 3, 4, and 5. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the model 
assessment implies checking for consistency between some predictions derived 
from the models and data from archaeological and evolutionary sources.  
Finally, this approach advises that the researcher “should not just criticize 
the prevailing view, but try to propose alternatives.” (Mahner & Bunge 1997:v). 
In line with this, after identifying some potential problems of those models, I will 
suggest that an alternative scenario based on the role of visual art as a 
communication signal expressed in material culture, in the manner suggested by 
anthropologists Martin Wobst (1977) and Polly Wiesner (1983, 1984). In chapter 
6, I sketch a tentative model that accounts for the emergence of visual art in 
these terms, and indicate that this is coherent with both the archaeological 
record and current ideas on the evolution of human behaviour. 
A multidisciplinary perspective from communication 
Archaeological and evolutionary explanations of the origins of visual art cannot 
be completely independent of each other. On the contrary, they should be 
complementary, although they rarely are. Evolutionary scholars often reproach 
archaeologists for relying too much on a record that is fragmentary and limited 
(Miller 2000a:22) and for lacking a theoretical framework able to situate the 
archaeological data from specific times and places in the broader scope of 
human evolution (Dissanayake 2010). Equally, archaeologists have complained 
that models of behavioural evolution grounded in other disciplines often either 
ignore archaeological information or treat it superficially (Gamble et al. 
2011:115; Ingold 2007; Roebroeks & Verpoorte 2009). Finally, both fields may at 
times make use of different definitions of art and evolution. Therefore, it would 
be fruitful to apply a framework that could bridge over multiple disciplines, 
including archaeology, palaeoanthropology, biology, and cognitive science.  
In recent decades Pleistocene visual art has increasingly drawn the attention 
of scientists as a rich material that can give access to all sorts of relevant 
information about the people that created it. Nevertheless, the importance of 
explaining the emergence and development of the art itself frequently fades to 
the background of grander schemes that attempt to account for the evolution of 
language, cognition, mate choice, ritual, etc. As discussed above, in current 
archaeological debates, the issue of the origins of visual art is often brought up 
only to support or test scenarios of human cognitive and behavioural evolution. 
But works on the origins of visual art as a research subject in itself have not been 
prominent in the archaeological literature of the past two decades. 
Paradoxically, it is in the last twenty years that the most significant evidence in 
this respect, since the discovery of Palaeolithic cave art, has been unearthed. As 
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I review in the following chapter, recent finds and their dates, particularly from 
Africa, have extended the corpus and antiquity of Pleistocene visual art beyond 
any previous expectations. Therefore it is now a good moment to reflect on the 
existing origins-of-art hypotheses and to explore frameworks able to incorporate 
the latest archaeological data.  
A research framework will often correspond with the definition of the 
subject and the questions that guide the research. For instance, as we have 
seen, scholars that understand visual art as a symbol system have often opted 
for a semiotic approach, whereas those that define it as an evolved behaviour, 
have followed the ethological view. So, in large part, the way visual art is defined 
will influence how it will be approached.14 As a category, visual art is constituted 
by a group of artefacts that we call visual artworks. These can be described as 
any object or pattern made, modified, or displayed to engage the attention and 
influence the behaviour of a perceiver through visual cues – like colour, shape, 
texture, brightness, etc.15 Examples of Pleistocene artworks include personal 
ornaments, engravings, paintings, and sculptures (Nowell 2006:239), but the 
diversity of media and forms surely was greater than what has been preserved 
and identified archaeologically. These artefacts and the processes involved in 
their production are then the constituents of visual art.16 Hence, without them, 
there is no visual art.17 One strategy towards defining visual art, is precisely to 
look for the ‘common denominator’ that unifies all of these objects (e.g. 
Dissanayake 1992:41). But whereas many researchers search for this common 
feature in the artworks’ contents or function, I suggest to focus first in their 
form, that is in their material aspects, and only secondarily in their content. 
It is the case that art studies in archaeology often address the meanings of 
artworks and the relations between them, but not the artwrorks as 
archaeological materials in themselves (Boivin 2009:271; Conkey 2006:357). For 
this reason, few archaeological models have accounted for the development and 
change of visual art forms, e.g. questions such as why art media seem to 
diversify over time, or why personal ornaments predominate in the earliest 
stages.  As  archaeologist  Randall  White  has  pointed  out,  material  culture is a 
14 In strict sense, a definition should say what something is, not what it looks like, or what it does 
(Mahner & Bunge 1997:100). 
15 Elaborated after van Damme (2008:30). Kathryn Coe gives a comparable description of visual art, 
as a manner to attract attention towards something. For her, it is “the modification of an object or 
body through color, line, pattern, and form that is done solely to attract attention to that object or 
body” (2003:76). 
16 Just like numbers are not ‘the product’ of numeral systems, but their components.  
17 This marks a fundamental difference with models that suggest that the emergence of visual art is 
correlated with the origin of the capacity to ‘store’ symbols in material culture (e.g. Donald 1991; 
Mithen 2000a; Renfrew & Scarre 1998). Instead, it is suggested here that the symbols manifested in 
material culture cannot exist a priori, independently of the media, which embodies them (Ingold 
1998; Malafouris 2004). Therefore, what becomes relevant is not the ability to ‘express’ symbols in 
objects, but to understand, produce and use objects as symbols. 
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theme that has frequently been missing from the literature on the origins of art. 
As a consequence, Pleistocene art studies “usually end up speculating about the 
process by which ‘art’ (almost always conceived as graphic depiction) was 
‘discovered’, rather than illuminating the broader social, technological, and 
ideational contexts and processes that made complex representational systems 
possible, desirable, and useful” (1992:538). Indeed, by focusing on form instead 
of content we may be able to discern some of those contexts and processes 
White mentions, which have made visual art viable. 
Understanding visual artworks as material culture, however, does not mean 
to reduce them to mere “objects to be analysed” nor to reduce “the visual to the 
visible” (Ingold & Lucas 2007:290-1).18 Rather, it means to take a broad view of 
material culture as including not only end-products but all the steps in the 
processes of manufacture, use and discard, as well as the social and technical 
contexts that bring material culture into being (Chilton 1999:1; Gibson 2012; 
Ingold 2000:299; Ter Keurs 2006:6). While keeping in mind that the world of 
material culture is made up of subjects, agents, materials, practices, 
relationships, interactions, objects, and functions, among other elements, it 
should be acknowledged that it is the material aspect of artefacts what is central 
to their scientific study, particularly when archaeological remains are concerned. 
So it is “the materiality of physical objects that should be used as the starting 
point” (Ter Keurs 2006:57). Along these lines, archaeologists Olga Soffer and 
Margaret Conkey have rightly proposed to study Pleistocene art “as we would 
any category of archaeological artifacts. This involves a dual look that includes a 
study of the artifacts themselves as well as the context in which they were made 
and used” (1997:7). Following their suggestion, Pleistocene visual art refers here 
both to the artefacts known as artworks as well as to the practices and activities 
involved in art-making. Finally, by conceiving of visual art as material culture we 
may further understand its role and impact in human cognition and behaviour, 
since objects actually influence and even change their makers/users and their 
environments as they are produced and used (Malafouris 2008a). 
Neuroscientific and developmental psychology studies, for instance, are 
throwing light on the ways that brain, behaviour, and artefacts interact and 
change each other, creating a continuous feedback loop throughout an 
individual’s lifetime (Clark 2004; Latour 2007; Malafouris 2008a).19 In addition to 
18 There has been a tendency in archaeology to ‘go beyond’ the material and aim at the cognitive 
and the symbolic aspects of artefacts. Consequently, the objects themselves are sometimes 
relegated to the background as merely vehicles for ideas and meanings (Ingold 2007). Nowhere is 
this tendency stronger than in prehistoric art studies, where it would seem that the materials always 
have to “mean/symbolize something” in order to be at all relevant. At the other end of the spectrum 
are approaches that focus only on the description of artworks as material, arranging them in 
archaeological categories (types, styles, phases, etc.) but do not offer anything in terms of use or 
context. In actuality, the cognitive, the symbolic, and the behavioural cannot be separated from the 
practical, the material, and the historical (Davis 1989; Ingold 2007; Ingold & Lucas 2007).  
19 For instance, our brain capacity allows us to learn new skills, even as adults, (e.g. a second 
language, a craft, a musical instrument). The learning process, in turn, changes not only our 
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conceiving of visual art as material culture, I argue that visual art is a very 
particular kind of material culture which emerged in the context of human 
communication. 
The subject of communication is anything but novel in visual art studies, ‘art 
as communication’ has been a recurrent theme in anthropology, archaeology, 
psychology and art history since the 19th century (Conkey 2006:362; Hirn 1900; 
Lewis-Williams 2002:67). There are, however, a great many research approaches 
to communication. The one that has predominated in the social disciplines is the 
‘informational’ model, where communication is seen as “a process of sending 
and receiving messages or transferring information from one mind to 
another” (Craig 1999:125). Within this perspective, archaeology has traditionally 
adopted the semiotic tradition, where communication is understood in terms of 
the functioning and relations of sign systems, and the “problems of 
(re)presentation and transmission of meaning” (Craig 1999:136). For example, 
Leroi-Gourhan, and several scholars after him, defined visual art as a semiotic 
system (like a language) composed of conventional signs that can encode and 
transmit messages. As discussed above, the emphasis of semiotic views has been 
on decoding, measuring, or interpreting the information contained in visual art, 
again the main focus being on the art’s content.  
In evolutionary models, like those I will discuss in chapters 3 and 4, art is 
identified as a behaviour, or action pattern, that consists of making visually 
arresting objects or designs which give information about an individual’s state, 
affiliation, or ideas. Therefore, these have often adopted a psychological view of 
communication, where it is understood as “a process in which the behavior of 
humans of other complex organisms expresses psychological mechanisms, 
states, and traits and, through interaction with the similar expressions of other 
individuals, produces a range of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral effects”, 
that is, as “the process by which individuals interact and influence each other” 
(Craig 1999:143). Frequently, psychological/behavioural models define visual art 
as a ‘vehicle’ or medium of information or expression and work on analysing the 
motives and effects of art-making. Here I focus in mainly on the several effects 
that the perception of art can have.  
The common element to both views is the idea that visual art is able to 
‘transmit’, ‘encode’, ‘store’ or ‘evoke’ information, in other words, that visual art 
can serve for communication (Alland 1977:61). However, ‘messaging’ or 
‘communicating’ through art has recurrently been presented either as self-
evident (Lewis-Williams 2002:67), or as a function or even a secondary effect of 
art media, “a consequence of the nature of the marks as symbolic signs” 
(Davidson 2012:3). But why and how visual art communicates is something to be 
explained. In contrast to the approaches described above, I will argue that 
communication is not something that visual art does, but rather, that viusal art-
                                                                                                                                   
behaviour but also our neural anatomy (e.g. grey matter volume, hippocampus size), which again 
releases new learning potential (Mithen & Parsons 2008). 
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making is a communicative operation in itself. So, studying communication 
interactions should be central to explaining visual art.  
Furthermore, the traditional semiotic and psychological perspectives are 
based on a view of communication as ‘transmission of information’, but such a 
view may fall short because its description of communication is incomplete 
(Croft 2000:87). A more comprehensive description of communication includes 
the act of signalling (emitting information), signal reception (receiving 
information), and the signal’s effect (response) (Scott-Phillips 2008:388). 
Furthermore, the purpose of communication is not exchanging information for 
its own sake, but with the purpose of coordinating behaviour between the 
signalling agents (i.e. guide decision-making regarding how to behave in a 
situation). That is, communication is a process that ultimately influences and 
guides the behaviour of the organisms involved in the communicative 
interaction (Maturana 1980). Therefore, it may be fruitful to switch the focus 
from the unidirectional action of information transmission to the signal-
response dynamic between agents. To be  sure, communicating is never a 
passive operation, as Martin Mahner and Mario Bunge make clear (1997:65):  
To understand communication we must realize that exchanging 
‘information’ is not like trading goods, but is interacting with another 
animal (directly or via artifacts) in such a way that each party elicits 
certain learning processes in each other’s brain. In other words, 
successful communication consists in the construction or (re)creation of 
similar processes in the brains of the animals involved in the 
interaction.  
Another reason that an information-centred view of communication proves 
insufficient is that information is only a unit of analysis or description but not a 
real entity (Bunge 2010:67; Mahner & Bunge 1997:339), i.e. it does not exist a 
priori or independently of a signal (or sign), but only comes into being as the 
content of a signal. In this sense, information may be said to be an emergent 
feature of the communication process (Scott-Phillips 2008:392).20 The structure 
of communication systems is constituted not by signs and information nor 
‘information and brains’ (Pinker 2010:8995) but by interacting agents and 
signals, i.e. by organisms in an environment who exchange signals of one or 
more kinds – visual, acoustic, chemical, etc. (Bunge 1998:346, 2003:67). So, only 
20 Here a further distinction should be made, between sign and signal. A sign is a real material 
artefact (human-made, conventional, and artificial) which takes on a signalling function; whereas 
signals are not concrete objects (things) but processes that occur in concrete objects – an individual, 
an artefact, or a system (Bunge 1998:346). In other words, signals “are the stuff of purposive 
communication”, and signs “are the raw material of signals” (Gambetta 2009:170). Hence, signs – 
and the information they convey only emerge through the process of signalling itself (Bunge 
1997:419; Noble & Davidson 1996:115; Scott-Phillips 2008:392).  
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by looking at signals and signalling agents (real ontological entities) will we 
understand how information is produced and what for.21 
Communication is a widespread process in the biological world (Endler 
1993). All animal species have evolved ways of communicating with conspecifics, 
from the chemical pheromone signals produced by ants, to the complex songs of 
whales, to human speech. So, a comparative approach might be able to throw 
some light on the evolution of biological communication systems in general, and 
of primate and human communication in particular.  
So far, I have argued that visual art-making is a communicative operation, 
but more than that, I argue that visual art is a communication signal. Signals are 
typified as any stimulus (act or structure) that conveys information to organisms 
and affects their behaviour. Accordingly, I will define visual art is a signalling 
system displayed in material culture or, as anthropologist Martin Wobst once 
put it, signalling in artefact mode (1977:326). In chapter 6, I will discuss the 
evolution of communication signals, and show that visual art complies with the 
same characteristics, and thus should be redefined as a signal. 
Summarizing, I have proposed that visual artworks are not only ‘carriers of 
information’, but also human-made artefacts, and as such they should be 
approached for their study as any other instance of human material culture, or 
technology. This means explaining how people conceive or perceive artworks, as 
well as how they make them, what their production entails, what roles they play 
in their social contexts, and what effects they have on human behaviour. Also I 
have championed visual art as an instance of communication, where the latter is 
understood  as  the  operation  of  signalling  and  response  with  the  purpose 
of coordinating behaviour between organisms. Finally, I have suggested that 
evolutionary perspectives of visual art – be it in archaeology, psychology, or 
biology – should focus not only on the contents or effects of visual art, but also 
on the forms of visual art, how these developed, and the role they have played 
in human communication. As I have discussed, throughout the research history 
of Pleistocene art and its origins, most scholars have focused on recovering or 
interpreting the messages coded in artworks (content) but, as explained above, 
signs and information do not constitute the core structure of a communication 
system, so these elements can hardly explain how such a system emerges and 
develops. By shifting the focus towards interacting humans in a social 
environment and the relevant signals that guide their behaviour (form) we can 
aim to understand and explain how the communication system that we identify 
as visual art might have originated, and by looking at research on the evolution 
of (biological) communication we may obtain clues as to the mechanisms and 
potential selection pressures that may have shaped visual art behaviour.  
21 A further problem of informationist views is that the term ‘information’ itself has at least half a 
dozen different meanings in the scientific literature: as meaning, signal, message, quantity of order, 
knowledge, and communication (Mahner & Bunge 1997:280), often rendering it ambiguous.  
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Whereas communication offers a promising approach for understanding the 
emergence of visual art in particular, we also need a more general framework 
that will help us explain the evolution of modern human behaviour, cognition, 
and culture. In the following section, I suggest that cooperation may serve that 
purpose. 
1.3 Cooperation as an explanatory framework of human evolution 
To address the problem of the origins of visual art implies asking when and why 
humans started systematically engaging in visual art-making. The first issue 
(when) is addressed by archaeology and the material record, the second (why), 
by evolutionary studies of human cognition and behaviour. Therefore, a working 
model of the origins of visual art should integrate data from both. An 
evolutionary model of visual art should further aim to account for the 
emergence and retention of visual art practices in human phylogeny. Evolution is 
understood here as a general process that involves qualitative change that 
“consists in the emergence of things of a new kind” (Mahner & Bunge 
1997:311). Evolution, then, may occur in all sorts of systems: biological, cultural, 
semiotic, cosmic, etc. so far as they present transformations that give rise to 
new ontological levels or kinds. An evolutionary approach would then be 
concerned with describing the processes of stasis and change in an evolving 
system of any sort (Eldredge 1989). In this case, an evolutionary model of the 
origins of visual art as communication should deal both with the emergence of 
visual art as a new kind of signalling system, and the emergence of novel forms 
of visual art, as well as with the processes that potentially influenced these 
developments. The latter requires a general explanatory framework of human 
evolution. 
Studies on the evolution of human cognition and behaviour seem to be now 
at a turn. Because Darwin’s theory of evolution is based on the principles of the 
struggle for existence and the differential survival of fitter individuals, 
competition and self-interest have been continuously championed as key 
evolutionary forces, and the main motivations for people’s actions (Dawkings 
1989:18). Even in cooperation studies the “emphasis on individual advantage” 
has been a guiding principle of research (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981:1396). At the 
moment, however, there is a growing awareness that “individual-based ‘selfish-
gene’ perspectives are insufficient to effectively model human evolution” 
(Fuentes 2004:711), and that cooperation may offer a better framework for 
understanding many aspects of human cognition and behaviour. 
Whereas all primates are intensely competitive, “in addition to competing 
with others (and coordinating with others generally, like all social animals), 
humans evolved skills and motivations for collaborating with one another in 
activities involving shared goals and joint intentions/attention” (Tomasello et al. 
2005:687). Indeed, humans are the most cooperative primate, living in social 
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groups structured by unique forms of social cooperation (Moll & Tomasello 
2007). For instance, by distributing communal tasks among the members of the 
community (i.e. social division of labour), humans achieve high subsistence 
productivity. Specific units take on most foraging activities and the returns are 
shared with the entire group. The manufacture of tools and implements is also a 
social enterprise, from sharing the knowledge about the manufacturing process 
to putting them into practice. Even bringing up children is taken on communally; 
in this strategy, called ‘alloparenting’, group members other than the parents 
are actively involved in the care and provisioning of the human infant (Burkart et 
al. 2009; Hawkes et al. 2000; Hrdy 2009). At the individual level, cooperation is 
also embedded in human psychology. Prosocial behaviour and cooperative 
action appear spontaneously in humans from an early age: young children are 
keen on offering help and requesting it, and enthusiastically take on cooperative 
activities (Moll & Tomasello 2007). These types of behaviours involve what has 
been called shared intentionality, which is the ability to envision and work 
together towards common goals and ideas. It then seems that “human beings 
have evolved some specialized social-cognitive skills (beyond those of primates 
in general) for living and exchanging knowledge in cultural groups: 
communicating with others, learning from others, and ‘reading the mind’ of 
others in especially complex ways” (Hermann et al. 2007:1365). In fact, 
according to cognitive psychologist Michael Tomasello and his coworkers, it is 
this “special kind of shared motivation in truly collaborative activities in the form 
of a shared goal” that differentiates “human collaboration and intentional 
communication from the social interactions of other primate 
species” (Tomasello et al. 2005:680). That is, the ways human cooperate, and 
the socio-cognitive skills involved, is what qualitatively distinguishes human and 
ape cognition, and is both the source and the fuel of human culture (Tomasello 
& Hermann 2010).22  
Since humans are so highly cooperative, it is reasonable to suggest that 
many of the unique characteristics of human behaviour may be explained by the 
effects of cooperative behaviour and shared intentionality. Human cooperation 
strategies can then potentially account for much of human communication, 
cognition and culture (Moll & Tomasello 2007:646; Tomasello 2008:217). In fact, 
cooperation underlies much of human communication, to such an extent that 
22 Michael Tomasello and colleagues have dubbed this perspective the ‘cultural intelligence 
hypothesis’ (Hermann et al. 20007; Tomasello & Hermann 2010), or ‘Vygotskian intelligence 
hypothesis’ (Moll & Tomasello 2007), because it proposes that “what most clearly distinguishes 
human cognition from that of other primates … is their adaptations for functioning in cultural 
groups” (Tomasello & Hermann 2010:7), as suggested by Vygotsky. This hypothesis prioritizes 
human interaction (particularly cooperation) as the main driver in the evolution of human cognition, 
comunication and culture (Moll & Tomasello 2007:639). Primatologists Carel van Schaik and 
Judith Brukart, however, have suggested that this hypothesis may be expanded to 
encompass social animals, and minimally primate cognition as well. In this broader perspective, 
the hypothesis states that, not only humans, but all “species with frequent opportunities for social 




the latter may be understood as a cooperative behaviour itself (Tomasello 2008; 
Tomasello & Hermann 2010). If, as suggested above, visual art is an instance of 
human communication, then the pressures of cooperative behaviour must have 
shaped it, too. On this basis, in chapter 6 I will argue that the study of human 
cooperation can throw light on the early emergence and use of visual art.    
Many of the defining behavioural traits of our species mentioned above in 
turn, coevolved with the hunting and gathering way of life (Kaplan et al. 
2007:64). It seems that, social foraging and the social division of labour not only 
rendered greater returns for Pleistocene humans but also promoted collective 
work, group food sharing and communal child-rearing, which offered increased 
opportunities for social learning, communication and, ultimately, complex 
cognition (van Schaik & Burkart 2011). Currently, cooperative interactions are 
then being reassessed as crucial for understanding human evolution, especially 
as key selective pressures in the evolution of communication (Buckley & Steele 
2002; Croft 2000; Fitch 2010; Gärdenfors 2004; Godfrey-Smith 2013; Tomasello 
2008), and cognition (Dunbar 1998; Fuentes 2004; Pinker 2010; Whiten & Erdal 
2012). 
The emerging view is one of a human niche shaped by the coevolution of 
cooperation, cognition, communication, and culture (Burkart et al. 2009; Shea 
2011; Sterelny 2011; Tomasello et al. 2012; Withen & Erdal 2012), something 
that had been suggested since Darwin’s time. For example in his writings on 
human evolution, philosopher Friedrich Engels ([1876]2012) emphasized “the 
special feature of the human niche being productive labor and cooperation, 
which channelled the evolution of hand and brain” (Levins & Lewontin 
1985:253).23 Following Engels, the pioneering developmental psychologist Lev 
23 Engels’s model of cooperative labour as key to hominin evolution, elaborated in his 1876 essay 
“The part played by labour in the transition from ape to man” ([1876]2012), has proven quite 
insightful for its time (Trigger 1967). It anticipated the central tenets of leading hypotheses in 
current evolutionary anthropology, like the correlation between sociality, cognition, and language – 
as suggested by the ‘social brain hypothesis’ (Aiello & Dunbar 1993), and the ‘cultural intelligence 
hypothesis’ (Hermann et al. 2007) – and the coevolution of diet, brain and life history – as proposed 
by the ‘expensive tissue hypothesis’ (Aiello & Wheeler 1995), and the ‘embodied capital hypothesis’ 
(Kaplan et al. 2003). On the former, Engels states: “The development of labour necessarily helped to 
bring the members of society closer together by increasing cases of mutual support and joint 
activity, and by making clear the advantage of this joint activity to each individual. In short, men in 
the making arrived at the point where they had something to say to each other […] The reaction on 
labour and speech of the development of the brain and its attendant senses, of the increasing 
clarity of consciousness, power of abstraction and of conclusion, gave both labour and speech an 
ever-renewed impulse to further development” ([1876]2012:175-6). On the latter, he says: “A meat 
diet contained in an almost ready state the most essential ingredients required by the organism for 
its metabolism. By shortening the time required for digestion, it also shortened the other vegetative 
bodily processes […] The meat diet, however, had its greatest effect on the brain, which now 
received a far richer flow of the materials necessary for its nourishment and development, and 
which, therefore, could develop more rapidly and perfectly from generation to generation” 
([1876]2012:178). Unfortunately, Engels has suffered from ‘guilt by association’ and his thoughts on 
human evolution have often been overlooked. However, in view of its explanatory and predictive 
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Vygotsky (1971, [1930]1978, 1986) proposed that human cognition was the 
result of the history of human interactions, which are fundamentally cooperative 
(c.f. Moll & Tomasello 2007). More recently, prehistorian and 
palaeoanthropologist Glynn Isaac suggested that the characteristic traits of 
hominins evolved in an “adaptive complex” based on reciprocity (that included 
food-sharing, the division of labour, and a home base), and he advanced that 
“we ought to think of an inseparable set of distinctive behaviors which 
reinforced each other and which were jointly intensified through the action of 
natural selection without any one factor being an isolated prime 
mover” (1978:320). This is precisely what topical scenarios of a coevolved 
human niche emphasize, that there is no ‘smoking gun’ in the evolution of the 
human modern mind, behaviour and culture, but that the various elements that 
constitute them evolved together influencing and shaping each other along the 
way, so that ‘what makes us human’ is seen not a single special feature, but a “a 
whole cluster of systems of interacting abilities” (Bunge 2010:197).   
Besides recognizing the impact of social interaction and of (material) culture 
in human evolution, this ‘new thinking’ likewise acknowledges that, as Vygotsky 
suggested, human cognition and behaviour are the result of our specific 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic histories. The implication being that, these are not 
atemporal, fixed traits but have been and are in continuous flux. Such 
perspective has the potential of offering a fruitful framework for advancing 
research in human evolution, as recently noted by psychologist Louise Barrett 
and colleagues (2012:2108-9): 
The inclusion of sociocultural and historical processes into our 
consideration of cognitive evolution is made more productive, we 
would argue, if we adopt a theoretical framework that recognizes the 
‘mutuality’ of organism and environment: the idea that they are 
interdependent, forming mutually reinforcing feedback loops, so that 
each can only be fully understood in terms of the other. 
One way forward, then, is to take a step back, and return to those 
thinkers who emphasized the mutuality of organism and environment 
in just this way; people such as John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, 
Jakob von Uexküll, Lev Vygotsky and James Gibson. 
In sum, what all these views have in common is that they emphasize the 
processes and properties of individual development and interaction with the 
social and natural environments (e.g. epigenesis, self-regulation, feedback, 
plasticity, emergence of behaviour in ontogeny, etc.), which have often been 
overlooked by evolutionary frameworks (Jablonka & Lamb 2005:303) since the 
time of Darwin, as lamented by Engels ([1876]2012:180): 
power (Woolfson 1982), Engels’s labour model deserves to be acknowledged and reconsidered as an 
important contribution to human evolutionary theory. 
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In nature nothing takes place in isolation. Everything affects and is 
affected by every other thing and it is mostly because this manifold 
motion and interaction is forgotten that our natural scientists are 
prevented from gaining a clear insight into the simplest things. 
The present book also seeks to situate the study of the origins of visual art 
within this framework of a cultural historical cognition, and a human niche 
shaped by cooperative interactions. 
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2. FROM THE CRADLE TO THE CAVE: A SURVEY OF PLEISTOCENE VISUAL ART
Art-historicity and its prehistoricity are interpenetrating and variable phenomena, 
historical in themselves. They are never wholly present in but never wholly absent from an 
actual individual artwork. Thus it might be a mistake – and a major source of the 
apparent insolubility of the question of art’s origins – to look for a beginning in actual 
individual artworks, chronologically prehistoric or otherwise. A ‘Figure 1’ which could 
actually be dug up and exhibited will never be found. 
WHITNEY DAVIS, 1993 
The way scholars envision the art from early prehistory has been profoundly 
transformed over the past few decades. Once a term reserved exclusively for the 
enticing images of Europe’s Palaeolithic cave paintings, prehistoric art now 
includes engraved patterns before regarded as simple ‘doodles’, and items such 
as beads and pendants, previously relegated to the category of trinkets for 
‘mere’ decoration (Moro & González 2010:238). More importantly, recent finds 
have now demonstrated without a doubt that visual art did not emerge in a 
single sudden event, and that its different forms did not appear simultaneously. 
Rather, as I will review in the present chapter, visual art has developed over a 
long time, and has generated a great formal diversity – some of which has 
unquestionably been lost through the ages. There is a growing corpus of 
archaeological remains that constitute what is here referred to as ‘the 
Pleistocene record of visual art’, which includes objects such as beads, pendants, 
incised and engraved designs on various media, figurines, sculptures, reliefs, 
carvings, and painted motifs (usually on rock). Those art forms that are now 
irretrievable must have included more ephemeral sorts (body painting, designs 
on sand or earth) as well as applications on perishable materials (wood, hides, 
bark, feathers, fur, textiles, basketry, hair, and the human body).24  
I must point out that the following survey is based on an extensive review of 
secondary literature. I personally have not carried out an analysis of the sites 
and materials that will be discussed so, I rely on the work, interpretations and 
opinions of the cited scholars. For this reason, the survey is constrained to 
instances which, to my present knowledge, have been preserved, identified, 
recovered, made public, and accepted by (the majority of) the archaeological 
community as of Pleistocene age. Chronologically, the survey spans the latter 
part of the Pleistocene era from 130,000 to 25,000 years before present (BP), 
24 For instance, sand painting is still a well-known practice among Australian aboriginals, and the 
19th century explorer James Bonwick reported that Tasmanians frequently created drawings “on a 
tree” (1870:47). Similar practices must have existed worldwide. 
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and leads from the cradle of our species, the African continent, to the painted 
caves of Ice Age Europe.  
As discussed before, a general description of visual artworks comprises 
objects or patterns made, modified, and displayed to engage attention through 
the manipulation of visual qualities like colour, shape, texture, brightness, etc. 
The following survey offers a general overview of the earliest examples of such 
objects from the Pleistocene, which may be compressed in five categories: 1) 
ochre use – presumably for body painting and other applications, 2) personal 
ornaments, 3) incised objects, 4) carved figures, and 5) painting. The 
classification somewhat reflects the chronological sequence in which the various 
art forms appear in the record, and to some extent correlates with an increase in 
technical and organisational complexity.  
The forms of Pleistocene visual art that will be reviewed are in themselves 
quite diverse, span large regions and time periods, and are found in various 
types of settings – isolated finds, habitation sites, ritual spaces, etc. Due to this 
diversity, ‘one-size-fits-all’ explanations of Pleistocene art have become suspect, 
particularly those which aim at a universal interpretation of content, motivation, 
‘meaning’, or unilinear stylistic development (Nowell 2006:244). As I discussed in 
the previous chapter, a more productive approach might be to study Pleistocene 
visual art not only as a semiotic system, but first and foremost, as a class of 
human material culture (Ingold 1993:344). This is not to say that the semiotic 
aspect of visual art is irrelevant, but it is clear that at the moment our finest 
attempts to ‘recover’ its past meaning constitute educated guesses, at best, and 
more often than not, mere speculations. In contrast, by situating the emergence 
and development of artworks in the broader spectrum of the Pleistocene 
archaeological record, we may be able to formulate inferences about the 
circumstances under which this art was created and/or used, even if we remain 
unable to access its original meaning or intention.  
The aim of the present chapter is, then, not to give a detailed review of the 
whole of the archaeological record of visual art in the Pleistocene, nor to 
reassess the evidence, or discuss interpretations of meaning or content.25 
Rather, the purpose is to identify probable chronological and cultural patterns of 
occurrence and change in the visual art forms that, seen in the light of the 
archaeological record, might point towards the circumstances in which visual art 
behaviour flourished as a human practice. With this objective in mind, I will 
focus particularly on two moments that are often referred to as ‘bursts’ of high 
human creativity, during which novel technologies and behaviours arose, 
including various forms of visual arts (McBrearty & Brooks 2000). The first is 
situated in the mid part of the African Middle Stone Age (MSA) between 130 and 
70,000 years before present, and the second, in the European Early Upper 
25 For thorough reviews of the Pleistocene record of visual art, see: Bahn & Vertut (1997); Cook 
(2013); D’Errico et al. (2003); D’Errico & Henshilwood (2011); McBrearty & Brooks (2000); Rau et al. 
(2009); White (2003); Zilhão (2007). 
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Palaeolithic (EUP) between 45 and 25,000 years before present. Note that 
the attention lies on the archaeological record of our species, Homo sapiens,26 
which as far as we can say with any certainty has been the only systematic 
producer of visual artworks.27 In the following chapters, this survey will also 
provide the yardstick with which to assess origins-of-art models, and will be 
used to test specific predictions from those models. 
2.1 Archaeological periods in focus: The MSA and EUP 
One of the goals of this survey, as mentioned above, is to provide a general 
overview of the circumstances in which visual art first emerged and of its major 
developments during the Late Pleistocene period, so that it can be contrasted 
against existing hypotheses about the origins of art. Therefore, it concentrates 
on the two periods that, according to current data, encompass the earliest 
occurrences of visual art: the African Middle Stone Age (MSA), which spans from 
280 to 30,000 years before present (BP), and the European Upper 
Palaeolithic (UP), which roughly dates from 45 to 12,000 BP.28 Within 
these extensive periods, I will further zoom in on two moments 
which, according to archaeologists, involved a number of behavioural 
innovations in diet, technology, social organisation, and culture, including 
the appearance of new art forms: the MSA between 130-70,000 BP, and 
the European Early Upper Palaeolithic (EUP) between 45-25,000 BP.  
During the periods of our interest, several hominin species still inhabited 
the Old World. The exact number of hominin species that have existed since the 
split between Homo and Pan (chimpanzees and bonobos) is still unknown, but 
estimates range between 8 and 27 (Bokma et al. 2012). It is also unclear how 
many of them co-existed at any one time,29 but multiple lineages must have 
lived side by side perhaps for long periods (Endicott et al. 2010; Tattersall 2009). 
The complex picture of the evolutionary relations between these hominin sorts 
26 Following the phylogenetic species concept, a species is understood as a lineage of organisms, 
distinguished from other lineages by its evolutionary trajectory, bound in time by its origin in a 
speciation event and its eventual disappearance by further speciation or extinction (Sterelny & 
Griffiths 1999:193). Seen in this light, Neanderthals, other extinct hominins – like the recently 
discovered Denisovans –, and Homo sapiens are considered separate species (Stringer 2012:36). 
This means that whether these other human groups were absorbed by modern African populations 
or died out, they constitute separate lineages by virtue of their own particular evolutionary path, 
which diverged from ours for at least 400,000 years, since the split from a last common ancestor 
(Hublin 2013). Therefore, ‘our species’ means here all individuals classified as H. sapiens, from the 
200,000 year-old Omo fossils to contemporary populations (aka modern humans). 
27 Alternatively, it is the only hominin whose visual artworks have left a distinguishable trace in the 
archaeological record. 
28 Henceforth, BP: years Before Present. 
29 Evolutionary biologist Folmer Bokma and colleagues report: “Allometric analyses of mammal 
families of similar size and weight as humans also suggested a low number of hominin species 
simultaneously in existence. Similar to these studies, we calculated that it is highly unlikely that 
there ever simultaneously existed more than 5 hominin species” (2012:2973). 
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is frequently being revised according to new fossil and genetic data (Carrión et 
al. 2011; Johanson & Wong 2009:253).30 At the moment, we know of at least 
four extinct hominins that at some point co-existed with modern humans during 
the Late Pleistocene: H. helmei/heildelbergensis in Africa, Neanderthals in 
Europe and the Middle East, Denisovans in Asia, and H. floresiensis in Indonesia 
(Endicott 2010; Reich et al. 2010; Stringer 2012).31  
Regarding the emergence of our own species, Homo sapiens, the earliest 
fossil specimens that may be classified as such are the remains found at the site 
of Omo Kibish, in the Omo River Valley in Ethiopia, dated to around 195,000 
years ago. These are followed by the cranial remains of the Herto Bouri site, also 
in Ethiopia, which have been assigned an age of 150,000 years (Trinkaus 
2005:209; White et al. 2003). These fossils, alongside genetic evidence which 
indicates that all living human populations share a common African female 
ancestor (Olson 2002; Stringer 2011), indicate that our species likely emerged in 
that continent some 200,000 years ago.  
The coexistence of various human sorts is potentially problematic for 
Pleistocene archaeology, as it is sometimes difficult to attribute material 
remains to a particular hominin population. However, as I discuss elsewhere in 
this chapter, so far the evidence suggests that only Homo sapiens recurrently 
and consistently engaged in visual art-making. It is for this reason that every 
description, table or list of traits that aims at showing the differences between 
the archaeological signatures of extinct hominins and modern humans features 
visual art as a key – if not the key – element that distinguishes ‘us’ in the 
archaeological record (Wadley 2001:203).32  
30 See: Bonde (2012); Stringer (2002, 2011); Trinkaus (2005); Reynolds & Gallagher (2012), and 
papers within. 
31 Just over the past decade, researchers have discovered the last two hominin sorts. In 2004, 
scientists exploring the Liang Bua Cave on the island of Flores, in the Indonesian archipelago, 
discovered the bones of a tiny human of about a metre tall. Officially called Homo floresiensis, and 
popularly known as ‘The Hobbit’, this species lived as recently as 18,000 years ago and is thought to 
be a direct descendant of an archaic population of Asian  H. erectus  (Brown et al. 2004). In 2010, 
another hominin came to light, as a research team extracted DNA from a finger bone and a tooth of 
40,000 years of age found at the site of Denisova Cave, in the Russian Altai Mountains. When the 
genetic sequencing was completed, to the everyone’s surprise, it did not correspond with either the 
sapiens or Neanderthal genomes, but represented a new as yet unknown hominin type (Krause et 
al. 2010). The now called ‘Denisovan’ hominins are thought to have been a local group derived from 
an Asian H. heidelbergensis population. Whereas  H. floresiensis  seems to be a unique island species 
remotely related to modern humans, we share a more recent common ancestor with Neanderthals 
and Deninovans – H. heidelbergensis – from which the African and Eurasian lineages split some half 
a million years ago (Endicott 2010:93). To make matters more intricate, it now seems that some 
amount of interbreeding  might have taken place between Homo sapiens and extinct hominin 
groups, as traces of their ‘archaic’ DNA is found in the genetic composition of living humans. Sub-
Saharan African populations show genetic markers of ‘archaic’ African humans. Eurasian and 
American groups have been found to possess some Neanderthal genetic remnants, and traces of 
Denisovan genes are present among Australasian peoples (Stringer 2012). 
32 See, for example: Bar-Yosef (2002:367); Gilman (1984:116); Henshilwood & Marean (2003:628); 
McBrearty & Brooks (2000:492); Mellars (1996:397); Roebroeks (2008:919).  
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The African Middle Stone Age (MSA) 
The African Middle Stone Age, or MSA for short, is an extremely important 
archaeological period since it comprises the emergence of our species, Homo 
sapiens, and its expansion out of Africa (Trinkhaus 2005). Although imprecisely 
defined, the MSA denotes a set of African archaeological industries south of the 
Sahara that belong to the long period between 280 and 30,000 years BP (Clark 
1988; Jacobs et al. 2008). The lithic industries of the MSA represent a transition 
from the Earlier Stone Age and its ‘Acheulean’ type tools like handaxes and 
cleavers produced from large flakes or cores, towards more sophisticated 
production techniques involving prepared cores, the use of flakes and blades as 
tool blanks, and retouching as a method for shaping or sharpening tools 
(Barham & Mitchell 2008:17). These new variety of stonetool technologies 
indicate general changes in hominin cognition and behaviour related, for 
example, to innovations in diet, resource acquisition, and social organisation. 
Although, as mentioned, several hominin species coexisted in Africa during 
the MSA, a few well-studied sites seem to reveal the ‘archaeological signal’ of 
modern humans (H. sapiens), meaning that the activities that can be inferred 
from them resemble the sorts of practices observed among historical hunter-
gatherer groups, such as the San Bushmen of the Kalahari Desert (Deacon 1992). 
Several of these sites are found near the coast of South Africa (Howiesons Poort, 
Diepkloof, Klasies River Mouth, Border Cave, Sibudu, and Blombos Cave), and 
some include very early traces of artistic behaviour (see section 2.3), which 
indicates that humans, modern in both anatomy and behaviour, were present in 
those locations (Henshilwood & Dubreuil 2011). These sites, whose dates span 
from before 100,000 and up to 60,000 years BP, include several novelties 
regarding lithic technology, the use of space, diet, and symbolism (Wadley 
2001). Even the adoption of clothing can potentially be traced back to this 
period (Gilligan 2010; Toups et al. 2011). Naturally, the degree of innovation is 
neither constant nor homogeneous throughout the different sites, however, its 
significance and recurrence is sufficient to point towards the emergence of a 
recognizably modern hunter-gatherer way of life. Although the dates from these 
sites cannot be transferred to the whole of Africa (Soriano et al. 2007), they 
minimally indicate what was happening in some regions of that continent at the 
time. Furthermore, an increasing number of sites from North Africa seem to be 
corroborating the emergence of a pattern of modern human activity by 100,000 
years BP (Balter 2011; Vanhaeren et al. 2006).  
Although sufficient palaeoenvironmental data for the complete African MSA 
is still scarce, the existing information suggests that environmental factors may 
somehow be correlated with the appearance of the various changes in hominin 
behaviour mentioned above. Our period of interest within the MSA falls into a 
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climatic phase called Marine Isotope Stage 5 (MIS 5, 127-70,000 BP)33. This 
period is itself subdivided in five stages in which conditions kept changing from 
warm and wet to cold and dry (Barham & Mitchell 2008:239-40; Borroughs 
2009:82-3).34 The period previous to MIS 5, from 135-127,000 BP was one of 
very arid conditions, which may have driven human populations to occupy 
wetter regions, for instance along the coastal margins (Barham & Mitchell 
2008:238). The beginning of MIS 5 constitutes an interglacial period (MIS 5e 127-
116,000 BP), during which conditions were much like they are today. This was 
followed by a period of increased aridity (MIS 5d 116-105,000 BP). The next 
phase, MIS 5c (105-94,000 BP), was a warmer period, followed by a colder and 
dryer phase (MIS 5b 94-84,000 BP), and again by a warm period in MIS 5a (84-
70,000 BP). After that, there was a general decline in temperature that can 
perhaps be attributed to the eruption of the Toba ‘supervolcano’ in Indonesia 
(Borroughs 2009:84-5). The eruption took place somewhere between 73,500 
and 71,000 BP and brought about extremely dry conditions that had a great 
impact on African human populations, which may have been reduced almost to 
extinction (Ambrose 1998b; Barham & Mitchell 2008:262).  
In brief, the environment of the human populations that produced the 
earliest traces of visual art in Late Pleistocene Africa was anything but 
undemanding, which probably led them to develop a wide array of behavioural 
and cultural strategies to cope with constantly changing conditions that 
ultimately had important effects on cognition (Shultz et al. 2012). Among others, 
for example, broadening the scope of exploited foodstuffs, occupying preferably 
resource-rich regions, such as coastal margins, and creating social safety 
networks of exchange. The possibilities and implications of some of these 
changes for human social interaction will be explored in chapter 6. 
The European Early Upper Palaeolithic (EUP) 
In Europe, the Upper Palaeolithic follows the Middle Palaeolithic, which lasted 
from around 300,000 to 50-40,000 BP. The transition between these two periods 
is marked by various populational and cultural changes that are manifested in 
the archaeological record as novelties in technological techniques and artefact 
types, differences in settlement and resource exploitation patterns, and the 
emergence of visual art, among others (Mellars 2004).35 Many of these changes 
seem to coincide with the appearance of modern human populations in this 
33 The Marine Isotope Stages (MIS) or Oxygen Isotope Stages (OIS) are “the designated climatic 
stages in the standardised ocean-sediment records. There are 19 stages defining the principal 
glacial and interglacial periods since the Matuyama-Brunhes reversal of the Earth’s magnetic field 
around 750 kya” (Borroughs 2009:319). 
34 MIS 5 “Encompasses a sequence of alternating sub-stages of warmth and cold, each lasting 
about 10,000 years” (Barham & Mitchell 2008:239). 
35 For a detailed up-to-date review of the Middle to Upper Palaeolithic transition, see: (O. Bar-Yosef 
2002, 2007; Roebroeks 2008). 
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territory, and the (cultural or biological) demise of the native Neanderthal 
groups, who thrived in Eurasia during the Middle Palaeolithic. The process of 
‘colonization’ by modern humans, who probably entered Europe from the 
Middle East, may have begun as early as 50,000 BP (Hublin 2012).  
The Upper Palaeolithic of central and western Europe is broadly subdivided 
in four successive archaeological phases: Aurignacian (45-28,000 BP), Gravettian 
(28-23,000 BP), Solutrean (23-16,000 B), and Magdalenian (16-10,000 BP). This 
survey will focus mainly on the first two phases (the Early Upper Palaeolithic), 
and particularly on the Aurignacian, for the earliest examples of visual art in 
Europe go back to his period. 
The Aurignacian 
The term ‘Aurignacian’ refers to both an assemblage of archaeological traits, and 
a chronological unit referring to the earliest Upper Palaeolithic phase extending 
from ca. 45,000 BP up to 27,000 BP (Davies 2001), and as mentioned, it is usually 
seen “as a proxy for the first expansion of modern humans into Europe” (Hublin 
2012:13471). As an archaeological complex, its origin is believed to lie in Asia, 
the Northern Middle East or the Levant, where it is recognized as early as 47,000 
or 45,000 BP (Kozlowski & Otte 2000; Davies 2001:195; Mellars 2004:463, 
2005). In Europe, its earliest manifestations date back to ca. 45,000 BP in the 
south and 40,000 BP, or earlier, in the Western central regions (Higham et al. 
2012; Hublin 2013; Mellars 2005:19). The latter will receive special attention 
here, since it is there where the earliest traces of visual art are found. 
Despite the advances in absolute dating techniques over the last years, 
setting a fixed time range for the Aurignacian in Europe has remained a highly 
controversial subject. This is mainly due to problems with radiocarbon dating 
and what archaeologists Nicholas Conard and Michael Bolus have named the 
“Middle Paleolithic Dating Anomaly”, produced by the “fluctuations in the 
production and deposition of radioisotopes in various media over the period 
from 30-50 k calendar years ago” (2003:356), which causes radiocarbon dates to 
appear at least 2,000 and up to 6,000 or more years younger than their calendar 
age (Churchill & Smith 2000:68; Conard & Bolus 2003; Mellars 2004: 462; 
Gamble 1999:273). While this so-called anomaly has been a relevant subject of 
debate on the chronology of the Aurignacian (Verpoorte 2005; Zilhão & D’Errico 
2003), new dating techniques and calibration methods for existing dating 
datasets seem to confirm an early start of the Aurignacian in Europe, by 50- 
45,000 BP (Higham et al. 2012), which also “matches what we know of the 
dispersal of modern humans to the east, into Asia and toward Australia” (Hublin 
2012:13472). 
Much research has focused on tracing this complex geographically and 
chronologically since, “if one assumes that modern humans produced 
Aurignacian artefacts, dating the earliest Aurignacian could be viewed as 
equivalent to dating the arrival of modern humans in Europe” (Conard et al. 
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2003:166). This assumption has been questioned, mainly because so far no 
modern human remains going back to the early dates of the Aurignacian have 
been found in Europe. The earliest ones come from Romania and are dated to 
36-34,000 BP, but lack any archaeological association (Hublin 2013:234; 
Verpoorte 2005). However, no Neanderthal remains have been found with 
Aurignacian artefacts yet; whereas modern humans recurrently have (Churchill 
& Smith 2000; Hublin 2013).  
Regarding the lower chronological limits of the Aurignacian, there are 
several sites that have now yielded dates of 40,000 BP, and older. For example, 
the Catalan rockshelter of Abric Romani, which has given  radiocarbon (AMS) 
dates of 37,000 BP, and Uranium-series dates going as far back as 43,000 BP. The 
marked difference in results between these dating techniques is attributed to 
the assumption that radiocarbon ages are underestimates by several thousand 
years. On these grounds, other Iberian sites such as L’Abreda (c. 38,500 BP), in 
Cataluña, and El Castillo (c. 38,700 BP), in Santander, may also be as old as 
43,000 BP (Gamble 1999:273). Another set of early dates comes from the 
German region of Swabia. The site of Geissenklösterle, in the Ach Valley, has 
long been known for its rich Aurignacian levels. Radiocarbon (AMS) results for 
the lower Aurignacian layers of the cave have given an age of ca. 38,000 BP; 
while Thermoluminescence (TL) dates from burnt silex go back even further, to 
40,000 BP (Richter et al. 2000; Conard et al. 2003; Conard & Bolus 2003:353). 
Also, bones from the adjacent cave site of Höhlenstein-Stadel yielded dates of 
ca. 42-34,000 BP (Conard & Bolus 2003:342). These and a new series of 
radiocarbon dates now suggest that the early Aurignacian of the Swabian region 
may date to 43-41,000 BP (Higham et al. 2012).  
All in all, the Aurignacian of Western Europe is now recognized as of 
indisputable modern human authorship, and seems to have had a start prior to 
40,000 BP (Hublin 2013), spanning up to 29,000 BP (Bocquet-Appel & Demars 
2000:552). The emerging picture suggests that modern humans arrived early 
into Europe from the East, perhaps following the Danube river (Conard & Bolus 
2003; Higham et al. 2012), and spread stepwise through the continent, possibly 
absorbing indigenous Neanderthal populations (culturally and/or biologically) 
along the way (Hublin 2013:242). 
Most known early Aurignacian sites in Western Europe seem to be clustered 
in three general regions or “nodes of concentration, separated by vast zones 
which are either empty or with a negligible population density” (Bocquet-Appel 
& Demars 2000:551). These clusters are found in Aquitaine, the Franco-Spanish 
Pyrenees area, along with Cantabria and Catalonia, and Belgium Wallone, 
German Swabia, the Paris basin and the South of France. Apart from these, 
significant Aurignacian groupings are also found in Eastern Europe. Later sites 
spread north and south of these regions but seem to keep approximately the 
same pattern of distribution throughout the whole duration of the Aurignacian 
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and into the Gravettian (Bocquet-Appel & Demars 2000:554). It is possible that 
these clusters represent early foci of modern human occupation. 
Climate-wise, the conditions of the European Early Upper Palaeolithic, like 
those of the MSA, were also full of ‘ups and downs’ (Borroughs 2009:115). 
The period of our interest (45-25,000 BP) falls within Marine Isotope Stage 3 
(MIS 3, 60-24,000 BP), a period of rapid climatic fluctuations. The 
relatively mild conditions at 40,000 BP were immediately followed by a cold 
event at 39,000 BP, and again a stage of relative warmth from 38-32,000 BP, 
followed by cool-warm oscillations until the continuous decline in 
temperature that marked the start of the Last Glacial Maximum (the coldest 
period of the last Ice Age) which lasted roughly from 24-16,500 BP. Although 
there were ‘strikingly cold periods’ during MIS 3, when temperatures may 
have been 10° to 12°C below modern values, and precipitation rates were 
low (Churchill & Smith 2000:70), Eurasia remained habitable (Borroughs 
2009:86). In fact, the cold conditions caused an increase of grasslands, arctic 
steppe and tundra environments, known as the European mammoth 
steppe, which supported large communities of grazing herbivores such as 
woolly mammoth, woolly rhinoceros, reindeer, red deer, horse and bison, 
whose large herds constituted prime hunting game for Palaeolithic 
humans (Gamble 1999:280-283; Guthrie & Van Kolfschoten 2000:17). 
So, although conditions during the Early Upper Palaeolithic may have been 
harsh in terms of climate, they were not in terms of resource availability, and 
human population numbers remained low but stable (Bocquet-Appel & 
Demars 2000:551; Forster 2004:261).   
In sum, compared to the relatively mild and constant climatic conditions of 
the Holocene, the Late Pleistocene was a period of fluctuations that 
undoubtedly influenced the lifestyle and behaviour of modern humans, as 
geologist and palaeoclimate expert John Lowe explains (2001:18): 
For the last glacial-interglacial cycle […] at least 24 abrupt oscillations, 
from cold stadial conditions to warm interstadial conditions (almost as 
warm as those of the present day) and back to cold conditions again, 
characterize the interval between 110 and 14 [thousand years] BP. 
Some of these irregular oscillations lasted only 1 to 3 [thousand years], 
while some of the cold-warm transitions occurred within a few 
decades. [These events] may have had important influences on the 
survival, distribution and migration of human populations. 
The shifting environmental circumstances of the mid MSA and the EUP, on the 
one hand indicate that we cannot really speak of a human evolutionary 
environment, except as one of variability and frequent change. On the other 
hand, these circumstances might help explain the discontinuous mosaic-like 
pattern of the archaeological record of visual art, since cultural traits, like the 
human communities themselves, likely fluctuated according to the demands of 
every new shift. 
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2.2 Pleistocene visual art: Identification and attribution 
In this section, I discuss some of the problems of identifying artworks in the 
archaeological record. I argue that, to a point, these issues may be avoided by 
adopting a more specific definition of Pleistocene visual art and a better 
description of the types of items and practices that constitute it. 
One of the questions that preoccupies (prehistoric) visual art scholars is how 
to recognize an artwork as such. As philosopher of art Stephen Davies wonders, 
“How can we distinguish culturally significant practices in which art is absent 
from those in which it is present?” (2000:206). This problem is particularly 
pressing when dealing with artworks from the remote past because in the 
archaeological record – inversely to Ernst Gombrich’s famous statement – there 
are no artists, only art. Hence, we will only be able to say anything about the 
development of art in the Pleistocene provided we can recognize it among other 
traces of past human activity. To be art, according to art philosopher Gregory 
Currie, it suffices that an artefact be “produced with the intention that it have 
aesthetic features” (2011:17); i.e. qualities that amount to ‘beauty’, like 
symmetry, balance, elegance and vivacity. Under these terms, Currie postulates 
that (visual) art-making may have ancient roots in the manufacture of stone 
tools, particularly the (often) oval-shaped cutting tools known as handaxes.36 
Whereas such a broad characterisation has the intention of allowing the 
inclusion of archaeological examples into the art category, it is not infallible. 
Firstly, it is so broad that it may well include a great deal of human material 
culture, from stone tools to pencils, taking us back to the original problem of 
how to distinguish artefacts from artworks. In second place, despite its 
broadness, it leaves out ‘found’ objects, which can be used or displayed as visual 
art, like in the case of seashells which often occur in the archaeological record, 
as the following survey will show. Thirdly, and most importantly, an aesthetic 
element is not sufficient to define art, as Wilfried van Damme has noted, “art is 
more than aesthetics, and aesthetics is more than art” (2006:154), and by the 
same token, the ‘aesthetic’ is not limited to beauty. Rather, aesthetic features 
include all perceptible, attention-grabbing properties, in this case all visually-
arresting properties, whose effects need not necessarily be positive (i.e. 
beautiful, pleasing). Art philosopher Stephen Davies, for his part, has suggested 
that although pleasing aesthetic qualities do not exhaust (visual) art, they can 
36 Handaxes are the most abundant and longest used stone tool ever made; they first occur in the 
Lower Palaeolithic by 1.4 million years ago and prevail up to the late Middle Palaeolithic, around 
50,000 years ago (Mithen 2003). Millions of such multipurpose tools were produced over time by at 
least four different hominin species: Homo ergaster, H. erectus, H. heidelbergensis and H. 
neanderthalensis (Kohn & Mithen 1999). Handaxes are found in Africa, Europe, North Asia and the 
Middle East, and come in different shapes, sizes and materials, but the most distinctive ones have a 
symmetrical oval shape. Many of these artefacts seem to have been worked beyond functionality, 
which has led some scholars to think that their makers were producing them from aesthetic 
conventions (Currie 2011; Kohn & Mithen 1999; Lycett 2008; Mithen 2003; Zahavi & Zahavi 1997).  
From the cradle to the cave 
39 
help us identify it minimally. That is, although the visual art of any given culture 
may include a variety of (non-pleasing, non-modified, non-aesthetic) items 
difficult to recognize as artworks, at least those which have been produced to 
comply with gratifying aesthetic properties will be identifiable as such to cultural 
outsiders (Davies 2000:209). This indeed has been a common criterion used by 
researchers looking for traces of art activity in the archaeological record. To a 
great extent, visual art is identified archaeologically by analogy to what is 
considered visual art in the context of the researcher (Moro & González 2010). 
A second criterion often used is ‘non-utilitarianism’, that is, whenever 
researchers “cannot think of any function, other than communicative or 
symbolic” (Chase 1991:200) then they tend to include artefacts in the category 
of artistic or symbolic artefacts (D’Errico & Villa 1997:28). However, identifying 
with any certainty whether some item is utilitarian or not is problematic. For 
instance, many of the objects usually classified as beads or simply body 
ornaments, may well have been used as buttons or garment closures (Gilligan 
2010:52), but its function would not diminish their aesthetic or art-like qualities. 
For many archaeologists, artworks should not only have aesthetic properties, 
but should also be ‘symbolic’, i.e. “imbued with meaning” (Henshilwood & 
D’Errico 2011:76; Mithen 1996a:175). But identifying symbolism in the 
archaeological record is just as difficult. In our “symbolic species”, to paraphrase 
Terrence Deacon (1997), everything and anything can be immersed in 
symbolism. This includes not only human-made or transformed items, but also 
basic human necessities such as food exude symbolic references (Levins & 
Lewontin 1985:262). Furthermore, symbolic ability by itself might not be a good 
measure of artistic behaviour since our closest primate relatives, the 
chimpanzees and bonobos (or pigmy chimpanzees), are able to successfully 
learn and use, however limitedly, gestural, graphic, and language-based symbols 
– e.g. sign language, numerals, and lexigrams (Gillespie-Lynch et al. 2011; 
Heimbauer et al. 2011; Matsuzawa 2009; Tomasello & Hermann 2010). This 
indicates that symbolic capacity, even if incipient, might be a shared hominin 
trait (Shea 2011:14; Wadley 2001:20) and thus should be expected to appear at 
least sporadically in the archaeological record predating the emergence of our 
species (Henshilwood & Marean 2003:644; D’Errico & Nowell 2000:146).37 In 
relation to the evolution of modern humans, what should be explained is not 
when the (likely ancestral) capacity to use symbols appeared, but the 
circumstances under which humans engaged in the systematic production of 
symbol systems and how these became incorporated into the human cultural 
37 However, this does not necessarily mean that there has been a gradual and continuous 
development of ‘symbolic thought’ culminating in visual art. We should be wary of notions of 
‘partially’, ‘proto-‘, or ‘semi-‘ symbolic hominins or artefacts, which are frequently discussed by 
archaeologists. Symbolism (or the capacity for it) is not a gradable property. As Wobst explained 
(1977:326), something is either symbolic or it is not, but it cannot be ‘slightly’ or ‘halfway’ symbolic. 
Therefore, I reject the use of terms such as ‘fully symbolic’ (Henshilwood & Marean 2003:644) to 
describe modern human behaviour.  
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repertoire (Donald 1991:160; Vygotsky 1992:56; Wadley 2001:205).38 Thus, most 
researchers agree that visual art minimally has aesthetic and symbolic 
properties. Nonetheless, neither the aesthetic or symbolic characterizations are 
sufficient to define it, nor do they offer an answer to Davies’s question of how to 
distinguish art from non-art.  
Having defined visual art as a human communication signal, I suggest that 
an important criterion for identifying visual art is display. That is, to function as a 
signal visual art must be presented or ‘emitted’ to potential receivers. Therefore, 
when display may be inferred as a primary function of aesthetic or symbolic 
artefacts, then we may include them in the category of visual art. Furthermore, 
because signals are conventional and shared, visual artworks should have certain 
recurrence within a given context, thus repeated occurrence offers another 
criterion for classifying objects as visual art. 
Ethnographical analogy can also be a source of information for interpreting 
the archaeological record of visual art. Because Pleistocene humans had an 
appropriation economy based on  hunting and gathering, data from historical 
hunter-gatherer groups can help in assessing some assumptions, for instance 
about the context, use and production of visual art-making practices. I am well 
aware of the methodological and ethical issues of using ethnographical data 
from historical groups to interpret Pleistocene human behaviour (Conkey 1987; 
Inglod 1996, 1999; Myers 1988). However, ethnographical analogies are central 
to archaeological interpretation, which relies on the principle that “in the past as 
in the present, there is a correlation between behaviour and material culture 
that allows us to reconstruct the former from the latter”, and that there “are 
some general patterns to the ways humans use and discard artefacts” (Gándara 
1990:74, my translation), which in turn are much influenced by economic and 
social organization. So, looking at how those patterns emerge and change 
among historical hunter-gatherers might tell us something about how they 
developed among extinct ones (Kuhn & Stiner 2001b:100). 
Everything considered, the three main inclusion criteria for this survey are 
anthropic origin, (inferred) display purpose, and repeated occurrence in the 
archaeological record. The first of these requirements, that the object in 
question show evidence of having been made, modified, or used by humans (van 
Damme 2008:30), is not always easy to determine in archaeological materials, 
especially among non-tools from early sites. However, archaeologists have 
developed various techniques that allow them to indicate with more precision 
whether an object has been purposefully handled or modified, such as 
experimental replication, use-wear analysis, and enhanced electronic and digital 
photography and microscopy. For example, some pieces believed to be 
38 As ethologist Desmond Morris concluded after comparing the ‘artistic’ behaviour of chimpanzees 
and humans, “both men and apes possess a sense of design and composition although […] it was 
only man the hunter whose needs led him to utilize this talent and so develop picture-making as an 
active part of his natural existence” (1962:148). 
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engraved bones from the Lower and Middle Palaeolithic, upon closer technical 
examination, have turned out to be of natural (e.g. vascular groves), or animal 
origin (e.g. predator activity) (D’Errico & Nowell 2000; D’Errico & Villa 1997). 
Whereas in the case of MSA shell beads, these techniques have helped 
corroborate human manipulation and suggest probable uses (Bar-Yosef Mayer 
et al. 2009; Vanhaeren et al. 2013). All the objects included in this survey, as far 
as research indicates, have been collected, transformed or made by humans.  
A display purpose is also difficult to resolve, as in the case of ochre use (see 
below), however, the combination of aesthetic properties, labour investment, 
context, and ethnographic analogy, strongly suggest that the five categories 
discussed in this survey were in principle produced to be displayed.  
Finally, conceiving of visual art as part of a cultural system implies that it 
should appear as a recurrent practice in the archaeological record, and not only 
as an accumulation of isolated or ‘one-off’ cases. Cultural traits are typically 
socially shared, persistent, and variable in a population (van Schaik & Pradhan 
2003). Therefore, continuity and/or recurrence in a constrained chrono-
geographical span is used as an inclusion criterion. As a result, the present 
survey of Pleistocene visual art includes forms occurring at more than one site 
within the same time range (of at least 10,000 years) and within a particular 
geographic region; forms that occur at more than one archaeological level in one 
site (suggesting transmission of cultural behaviour over time); and, forms that 
are quantitatively significant at any given site or period (suggesting that they 
were used and/or produced by several individuals, i.e. culturally shared 
behaviour). Overall, the corpus includes evidence related to activities such as the 
colouring and painting of surfaces, personal and artefact ornamentation by 
various techniques, and the inferred intentional transformation of materials 
towards decoration or representation.39 
39 The existing literature on prehistoric art often discusses a handful of artefacts as potential ‘firsts’ 
of visual art forms. The three most prominent examples are the Makapansgat pebble, and the 
Berekhat Ram figurine, and the Tan Tan statuette. These objects apparently show intervention by 
hominins, and are said to represent “the earliest example of some kind of aesthetic sense, or at least 
evidence for recognition of a likeness” (Bahn & Vertut 1997:23). Therefore, they are worth 
mentioning although they are excluded from this study for not complying with the criteria given 
above. The Makapansgat cobble, which resembles a human face, was found in the context of 3-
million-year-old site belonging to Australopithecus. The Berekhat Ram statuette was recovered in 
Israel and estimated to be 250-280,000 years of age, predating the emergence of or species by 
some 50,000 years. The piece is made of volcanic tuff and was artificially enhanced by some 
hominin apparently to make it look like a female figure, which incidentally resembles the later 
Upper Palaeolithic ‘Venuses’ (D’Errico & Nowell 2000). The Tan Tan figurine is an anthropomorphic 
quartzite fragment found in a 400,000-year-old site in Morocco. Like the previous piece, this one 
also seems to have been partly shaped through human intervention, and further has some 
minuscule traces of red pigment (Bednarik 2003). Although these alleged cases of early art-like 
objects cannot be readily dismissed (Bahn & Vertut 1997:26; D’Errico & Nowell 2000:146), the 
interpretive problems and the lack  of academic consensus surrounding them cannot be ignored 
either. Furthermore, even if such artefacts did represent an early aesthetic or formal recognition 
sense, as argued by Bahn and Vertut, as far as we can tell they did not constitute a systematic 
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I reiterate that my focus will be on (purported) Homo sapiens contexts. As 
mentioned before, so far as we can tell, our species is the only hominin sort to 
have produced artworks of sufficient quantity and kind to leave a definite, 
identifiable trace in the archaeological record. Even when the behavioural and 
cognitive complexity of Neanderthals is increasingly being recognized and 
understood, evidence for the regular production and usage of visual art among 
Neanderthals remains ambiguous and controversial (Álvarez & Jöris 2008:32; 
Howell 1999:226; Roebroeks 2008:923; White 2001). A detailed examination of 
purported artworks from the Middle Palaeolithic attributed to Neanderthal 
populations is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of the present study, and 
therefore will not be discussed in the inventory.40 
Now, I finally turn to the survey of Pleistocene art forms, which will further 
map out the development that visual art, with the intention of recognizing 
trends and patterns in this process. At the same time, this survey will provide a 
basis for identifying potential factors that may have shaped and supported the 
emergence of visual art behaviour. 
2.3 Tracing the origins of Pleistocene visual art: A general survey 
This survey, as mentioned before, will focus not on examining the whole record 
of Pleistocene visual art, but on what is currently known as the earliest evidence 
for the five categories established above (ochre, engravings, ornaments, carvings 
and painting) . This evidence falls mainly within two periods: the midpoint of the 
African Middle Stone Age, and the early stages of the European Upper 
Palaeolithic. It must be noted that although we must rely on archaeological data 
(e.g. dates, geographical distribution) for the earliest evidence of visual art 
forms, these may not necessarily correspond with the actual original 
occurrences of art practices, that is, we should not immediately assume that the 
first appearance of art in the archaeological record truly reflects the emergence 
of art behaviour. It is more probable that, as philosopher Kim Sterelny has 
pointed out (2012:811):  
We do not see origins in the record, but the cultural effects of 
innovations as their effects accumulate. We do not see the first 
instance of an innovation; we see it once it has become a routine 
feature of the community toolkit.
Visual art became prominent in the Late Pleistocene, and as the survey shows, it 
often (though not always) intensified, diversified, and became more complex 
over time. The earliest traces of possible visual art activities are found in the 
cultural practice nor do they seem to be in any way related to the development of visual art among 
modern humans (Davis 1993:346). And because it is the latter which I aim to explain, I have excluded 
the three discussed objects from my inventory of Pleistocene visual art.  
40 For a review of this sort see: Langley et al. (2008); Roebroeks (2008); Zilhão (2007). 
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form of ochre extraction and processing. This is followed by the simple 
modification of materials, and later by the crafting of beads and finally, there is 
the systematic production of visual art objects and traditions. Nonetheless, this 
development is not assumed to have happened in strict linear chronological 
succession. The various visual art forms and techniques frequently appear, 
disappear, and reappear in the archaeological record, and ‘simple’ forms usually 
co-occur with more ‘complex’ ones. The apparent trend in the development of 
visual art – from simple to more complex forms – has been recurrently 
attributed to the enhancement of human cognitive capacities over the 
Pleistocene (e.g. Coolidge & Wynn 2005; Mithen 1996a; Morris-Kay 2010). 
However, the increasing diversification of visual art forms, media and techniques 
may also be interpreted in terms of increasing technological sophistication. As I 
will argue, the ‘progression’ of visual art forms may represent a growing labour 
investment in visual art which means that visual art production became an 
increasingly important practice to which more and more time, effort, 
knowledge, skill, and people were devoted. In other words, over the course of 
the Pleistocene visual art forms became progressively more frequent, complex 
and specialized (see discussion in section 2.4). Again, this need not imply a linear 
progression where simple forms gradually gave way to more sophisticated ones. 
Rather it probably involved a process of diversification, where existing types and 
practices provided ‘scaffolds’ for novel – and more complex – forms. According 
to the chronological order in which they first appear in the archaeological 
record, and the amount labour investment they entail (time and effort), I have 
grouped Pleistocene visual art forms into five groups: ochre pigments, personal 
ornaments, incised objects, carved and sculpted figures, and painting. 
Evidently, the five categories suggested here are a simplification for the 
purpose of our study, and there is some overlap, for example, there is ochre on 
ornaments, there are engravings on ochre, some carved figures seem to have 
been used as pendants, and cave art usually includes a combination of 
techniques such as engraving, finger tracing, and painting. Furthermore, there 
are surely several other art forms we can think of which have been lost to 
archaeology, such as sand drawings, designs on wood, fibres or leather, and 
body art. Many researchers in fact agree that the human body must have been 
the first canvas of visual artistry (Donald 1991:277; Schildkrout 2004; Turner 
1980). Ethnographic examples of body art include several techniques applied to 
the skin, teeth and hair, like shaping, cutting, piercing, scarifying, tattooing, 
branding, and painting. We could also include here hairstyles and clothing 
(Gilligan 2010). Traces of these practices are naturally lost with the 
decomposition of the human body and biological materials, however, some 
indirect evidence can be used to infer them, like the presence of ochre 
pigments, which will be the first category to be discussed.41 
41 Body art (e.g. tattoos, scarification, painting) and the use of garments can also be inferred from 
figurative art. For example, the ‘Venus’ figurines have proven a valuable source of information about 
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Figure 2. Geographical location of the most important sites included in this survey. 
Ochre pigments 
Ochre is a generic term that encompasses several naturally occurring minerals 
with high contents of iron oxides that produce a range of hues in yellow, brown, 
orange, and red. Typical ochre minerals like limonite or hematite can be rubbed 
directly on surfaces to apply colour or be crushed to produce powders of reddish 
shades that can then be used as pigment (Henshilwood et al. 2011:219). Other 
Palaeolithic female hairstyles, headgear, and garments, and of possible body art patterns (Soffer et 
al. 2000). Rock art from the European Palaeolithic has also provided some clues about the use of 
complex clothing and hats (Gilligan 2010). 
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naturally occurring minerals which may be used for pigment production include, 
among others, gypsum and kaolin (white), charcoal and manganese dioxide 
(black).  
The archaeological evidence of pigment use is rather ambiguous in that we 
are normally presented with only traces of ochre processing, or merely the raw 
material itself. As observed by archaeologist Francesco D’Errico and colleagues 
(2012:943): 
Pigments found at archaeological sites in the form of modified chunks 
or residues adhering to objects are generally the by-product of a 
sequence of actions that is difficult to reconstruct. It is for this reason 
that the interpretation of early pigment use is often controversial in 
nature. 
Although we do find some examples of pigment applied to objects in the record 
of early Pleistocene visual art, most of the time its final purpose has to be 
inferred by the researcher. Accordingly, this subsection is divided in two parts: 
one dealing with evidence for the extraction and processing of ochre minerals 
(possibly to produce coloured pigments), and the other dedicated to the 
different uses that we can observe directly or infer indirectly from the 
archaeological context. 
Ochre extraction and processing 
The earliest possible evidence of ochre exploitation in Africa actually is over 
200,000 years old, predating the earliest fossil specimens of our species, and 
thus surpasses the time range set for this survey. However, the information is 
relevant because it suggests that our immediate hominin ancestors had “at the 
very least an awareness of these minerals and their properties and their 
availability in the landscape” (Barham 1998:708), which sets an important 
precedent for the development of ochre use as a regular behaviour among H. 
sapiens. Evidence from various sites, most notably Kapthurin in Kenya (Barham 
2002:189, McBrearty & Brooks 2000:528) and Twin Rivers in Zambia (Barham 
1998, 2002), includes the accumulation of large quantities of ochre minerals 
(e.g. limonite, hematite, specularite) some of which show traces of intentional 
abrasion, indicating that they may have been scraped and rubbed onto surfaces 
to obtain yellow and reddish hues (Barham 1998:705, 2002:188). Conservatively, 
the dates from these sites indicate that by 270,000 years BP African hominins 
already “had incorporated color into their lives” (Barham 2002:189). 
The first example of ochre exploitation by Homo sapiens comes from 
the South African site of Pinnacle Point (Marean et al. 2007; McBrearty & 
Stringer 2007). In this location, archaeologists found an accumulation of over 
fifty pieces of red ochre, a dozen of which showed traces of use (grinding and 
scraping). This ochre find, dated to 164,000 BP, “has all the hallmarks of pigment 
for body-painting and perhaps colouring of other organic surfaces” (Marean et 
al. 2007: 907). 
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The evidence of ochre extraction in South Africa during the Late Pleistocene 
is abundant. Ochre use is recorded at the sites of Klasies River and Howiesons 
Poort going back to 100,000 and 80,000 years BP, respectively. The 
archaeological material from Border Cave includes ‘hematite pencils’ older than 
100,000 years, and Blombos Cave has a record of ochre exploitation spanning 
multiple stratigraphic layers dated from 100 to 75,000 years ago (McBrearty & 
Brooks 2000:528; Watts 2009).42 At the latter site, a recent find revealed an 
ochre processing workshop that includes two toolkits used for producing and 
storing an ochre mixture. The toolkits consist of two abalone shell containers, a 
stone cobble, probably used as a hammerstone, mineral residues from 
grindstones, crushed bones whose marrow could be used as a pigment binder, 
charcoal, and red ochre. This find has been dated to circa 100,000 years BP and 
is the best evidence that in the MSA humans were purposively exploiting ochre 
for pigment extraction (Henshilwood et al. 2011). It also gives an indication of 
the sorts of activities and materials involved in ochre-processing. 
 There are other early examples of ochre extraction and use beyond 
Africa. In the site of Qafzeh Cave, in Israel, several lumps of red ochre with 
traces of scraping have been recovered from stratigraphic layers dated to 92,000 
BP (Hovers et al. 2003). These pieces of ochre were transported into the site 
from outward locations where intense red hue minerals (hematite) could be 
found, indicating  purposive selection and preference for particular raw 
materials. The ochre lumps were found alongside some smaller bits, possibly 
debris, suggesting a work area or ochre processing-workshop. There also is a 
possible association of ochre occurrence with human burials and marine shells 
at this site (Bar-Yosef Mayer et al. 2009; Hovers et al. 2003). Incidentally, Qafzeh 
constitutes the first modern human occupation outside Africa, although it may 
be considered an extension of habitat range, rather than a ‘migration’ 
(Borroughs 2009:109). This modern human enclave in the Levant, however, did 
not flourish for long, and its members soon went extinct leaving no traceable 
descendants in any existing gene pool (Forster 2004:261; Mellars 2004:461). The 
data from this site offers further support that ochre extraction and use was 
established as a customary activity among H. sapiens populations by 100,000 BP. 
In Europe, the use of ochre minerals is well documented in the Neanderthal 
archaeological record of the Middle Palaeolithic, particularly towards the end of 
that period between 60 and 40,000 BP (Caron et al. 2011; D’Errico 2008; D’Errico 
et al. 2010; Soressi & D’Errico 2007; Roebroeks et al. 2012;  Zilhão et al. 2010). 
Iron oxides producing orange, yellow and red were exploited, although in low 
quantities. The most common colour mineral used among these hominins was 
manganese dioxide, which produces a black pigment (D’Errico 2008:170). The 
differences in ochre use between the Middle and Early Upper Palaeolithic, 
42 The sites mentioned here only include the earliest samples of ochre exploitation but the actual 
record is much more extensive. For a general overview, see: Watts (1999).  
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however, are both quantitative and qualitative. Not only is the frequency of 
ochre exploitation in the later period much higher, but also a preference for the 
colour red is quite marked (Watts 1999, 2009). Furthermore, in the Early Upper 
Palaeolithic, especially in the Gravettian, red ochre is often found in burials (Riel-
Salvatore & Gravel-Miguel 2013:330).43  
Ochre applications 
Whether ochre use qualifies as evidence of human visual art behaviour has been 
hotly debated among archaeologists. Although the aesthetic, symbolic or 
ritualistic connotations of red ochre in particular have often been highlighted 
(e.g. Knight et al. 1995), ochre can have many different domestic (utilitarian) 
applications that would not necessarily involve any artistic intentions (Wadley 
2005; Wadley et al. 2004). There is no need, however, to divorce the utilitarian 
from the artistic. Ethnographic data show that pigments may be used in both 
practical as well as symbolic contexts, and that these are not mutually exclusive 
(McBrearty & Stringer 2007:794; Rifkin 2012). 
Some practical applications of ochre include, among others, the treatment 
and preservation of hides and production of leather objects (Dubreuil & 
Grosman 2009:948). Ochre can also be mixed with resins and wax to produce an 
effective adhesive to, for instance, attach stone tools like points, blades and 
arrows to hafts and shafts (Wadley 2005). Ochre clays are also known to have 
some medicinal properties, for instance antiseptic, astringent and deodorizing 
qualities; and when eaten they can have a purging effect and help against 
stomach pain (Velo 1984, 1986). Finally, ochre and other mineral pigments 
either mixed with oils or by themselves can offer skin protection against insects 
and the elements, as ‘sunblock’ (Ellis et al. 1997). 
The fact that pigment use is also well documented in the Neanderthal 
record points to the possibility that it could have been a widespread hominin 
practice, either for its visual properties or as a useful adhesive for the production 
of composite tools or in the treatment of animal hides. The question of whether 
ochre was attributed any symbolic meaning applies equally to Neanderthals as 
to early modern humans (D’Errico 2008; Zilhão et al. 2010). Symbolism is not an 
intrinsic quality of coloured minerals, but rather it is a property given by social 
practice. Thus, as noted by archaeologist Wil Roebroeks and colleagues 
(2012:1893) the mere occurrence of ochre or other pigments should not 
immediately be taken as evidence for either artistic or symbolic behaviour.  
43 The association of red ochre and human burial is also observed in one of the earliest known 
archaeological sites in Australia, Lake Mungo dated around 60-40,000 BP, where a modern human 
skeleton covered in red ochre pigment was found (Bowler et al. 2003; Klein & Edgar 2002:248; 
Stringer 1999). It is notable that the source of the ochre was about 200 kilometres away from the 
burial site, which implies that the material was specifically sought after and transported a long 
distance (Klein & Edgar 2002:249).  
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The issue remains whether ochre and other minerals were used as 
pigments in artistic activities. The ethnographic record shows that pigments 
have a generalized use in body ornamentation and ritual activities, as paint or 
dye applied to the face, body and hair, attires, and in tattooing. Body paint and 
these other examples of pigment application are unfortunately ephemeral 
activities that leave no direct trace in the archaeological record. But the 
generalized use of body painting among historical hunter-gatherers (both living 
and extinct), and its cultural relevance as a (primordial) marker of social identity 
strongly suggests that the use of pigments for bodily decoration was probably 
practiced at some point among Pleistocene humans (cf. Fiore 2008; Layton 1989; 
Power 1999; Turner 1980; Schildkrout 2004). So, if ethnographic data serves as 
an analogy, at least for modern humans, it is rather likely that throughout 
prehistory pigments were used as hide preservatives, adhesives, medicine, sun 
and insect protection, as well as for personal and artefact ornamentation and in 
ritual. The use of mineral pigments does not preclude at all the functional or the 
ceremonial, “ochre seems to have been a material with both symbolic and 
utilitarian functions” (McBrearty & Stringer 2007:794).  
It is however significant that among the members of our species particularly 
red-coloured minerals were recurrently targeted and preferred over blacks or 
whites, which points to an intentional selection that would not be expected if 
pigment use had been strictly utilitarian (McBrearty & Stringer 2007; Watts 
1999). The persistent presence of red ochre in Pleistocene funerary contexts 
furthermore points towards its probable importance in ritual activity. The 
relation between red ochre and human burial may be an ancient one as 
evidenced by the possible association at Qafzeh (Hovers et al. 2003:507). Red 
ochre is also a frequent element in funerary contexts from the Gravettian in 
Upper Palaeolithic Europe – e.g. Sungir, Russia; Krems-Wachtberg, Austria; Dolní 
Vestonice, Czech Republic (Einwögerer et al. 2006; Formicola 2007:446; Riel-
Salvatore & Gravel-Miguel 2013:330). It may be argued that the incidence of red 
ochre in human burials may be related to its preserving and deodorizing 
qualities, but symbolic references to blood, life and death can hardly be avoided 
in light of ethnographic and historical records showing that red pigment often 
plays an important role in the symbolic lives of many human groups, in Australia, 
Africa, and the Americas (Knight 2009; Morris 2010:10; Wrenschner 1980). 
Anthropologist Ernst Wreschner has noted that there might be an evolutionary 
perceptual/aesthetic bias towards the colour red because of its potential 
emotional association with blood, and conceptions of life and death (1980). 
Similarly, Ian Watts, who has analysed the Pleistocene ochre record extensively, 
has highlighted that beside redness, ochre properties such as lustre and 
brilliance might also act as sensory stimuli that produce an ‘aesthetic effect’ in 
humans (1999:129).44 The aesthetic appeal of red ochre is also suggested by the 
44 Anthropologists Chris Knight, Ian Watts and Camilla Power have attempted to explain “why 
red ochre became the cultural species marker of Homo sapiens” (Power 2009:257) by suggesting 
From the cradle to the cave 
49 
fact that Pleistocene ornaments (beads and pendants) often show traces of 
having been rubbed with it (see below), which shows that they were either 
purposefully coloured, or they acquired the ochre by contact with coloured 
surfaces (e.g. skin, hair, garments). 
In conclusion, ochre use seems to be an ancient human practice. Moreover, 
in both Africa and Europe the appearance of modern H. sapiens is accompanied 
by an increase in the frequency and quantity of red ochre exploitation. So, even 
if by itself it remains ambiguous as evidence for visual artistic behaviour, as 
Watts has argued convincingly, the habitual occurrence of red ochre minerals 
(for pigment production) may be considered a defining archaeological marker of 
our species (2009:80). 
Personal  ornaments 
Archaeologists usually classify as personal or body ornaments those “small, 
durable objects that are somehow modified for suspension or attachment to 
that early modern human females developed the bio-social strategy of faking menstrual blood 
with red ochre pigments for their own benefit (Knight 1991; Knight et al. 1995; Power 1999, 
2004; Watts 1999, 2009). Their ‘sham menstruation’ or ‘female cosmetic coalition’ model proposes 
that the costs of pregnancy and child rearing on females and decreased mobility of mothers 
due to the high dependability of their infants, constraining their access to resources. 
Therefore, human females needed to secure maximum male cooperation in subsistence and 
parental investment. Males are likely to direct their interest and resources to fertile females. 
And since human females have lost physical signs of oestrus, menstruation works as the only 
reliable indicator of female fertility so, women would want to advertise and amplify that signal to 
attract males and entice them to provide for them (and their offspring) with the promise of 
future mating opportunities. Using visual signalling as a collective deception strategy would 
also entail the foundation of symbolism and ritual. On the one part, ‘faking’ involves convention 
and displaced reference in which a group (in this case the female coalition) agrees that a signal 
stands for something that is not. And on the other, that agreement would have to be made public 
and reinforced by costly collective rituals that display commitment to the coalition. The 'sham 
menstruation' hypothesis, so briefly sketched here, faces various problems. Firstly, it assumes the 
loss of oestrus in the human lineage, which supposedly triggered changes in reproductive 
strategies; but it is possible that oestrus signs such as the genital swelling of chimps is a separate 
development that humans never presented, or that its loss goes back a long time, to the 
evolution of bipedalism (Pawlowski 1999). Either way, it should not be given weight as the 
direct cause of human socio-sexual organization. Secondly, although sham menstruation is 
documented ethnographically, there is no evidence that it was generally practiced by early H. 
sapiens groups (Hovers et al. 2003:510). Utilitarian, rather than symbolic explanations for the 
presence of red ochre in Middle Stone Age African sites cannot be discarded, as discussed in the 
text (Boyd et al. 1995). Thirdly, it assumes that the strategy would invariably succeed, but fails to 
explain satisfactorily why men would ‘fall for it’ (Taylor 1996:104). Furthermore it does not 
clarify, for example, why non-related males would be tolerant of each other, or why female 
coalitions did not end up in a gender segregated matriarchal system, as among elephant groups. 
Finally, hominin females probably did not have to come up with a scheme to ‘force’ men to provide 
for them and help them rear their offspring, since male-female bonds and intersexual cooperation 
is near-universal among higher primates (van Schaik & Dunbar 1990). Thus, the sexual division 
of labour probably is not a result of early H. sapiens female coalitions, but more likely is an 
ancestral form of social organization, as it is also common among social carnivores (Guthrie 2005). 
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other materials” (Kuhn & Stiner 2007b:43), including beads, pendants, and 
‘charms’, which are referred to generically as ‘beads’. These could have been 
used as object decorations (e.g. garments, batons, baskets) as well as for 
jewellery (White 1992:554).  
Once considered mere ‘trinkets’, archaeologists now recognize the artistic, 
symbolic and social potential of these items and the important role that they 
might have played in the lives of Pleistocene humans (Moro & González 2010). 
This re-evaluation acknowledges that ornaments can be imbued with specific 
social functions. Several authors agree that body ornamentation is a good 
medium for social communication, particularly to convey messages of ethnicity 
and identity (Coe 2003; Kölbl 2009; Kuhn & Stiner 2007a, 2007b; Vanhaeren 
2005; White 1993; Wiessner 1983, 1984; Wilkins 2010; Wobst 1977; Zilhão 
2007). Furthermore, because personal ornaments “are the most characteristic 
artifacts that help to trace human symbolic behaviour” (Álvarez & Jöris 2011), 
they are also considered a hallmark trait of modern humans (D’Errico 2007:130; 
McBrearty & Brooks 2000:521). 
Body decoration in ochre and other pigments (body painting) can also carry 
social messages (Fiore 2008). But, as noted by archaeologists Steven Kuhn and 
Mary Stiner, beads, pendants, charms and jewellery perform better than 
pigment as a technology for information transmission because they free 
communication from direct face-to-face interaction and can encompass a wider 
range of messages. Thus, the emergence of body ornamentation might indicate 
“an expanded scale of social interaction, with messages exchanged over larger 
areas and among a wider variety of people” (2007a:51). This implies a qualitative 
change in the way people used ornaments to engage in communication. I will 
elaborate on this in chapter 6. 
According to the criterion of labour investment, I have divided personal 
ornaments in two subcategories. The first, modified ornaments, includes natural 
items (e.g. shells, teeth, fossils, etc.) that have been selected and frequently, 
though not always, slightly modified presumably for display. The second 
subcategory, manufactured ornaments, is constituted by those ornaments which 
have been fully shaped by a more complex production process that includes 
selecting a raw material and subsequently working and modelling it to obtain 
the desired form. These include, for instance, beads made ‘from scratch’ using 
ivory, antler, stone, and bone. 
Modified ornaments 
The type of ornaments discussed in the following paragraphs entail in most 
cases natural objects that have been collected and slightly altered by humans to 
fulfil their new function, for instance by polishing, perforating, or stringing them. 
In any case, the amount of labour applied to the materials after collection was 
not considerable, although the modification process might still have required 
special knowledge of the materials and certain skill (see: Tátá et al. 2014). 
From the cradle to the cave 
51 
Modified ornaments, then, are human-altered natural objects such as shells, 
stones, animal teeth, etc. that often have been interpreted as beads or 
pendants, for use in jewellery, but that could equally have been braided in the 
hair, sewn to pieces of clothing, or attached to personal items like bags, baskets, 
or domestic utensils (White 1992:554).  
This kind of items has recently become centre stage in discussions on the 
origins of visual art. Since the discovery of a collection of shells dating from 
75,000 BP at the site of Blombos Cave in South Africa in the early 2000s 
(Henshilwood et al. 2004), the number of finds, and the age of the shells has 
only increased. The evidence now indicates that at the least by 100,000 years 
ago, humans were using modified marine shells for display purposes, likely as 
personal ornaments. Most of these early beads come from coastal sites in the 
North and South of Africa, but there are also significant examples from the 
Middle East and the Levant. The latter region has in fact yielded potentially the 
oldest objects of this kind. Excavations at the cave site of Skhul in Mount Carmel, 
Israel, during the early 1930s exposed a rich archaeological context that included 
the buried remains of ten (modern human) individuals, lithic artefacts, and a few 
seashells. The site has been dated between 135 and 100,000 BP. A recent 
analysis of the shells, now housed in the natural History Museum in London, 
revealed that at least two perforated Nassarius gibbosolus specimens were 
probably used as beads. The cave, high up from sea level, could not have been 
reached by the sea so that the shells could not have been naturally deposited, 
also animals would not have transported them that far, and there are not 
enough shells to consider human consumption. Therefore, it is likely that the 
cave dwellers selected and transported the shells to the site, and given that they 
are perforated, it is probable that they were used for suspension (Vanhaeren et 
al. 2006). At the nearby site of Qafzeh Cave (92,000 BP) ten marine bivalve shells 
(Glycymeris insubrica) were found. As in the previous case, the presence of the 
shells is best explained by human agency, since the cave is some 40 km away 
from the coast. Also, most of the shells have perforations, traces of use wear, 
signs of stringing, and some of them also bear red ochre stains (Bar-Yosef Mayer 
et al. 2009). Finally, archaeologist Steven Kuhn and colleagues (2001) have 
reported a series of shell beads from the sites of Ksar ‘Akil in Lebanon, and 
Üçağizli Cave in Turkey, dating back between 41 and 43,000 BP. Most of the 
specimens correspond to the species Nassarius gibbosula and Columbella 
rustica, although the bivalve Glycymeris and other small gastropod shells are 
also present. Many of the shells are perforated presumably for suspension. 
Again, the presence of the shells can be attributed to human intervention, and it 
is notable that the inhabitants of these sites, as in the other cases, “were 
selective in their choice of shells for ornament making, preferring comparatively 
rare varieties with luminous white or brightly colored shells, some with arresting 
patterns” (Kuhn et al. 2001:7642). 
In Africa, small marine shells probably used as ornaments have been found 
in several Pleistocene sites. On the north of the continent, in Morocco, they 
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have been recovered at Smuggler’s Cave, with a date of 108,000 years BP (Balter 
2011), at Pigeons Cave, 82,500 years BP, at Rhafas Cave, 80-70,000 years BP, and 
at Ifri n’Ammar, 83,000 years BP (D’Errico et al. 2009). The 13 seashells 
(Nassarius gibbosulus) from Pigeons Cave were transported some 40 km, and 
show intentional perforations, signs of wear, and  one bears red pigment 
residues (Bouzouggar et al. 2007). Finally, the collection from the Musée de 
l’Homme in Paris included a Nassarius shell from the site of Oued Djebbana, in 
Algeria, with an estimated age of 90,000 BP (Vanhaeren et al. 2006:1787).  
In South Africa, the richest collection of MSA shell beads has been 
recovered at Blombos Cave. A total of 68 Nassarius shells from stratigraphic 
layers dated to c. 75,000 BP (Henshilwood et al. 2004). Here, too, the 
examination of the shells has discarded the possibility of natural deposition, 
leaving human action as the only explanation. Microscopic and experimental 
analysis has indicated that the shells with perforation were probably pierced 
with a bone point, and show traces of stringing and wear (Fig. 4). Most of the 
shells were found in groups, which is indicative that each group might have been 
part of single beadwork items (Vanhaeren et al. 2013:2). The shells form 
Blombos, in short, are the best evidence that in the mid MSA these objects were 
being used for display, probably as ornaments. Elsewhere in South Africa, six 
perforated Afrolittorina africana seashells were found at Sibudu Cave and dated 
to 70,000 BP (D’Errico et al. 2008), however further analysis has not yet 
confirmed that they were used as beads (Vanhaeren et al. 2013:501). Finally, 
Border Cave yielded a perforated Conus shell associated with a human burial, 
dated to 76,000 BP (Vanhaeren et al. 2013:500).  
So far, there are no more finds of shell beads in sub-Saharan Africa after 
70,000 BP. The next find of African personal ornaments is constituted 
by manufactured beads of ostrich eggshell dated ca. 40,000 BP (see below). In 
any case the evidence further suggests “that soon after 100,000 years, and 
possibly even earlier, personal ornamentation became a widespread practice 
in Africa, and adjacent areas of southwest Asia” (Bouzouggar et al. 2007:9968). 
In Europe, personal ornaments begin to appear at high frequencies in the 
Early Upper Palaeolithic, at the time related to the spread of modern humans 
into this region.45 Throughout the Aurignacian (45-28,000 BP), there are 
abundant modified ornaments made from marine shells, often from small 
gastropods (including Nassarius) and mammal teeth, but also from a wide range 
of other materials, such as freshwater, terrestrial and even fossil shells, fish 
vertebrae, animal bone, minerals, crystals, and amber (Álvarez & Jöris 2011; 
Kuhn & Stiner 2007b:44; White 2007). Clearly, eye-catching lustrous (and often 
45 Zilhão and colleagues (2010) have reported the presence of shells in Neanderthal occupations in 
Spain, dated to ca. 50,000. At Cueva de los Aviones, 4 Glycymeris insubrica shells were found, and 
Cueva Antón a shell of Pecten maximus with pigment remains has been recovered. The authors 
suggest that these must have been used as personal ornaments. In my opinion, however, the 
evidence is not as conclusive as it is for the MSA and EUP sites. 
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exotic) raw materials were selected to be modified into ornaments (Álvarez & 
Jöris 2011:35; White 1993). The use of modified natural objects as ornaments 
continued during the whole of the Upper Palaeolithic, but along these, 
manufactured beads also became common.  
Manufactured ornaments 
In contrast to the previous category of objects, the following paragraphs deal 
with ornaments which have gone through a more elaborated and exhaustive 
manufacturing process, where the raw material has been collected, worked 
(sometimes extensively), and shaped to create the final artefact.46 This process 
entails a greater investment of labour as well as time, a good knowledge of the 
qualities of the raw material and the tools and techniques to modify it. These 
kinds of personal ornaments made ‘from scratch’ appear in the archaeological 
record later in time than the modified sort. Like the previous, manufactured 
ornaments may have been used as body decoration, to adorn artefacts, or even 
as buttons (Gilligan 2010:57; White 1992:554). 
In Africa, the oldest of these manufactured ornaments, as mentioned 
before, are ostrich eggshell beads. At the site of Border Cave, in South Africa, 14 
of these have been found in layers pertaining to 44-41,000 BP (D’Errico et al. 
2012). To create them, people first cut and shaped ‘blanks’ of ostrich eggshell, 
which were then perforated and reduced to round discs. At Enkapune Ya Muto 
rockshelter in Kenya, in a layer dated to around 41,000 BP, 25 ostrich eggshell 
beads in different stages of the production process were excavated, revealing 
the laborious manufacturing method. As noted by archaeologist Stanley 
Ambrose, these items “may mark the dawn of an era of new artefact 
manufacturing techniques (drilling and grinding) and of personal adornment” 
(1998a:388). At times, the beads were further modified by heating, to turn them 
dark (D’Errico et al. 2012), or by applying ochre (Ambrose, pers. comm.) 
(Fig. 5)47. Ostrich eggshell beads have been found at other locations in Africa 
with similar dates (e.g. Mumba rockshelter in Tanzania), suggesting a 
widespread cultural tradition (Ambrose 1998a; D’Errico et al. 2012). 
Incidentally, ostrich eggshell beads are very important in the economy of 
the contemporary !Kung San hunter-gatherers of the Kalahari, constituting 
the core of their gift exchange system – the hxaro (Wiessner 1982). This 
suggests a function for the Pleistocene examples, and also creates the 
possibility of some cultural continuity in the region (D’Errico et al. 2012; 
Deacon 1992). 
46 Randall White has used the term “purposely fabricated beads” (1989:218), for what I have called 
“manufactured ornaments”. 
47 Fig. 5 shows: on the top two rows, finished eggshell beads, some with traces of ochre and burning 
(the second bead from the right on the second row is bone). The next three rows show earlier stages 
in bead manufacture. The middle disk on the bottom row has traces of red ochre, suggesting that it 




In Europe, as with modified ornaments, there is a high occurrence of 
manufactured beads in archaeological sites from the Aurignacian onwards. The 
most common raw material used in this region for making beads was mammoth 
ivory, but other materials like bone, antler, minerals, limestone, and amber were 
also habitual (Álvarez & Jöris 2011). 
The fabrication process of ivory beads has been well-studied and reveals 
that these ornaments were semi-mass produced, creating standard shapes, 
some of which show regional patterning. For example, in France the most 
common form in the Aurignacian is the so-called basket-shaped bead (White 
1989:223, 1993:280) (Fig. 6), whereas in German Swabia it is the tear-drop-
shaped and the two-holed bead that are typical (Barth et al. 2009; Kölbl 2009; 
White 1993:283) (Fig. 7). Ivory pendants could be created individually by carving 
and scraping a piece of ivory into shape, but more commonly beads were 
produced in series. This process involved preparing an ivory rod, dividing it in 
segments by thinning to produce preforms or blanks, perforating each preform, 
and then smoothing and polishing each blank into the final form (Barth et al. 
2009:16; White 1989:224) (Fig.3). 
Figure 3. Five discrete stages in the production process of Aurignacian ivory beads. 
Greater variation in form is to be expected in beads produced from scratch, as 
the makers are not as constrained by the original form of the raw material as in 
the case of modified natural objects like shells or animal teeth. The fact that 
some forms, materials and production techniques were localized even within 
regions (Kölbl 2009) indicates that the knowledge involved in bead-making was 
socially transmitted and, as reproduction experiments have revealed, it required 
considerable time and skill. Archaeologist Randall White, who has studied and 
reconstructed various techniques for fabricating ivory Palaeolithic beads, has 
estimated that “well over one hour of labor per bead is required by this process” 
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(1993:282). The reconstruction of beads reveals on the one hand a labour-
intensive sequence, but on the other hand, it also shows that people were 
maximizing production by using techniques that allowed the creation of several 
beads from a single piece of raw material, reducing waste and time investment. 
This, along with the remarkable standardization of Aurignacian beads, hints “at 
incipient craft specialization” (White 1989:223).  
The use of these artefacts as personal ornaments during the Early 
Upper Palaeolithic is supported by the fact that manufactured beads have 
often been found in burials. The most remarkable example is the multiple 
burial site of Sungir, in Russia. This grave, which dates back to the Gravettian 
(ca. 28,000 BP) or the Aurignacian (ca. 32,000 BP), contained the remains of 
five individuals, three of which were lavishly ornamented with thousands of 
beads that were originally sawn on their clothes and headgear, and also 
strung as jewellery. The bodies also bore modified ornaments (fox teeth and 
schist pendants), showing that these two kinds of  decorations were used 
side-by-side (White 1993:287- 294). The Sungir burial is, of course, exceptional. 
However, a recent comparative analysis of Palaeolithic mortuary practices has 
shown that actually ornaments and ochre are “notably more frequent” in 
Early Upper Palaeolithic burials (namely from the Gravettian), than in 
graves from the later Palaeolithic (Riel-Salvatore & Gravel-Miguel 2013:330). 
In the funerary sample from the EUP, manufactured beads are 
commonly found in the graves of adults and infants, usually in low 
quantities per individual, and often near the head, neck, torso, and arms, 
indicating that, as in Sungir, these were most probably attached to headgear 
and items of clothing worn in daily life (Riel-Salvatore & Gravel-Miguel 
2013:330), that is, the ornaments probably were not grave goods 
created especially for the funeral occasion. The possibility that both adults 
and children were frequently buried with their everyday ornaments supports 
the idea that these items had strong personal connotations of individual 
identity.48  
48 The close association with garments could also be an ancient one. As Ian Gilligan has suggested, 
it is possible that the emergence of personal ornaments correlates with the introduction of complex 
sawn clothing (2010). Blombos Cave has yielded bone awls that could have been used for garment 
production as early as 84,000 BP (Gilligan 2010:50), and studies on the divergence between head 
and clothing lice suggest that humans may have started wearing clothes systematically by 170,000 







This category includes all objects showing traces of intentionally made designs, 
generally by incision or engraving, on various materials.49 In principle, the labour 
investment involved in making these patterns may be no greater than that 
required for modified ornaments. Although it might take more dexterity and 
precision to create a discernible design on a surface (Henshilwood & D’Errico 
2011:77). Minimally, “an external understanding of conventional tools, 
techniques, and gestures, raw materials, tool breakage patterns, stability of 
working surfaces, and special strategies for engraving is required” in engraving 
or incising actions (White 1996:219).  
The earliest reliable examples of this category come from various Middle 
Stone Age sites in Africa (Cain 2006; Henshilwood & D’Errico 2011). Most 
notably, in Blombos Cave a collection of over a dozen engraved pieces of ochre 
dated between 100 and 75,000 years ago has been recovered (Henshilwood et 
al. 2009; Henshilwood & D’Errico 2011:78). Several bone fragments incised with 
linear patterns have also been found at this site (Henshilwood et al. 2002). While 
some of the grooves on these objects may seem random scratches, many of the 
pieces in the collection clearly show deliberate, geometric, patterned marking. 
Furthermore, a few pieces portray clearly organised geometrical arrangements. 
The best known example is the rectangular piece of reddish-brown siltstone 
which bears a deliberate double chevron design, recovered from a layer dated 
between 78 and 74,000 BP (Fig. 9). Closer examination has shown that the piece 
was faceted and ground in preparation for the engraving (Henshilwood et al. 
2009:33), indicating that the incising involved more than a spontaneous action. 
Incised or notched fragments of ostrich eggshell have been recovered from 
the basal strata at Apollo 11, Namibia, dating back to at least 83,000 years ago 
(Wilkins 2010:110). Another remarkable collection of ostrich eggshell pieces, of 
no less than 270 fragments, comes from the rock shelter of Diepkloof in South 
Africa, and has been dated to around 60,000 years BP (Texier et al. 2010). The 
pieces on this collection show deeply engraved, well-arranged linear motifs. 
Close analysis has indicated that a standardised engraving technique was used 
for the markings, with the long parallel lines done first, and the shorter, crossing 
49 There are a number of incised pieces of bone from Lower and Middle Palaeolithic sites which 
have been claimed to be intentional and of a symbolic nature. The most notorious of these is the 
bone from the German site of Bilzingsleben, which bears some parallel markings (Mania & Mania 
1988). However, as with other cases of ‘early symbolism’ the origin of this piece remains 
debatable and ambiguous (Mithen 1996a:175). For example, it proves difficult to determine whether 
the incisions were made intentionally or were a by-product of other actions such as sharpening 
cutting tools or defleshing the bone (Davis 1993:344). As the reader will note, these kinds of 
markings are qualitatively different from those discussed in these section, which show clear design 
patterns and therefore allow to infer some intentionality and a display function, which are two of  
the inclusion criteria given at the beginning of this survey. 
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lines, second. The incised eggshell fragments have been interpreted as the 
probable remains of ostrich egg water containers, like the ones known from San 
ethnography. San hunter-gatherers traditionally use ostrich eggs to collect and 
store water in different locations throughout the landscape. Often, these 
containers are marked with geometric patterns, similar to the ones on the 
archaeological examples, to indicate ownership or content (Henshilwood & 
D’Errico 2011:80; Texier et al. 2010). 
The early archaeological assemblages of the European Early Upper 
Palaeolithic typically include incised objects such as engraved pieces of bone, 
ivory and stone which have generally been classified as mobiliary or portable art 
(Bahn 1998:84). Some of the earliest examples from the Aurignacian show linear 
patterns, dot arrangements, crosses and some schematic motifs (Mellars 
1996:398; Zilhão 2007:34). For instance, the bone and ivory shafts engraved with 
parallel and criss-crossed lines from Vogelherd, Germany and Mladeč, Czech 
Republic, and the bone fragments engraved with linear motifs from Arcy-sur-
cure in France (Mellars 1996:395, 415). Later engraved pieces – from the 
Gravettian, Solutrean and Magdalenian periods – frequently  feature figurative 
motifs as well, including human and animal figures. Engraved motifs are also a 
common component of European rock art. Cave and open-air rock art sites 
generally include numerous instances of linear, geometric, or representational 
patterns engraved on rock (Bahn & Vertut 1997:166).  
Objects incised with linear or geometric patterns could be interpreted as 
strictly ‘notational’, for instance as mnemonic aids, records, tallies, or time-
keeping purposes (D’Errico 1998; Marschack 1972), rather than as artworks. 
‘Notational’ objects are well known from the ethnographic record, for instance 
the ‘message sticks’ among Australian hunter-gatherers (Howitt 1889) and the 
record-keeping notched sticks of the Irkut Buryat of Mongolia (Luria & Vygotsky 
1992:77). For some authors, having a notational function would disqualify 
incised objects as visual art (Elkins 1996:200). However, we again cannot rule 
out artistry on account of functionality (White 1996). Moreover, according to the 
criteria used for this survey, the relevant aspect is not whether the incised 
objects are notational or decorative, but rather that they represent the human 
intention to mark particular objects in a precise way for display, and that these 
markings were part of a conventional communication system (cf. Henshilwood & 
D’Errico 2011:92). 
Carved and sculpted objects 
The production of carved or sculpted two- and three-dimensional objects 
frequently involves a much greater amount of work and expertise than the art 
forms that we have discussed so far. It requires a good knowledge of the base 
material, appropriate – perhaps specialized – tools, and, in the case of figurative 
motifs, artistic skill and understanding of conventions to properly depict the 
desired subject.  
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Carved figures are still absent from the archaeological record of Late 
Pleistocene Africa.50 The Eurasian Upper Palaeolithic, in contrast, includes 
several impressive examples of such items. Recently, remains of what seems to 
be an ivory anthropomorphic figurine have been recovered at the Russian site of 
Kostenki. The possible human head has been dated to 42-45,000 BP (Anikovich 
et al. 2007; Cook 2013:56), which would make it the oldest example of figurative 
representation yet found. However, identification is uncertain due to the worn 
condition of the piece. 
The German region of Swabia, has yielded what so far is the earliest 
tradition of figurative art, consisting of over 40 figurines carved in mammoth 
ivory, found in various Aurignacian contexts dated between 40 and 30,000 BP 
(Conard & Bolus 2003; Porr 2010:92). The cave sites of Hohle 
Fels, Geissenklösterle, Vogelherd, and Höhlenstein-Stadel, among others, 
have yielded the dozens of figures depicting Pleistocene fauna (mammoth, 
horse, bison, lion, bear, water fowl) and a few anthropomorphic and 
therianthropic (human-animal) representations (Cook 2013:48; Rau et al. 
2009). The oldest of these so far is a female ‘Venus’ figurine from the basal 
Aurignacian layers at Hohle Fels, estimated to be some 40,000 years of age 
(Fig. 10). The small figure, carved in ivory, is just 6 cm by 3.5 cm, and 
shows a female body with exaggerated sexual features, it has a loop for a 
head which shows use wear, indicating that it was suspended and 
presumably carried or worn as an ornament or charm (Conard 2009). Its 
body is marked with grooves and the right arm has some linear marks that 
suggest a body art design — e.g. tattoo, scarification, or paint (Cook 2013:38). 
One of the most notable of the Swabian carvings is constituted by the 
therianthropic figure of the Löwenmensch, or Lion Man, from the site of 
Höhlenstein-Stadel. This sculpture was originally excavated in 1939, and was first 
published thirty years later, instantly becoming an icon of Swabian prehistoric 
art. It depicts a standing character with human and feline features. The body is 
very anthropomorphic, but the head, hands and feet are clearly catlike. Like the 
Hohle Fels Venus, the Lion Man’s upper left arm bears a linear design that could 
be depicting body art. Archaeologists recently explored the original excavation 
spot of the Lion Man and were able to find some missing pieces, such as 
fragments of its right arm, neck and back. The figure, now dated ca. 35,000 BP, 
has since then been carefully restored and is now nearly complete, measuring 
31.1 cm in height (Ulmer Museum 2013) (Fig. 11). The figure was carved on a 
single mammoth tusk, and replication experiments have indicated that it would 
50 In 2006, Sheila Coulson from the University of Oslo announced that Rhino Cave in the Tsodilo 
Hills of Botswana contained a large rock whose surface had been carved by humans to make it 
resemble a python, and purported a 70,000-year-old ‘python cult’ at the site. This would have made 
it the earliest instance of figurative carving world-wide. Although the cave does contain numerous 
rock engravings, and the natural rock formation resembles a serpent, archaeologists who have 
worked at this site for years have seriously challenged Coulson’s claims as largely speculative 
(Robbins et al. 2007). Therefore, I have not included it in this survey. 
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have taken up to 400 hours of meticulous work to create it (Cook 2013:33). To 
some scholars, this therianthropic figurine denotes the emergence of truly 
modern abstract thought, where the fusion of unrelated concepts (animal-
human) give way to a novel idea (Mithen 2007:22; Wynn et al. 2009). To others, 
the blending of animal and human properties supports interpretations of 
shamanic beliefs and practices among Pleistocene hunter-gatherers (Conard 
2003:831; Dowson & Porr 2001; Lewis-Williams 2002:202). It is remarkable that 
at the nearby site of Hohle Fels a second much smaller Lion Man figurine, of just 
a couple of centimetres in size, has been found (Fig. 12). This exemplar, also in 
ivory and of an estimated similar age as its larger counterpart, strongly indicates 
that the Aurignacian population of Swabia can be understood as a cultural unity 
who shared a common system of artistic conventions, and most likely of 
customs and beliefs (Conard 2003; Conard & Bolus 2003; Porr 2010).  
Other remarkable ivory figurines from the Swabian cave sites include the 
small but very detailed representations of mammoth and a horse from 
Vogelherd, with an estimated date of 35,000 BP (Cook 2013:52-4) (Fig. 13). The 
largest of the mammoth figurines, 5 cm in length, probably depicts a young 
animal with rounded back and no tusks (Fig. 13C). The polished body of the 
mammoth has deliberate geometric markings along the back and belly, and it 
has a small gap between the front and hind legs, through which it could have 
been strung or sawn to a garment. The second mammoth figure, of only 3.7 cm, 
shows an adult animal and is complete with tusks and tail, this one also bears 
some geometric pattern along the back (Fig. 13A). The highly polished horse 
figure is 4.8 cm long and shows an animal in profile with details of the face and 
mane, and also has markings on the body (Fig. 13B). Experimental replication 
suggests that it would have taken some 35 hours to make the horse figure (Cook 
2013:54).  
All of the carved figures from Swabia show tremendous craftsmanship and 
dedication, and although each is unique and seems to reflect individual choices 
and idiosyncrasies, as a whole, they constitute the earliest figurative art tradition 
in Europe (Porr 2010). The Aurignacian assemblages from Swabia are of further 
interest because there seems to have been a population ‘vacuum’ between the 
Middle and Upper Palaeolithic (Hahn 1987), meaning that Neanderthals had 
already abandoned the region before the start of the Aurignacian period 
(Conard 2004; Conard & Bolus 2003:361; Gamble 1999:377). In consequence, 
the makers of the  figurines could only have been a population of modern 
humans. 
After 30,000 BP, figurines and other carved objects become more common 
in the European Palaeolithic record. Generally grouped under the category of 
‘portable’ art, examples include figurative sculptures and decorated tools (e.g. 
batons, awls, shafts, spear-throwers) carved on ivory, bone, antler, horn, stone, 
and various minerals (Cook 2013).  
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Figure 9. Engraved ochre piece from Blombos Cave, South Africa, dated to ca. 75,000 BP. 
Figure 10. 40,000-year-old 'Venus' from the site of Hohle Fels, Germany, carved on 
mammoth ivory. 
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Figure 11. The Löwenmensch 
(Lion Man) from the site of 
Höhlenstein-Stadel, Germany. 
Sculpted from a single piece of 
mammoth tusk. 




Perhaps the best-known group of Palaeolithic sculptures are the female 
statuettes commonly known as ‘Venuses’, which have been found throughout a 
vast extension of the Eurasian continent. In their majority, these female 
statuettes pertain to the archaeological period known as Gravettian (28-23,000 
BP), although female figures continue to be found up until the end of the 
Pleistocene (Cook 2013:61-107). The stereotypical ‘Venus’ figurine (e.g. 
Willendorf) is a small female representation, naked or scarcely clothed, with 
accentuated breasts, hips, thighs and buttocks, and contrastingly minimized 
upper limbs and facial features (Fig. 14). In actuality the term is (mis)used to 
denote any female figurine from the European Palaeolithic, underestimating 
their variability and thus giving the wrong impression that they comprise a 
cohesive group of artefacts similar in appearance and function (White 2003). 
The ‘Venuses’ have been subject to a great variety of interpretations; among 
many: as fertility idols (Bégouen 1925), as sexually-arousing aids or ‘palaeo-
erotica’ (Absolon 1949; Collins & Onians 1978:14; Guthrie 2005:325), as fertility 
imagery used in rituals (Guthrie 2005:337; Taylor 1996:123), female self-
representation used as pregnancy charms (McDermott 1996), and as 
representations of a mother-goddess (Gimbutas 1981). These ‘readings’ are 
however highly dubious since, as mentioned before, the ‘Venuses’ are not a 
cohesive category but include figures and fragments of different sizes, forms, 
materials, styles, geographies, and ages (White 2003). Some of them, however, 
show clear regional and temporal variations, which perhaps would allow for 
more specific interpretations (Gamble 1982).51  
Because of their often figurative nature, carved and sculpted objects lend 
themselves more easily to any number of interpretations, as in the case of the 
‘Venus’ figurines. But interpretations aside, these artefacts represent a new 
category in terms of labour investment, requiring for their production more 
time, effort, knowledge and skill than the forms of personal adornment 
discussed before (Porr 2010:96). The particular case of the Aurignacian figurines 
from Swabia also allows us to recognize clear sets of cultural conventions 
identifiable by the recurrent use of materials, themes and forms in a restricted 
time-space. These may therefore be considered as a veritable Pleistocene visual 
art tradition.52   
51 Although most archaeologists are now critical of the term ‘Venus’, it is hard to avoid. After more 
than a century of having been in use, it is so strongly associated to Palaeolithic female figurines that 
any new find of this sort is immediately and inevitably so named, and interpretations of ritual and 
sexuality are unnecessarily but invariably called forth. Such was the case with the Hohle Fels 
‘Venus’, said to reinforce the “sexual-symbolism aspect of the art” in the Palaeolithic (Conard 2009).  
52 Another interesting group are the 26,000-year-old clay-modelled figurines found at the Czech 
sites of Dolní Věstonice, Pavlov and Predmostí, and the Austrian site of Krems-Wachtberg. These 
animal and anthropomorphic figures may comprise a second example of an early Palaeolithic 





Here I refer specifically to the practice of painting on large surfaces, such as 
rocks and walls, otherwise known as rock painting. This art form, like the rock art 
traditions of Palaeolithic Europe and Australia, is probably the most complex and 
labour-intensive of all Pleistocene visual art. Wall painting requires not only skill, 
but also a large amount of social and natural knowledge. Palaeolithic painters 
minimally needed to know the landscape well in order to choose the sites where 
they would work, they needed to know where to obtain the pigments and other 
raw materials required, and know how to mix and apply them. Not to mention, 
the amount of time and effort invested in the execution of the paintings 
themselves (Conkey 1993). The span of some styles of Palaeolithic painting also 
indicates that the makers had to be well-versed in social and artistic conventions 
to reproduce particular themes and motifs repeatedly.
As with the previous category, early Pleistocene examples of wall painting 
are lacking from the African continent. The earliest known example of painted 
art in Africa is the figurative image of an animal (eland?) on a rock slab found in 
the Apollo 11 Cave in Namibia, dated to 27-25,000 years BP (Wendt 1976), 
although some authors speculate it might be as old as 40,000 years (Masson 
2006:61). It has been suggested that some rock art traditions from Australia (e.g. 
the Bradshaw paintings at Ubirr and the petroglyphs at Dampier), might also 
extend as far back as 40,000 years or more, making it potentially older than 
Palaeolithic cave art (Morell 1995:1908; White 2003:183), but this chronology 
remains inconclusive. Currently, the earliest accepted dates for the so-called 
Bradshaw style at Ubirr lie between 25-17,000 BP (Brumm & Moore 2005:160). 
For now, the earliest instances of systematic rock painting come from the 
European Palaeolithic.  
In 1994 the announcement of the discovery of Chauvet Cave, in Vallon Pont 
d’Arc, Ardèche, France, made world news. This site has become renowned not 
only for its impressively realistic painted panels depicting numerous animals 
(cave lion, bear, horse, woolly rhino, bison, and mammoth, among others), but 
also because it has changed the standard view of the development of figurative 
art in the Palaeolithic (Fig. 15). Some of the most spectacular painted caves from 
France (e.g. Lascaux) and Spain (e.g. Altamira) have been attributed to the 
Solutrean and Magdalenian periods, which had always been considered the 
‘heyday’ of Palaeolithic painting. However, Chauvet yielded Aurignacian dates, 
going as far back as 32,000 BP, indicating that figurative cave art was not only 
older than expected, but also quite magnificent from very early on (Clottes 
2003). However, the accuracy of the dating of Chauvet has been questioned on 
various grounds (Pettitt 2008; Pettitt & Bahn 2003). Firstly, most of the samples 
for the radiocarbon dates were taken from the cave floor, therefore they may be 
representative of human activity in the cave, but not necessarily of the paintings 
(Pettitt 2008). Second, the styles, themes, and techniques used in the painted 
panels are typical of later periods (Gravettian and Solutrean), but absent in other 
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Aurignacian-age sites (Combier & Jouve 2014). Finally, Aurignacian occupations 
are in general scarce in the area around the cave, making Chauvet an unlikely 
isolated site (Combier & Jouve 2014; Pettitt 2008). Nevertheless, other scenarios 
must be considered, apart from the possibility that the dates may indeed 
correspond to the actual age of the panels. For example, that the paintings were 
created in various moments, with some images pertaining to the Aurignacian 
and some to later periods or, that other Aurignacian caves of similar quality and 
age have yet to be discovered. Some scholars have suggested that the overlap of 
themes between the Swabian figurines and the Chauvet panels (both depicting 
Pleistocene fauna like cave lion and bear) may support the Aurignacian age of 
the latter (Conard 2003, 2009; Zilhão 2007:34). But beside the faunal content, 
these two art traditions are very dissimilar, not only do they involve different 
forms and techniques (carving vs. painting) but also the context in which they 
were used and produced is divergent (Pettitt 2008:911). The ivory sculptures 
were all made, used and discarded in domestic spaces, and were found among 
occupation debris alongside personal ornaments, suggesting that their 
production and use was embedded within everyday activities and were probably 
connected to individual persons (Porr 2010). Whereas, Chauvet Cave has the 
characteristics of a non-residential ceremonial site, more likely associated to the 
organized collective activity of a group (Broglio et al. 2006:7).  
Despite the caveats, the Aurignacian origin of the Chauvet paintings has 
been generally accepted (Pettitt 2008), and in any case the paintings must be at 
least of Gravettian age, since the entrance to the cave seems to have become 
blocked by 21,000 BP (Sadier et al. 2012). Furthermore, there are now 
indications that figurative painting may have been a usual practice during the 
Aurignacian. The site of Fumane Cave in Italy has yielded rock fragments that 
seem to have detached from the cave ceiling which bear ochre and some simple 
schematic paintings going back to 35-32,000 BP (Broglio et al. 2006). Another 
roof-collapse with traces of paint depicting a zoomorphic figure and an 
engraving of a vulva at the site of Abri Castanet, in France, has given a date of 
ca. 36,000 BP (White et al. 2012). Also, a recent dating project covering several 
well-known painted caves in Spain, including Altamira, El Castillo, and Tito 
Bustillo has yielded dates going back to the Aurignacian in all of the sites 
(40-34,000 BP), suggesting that the caves were visited throughout the Upper 
Palaeolithic for artistic motives (Pike et al. 2012). Similarly, the Spanish site of 
Altxerri B, in the Basque country, includes painted motifs of various animals 
(feline, bear, horse) and has been dated to 34-30,000 BP (González-Sainz et al. 
2013). These results support the suggestion that painting practices have a deep 
temporality in Europe, where they seem to have developed locally among 
modern human populations (Jöris & Street 2008:797).  
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Figure 15. The horse panel at Chauvet Cave, France. An early example of a complex 
figurative rock art tradition from the Early Upper Palaeolithic. 
As in the case of carved and sculpted objects, instances of rock painting become 
more common in Europe after 30,000 years. Wall painting practices seem to 
have peaked towards the Magdalenian period (18,000-10,000 BP), in the coldest 
phases of the last Glacial era with most painted caves clustered around the 
Périgord region in France and the Spanish area of Cantabria suggesting that 
cave-painting might have been a localized artistic tradition. Although at the 
moment few examples from other regions are known (e.g. Kapova Cave in 
Russia, and Coliboaia Cave in Romania), it is probable that other Palaeolithic 
painted sites are still to be discovered.53 The improvement of dating methods 
and the increasing sample of dated caves also may start clarifying the 
development of rock painting traditions in the European Pleistocene. At the 
moment, it seems that Palaeolithic painting increased in complexity over time, 
from the early Aurignacian to the developed Aurignacian and Gravettian, and 
later. Alistair Pike and colleagues, for instance, noted that the motifs which 
yielded the earliest dates at the Spanish sites of Altamira, El Castillo and Tito 
Bustillo were simple, abstract, non-figurative and monochrome designs, for 
instance geometrics and hand stencils. Whereas, the later panels become more 
concerned with figurative art, particularly animal depictions (Pike et al. 
2001:1412). This pattern of increasing sophistication towards figurative art in 
Palaeolithic painting, however, need not be correlated with increased human 
53 Coliboaia Cave in Romania, whose date is currently estimated at 35-23,000 BP, is stylistically 
and thematically, highly reminiscent of Chauvet Cave (Ghemis et al. 2011). 
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cognitive abilities, creativity or imagination (e.g. Mithen 2001). Rather, it can be 
explained more parsimoniously by an increasing specialization of visual art 
practices. This is supported by the highly conventional regional and 
chronological styles of figurative painting, and the use of distinct locally 
distributed techniques and ‘paint recipes’ (Clottes 1993; Conkey 1993:109). As I 
discuss below and further in chapter 6, specialization of artistic practices likely 
correlates with larger mean population sizes and more intensive inter-group 
interactions as the Palaeolithic progresses. 
2.4 Trends in  the development of Pleistocene visual art 
At a first glance, it would seem that the archaeological record of Pleistocene 
visual art evolved in a linear fashion, making it easy to assume that the 
development of visual art occurred in an uninterrupted progression from simple 
(pigment use) to complex (figurative painting). But in reality, the development of 
Pleistocene art is more intricate than that. As we have seen, visual art has been 
recurrently present as a human behaviour for at least the last 100,000 years of 
our history. However, there are periods where it is almost invisible in the 
archaeological record, and others where it is abundantly present and varied 
(McBrearty & Brooks 2000:529). Furthermore, not all forms are found in all 
regions during the same time periods, and the presence of one form does not 
compel nor preclude its co-existence with another.  
The emergence of visual art hinges on some basic abilities (dexterity, 
knowledge of raw materials, labour investment in material culture, and the 
social use of artificial signs – i.e. symbolism) that to some extent were already in 
place early in hominin evolution (McBrearty & Brooks 2000:486). But the 
convergence of such traits in the systematic practices that we now recognize as 
visual art only started to leave clear traces by 120,000 years ago, if we consider 
the estimated date for the Skhul beads – or even earlier if we consider the 
evidence of ochre pigment production – and was certainly in place by 100-
75,000 BP (Barham & Mitchell 2008:256). 
The pattern of episodic bursts and gaps in the early record of visual art may 
be in part attributed to a ‘taphonomic bias’, that is “the tendency for younger 
things to be over-represented relative to older things in the archaeological 
record due to the operation of destructive processes like erosion and 
weathering” (Surovell et al. 2009:1715). Differential processes and conditions of 
deposition and preservation play an important role. For instance, certain types 
of sites (e.g. open air, coastal, reoccupied, urbanized, etc.) and certain soils (e.g. 
acidic, moist) do not favour the survival of archaeological materials. In 
Pleistocene coastal sites,  visibility in the record is largely affected by the 
changes in sea level over the past glacial and interglacial events (Blome et al. 
2012:584). Also intrusive elements like fauna and roots can disturb the sites over 
time and produce the mixture of archaeological material from different 
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moments. Evidently, the older the site the greater these issues become. Other 
factor affecting the shape of the archaeological record of Pleistocene visual art is 
constituted by the researchers’ biases. For example, at sites where 
archaeologists are not expecting to find certain materials (e.g. personal 
ornaments), evidence may be overlooked or misclassified. Also, some regions 
have been historically more accessible for study than other potentially rich areas 
that remain underexplored. Furthermore, dating techniques are continuously 
improving but are not infallible, particularly when dealing with materials of great 
age, as exemplified by the ‘Middle Palaeolithic dating anomaly’, and the 
difficulties of dating rock art, discussed above. It is important to note that all of 
these factors intervene in archaeological interpretation, as philosopher of 
archaeology Raymond Corbey explains (2005:114-5): 
Take five meters of sediment in an abri, a shallow cave in Southern 
France, consisting of a few score of perturbated layers, some of which 
contain knapped flint, fragments of animal bones, and traces of fire. 
The layers may represent some two hundred thousand years of 
hominid activities. Now take one of those layers with archaeological 
material, approximately five centimeters thick. It may not be clear 
whether this is the sedimentation of weeks, months, or centuries of 
occupation; of one continuous period of use of the cave or of a number 
of visits to the spot. Nor may it be clear whether that layer is 80,000 
years old, 120,000 years, or a mixture of remains from several periods. 
Such date provide rich playing fields for archaeological interpretation, 
not unlike the inkblots in the Rohrschach projection test used by 
psychologists. There are various preconceptions with respect to what a 
‘camp site’, ‘language’, a ‘ritual deposition’, or a sequence of 
technological acts are and how these phenomena should be 
conceptualized. Such preconceptions, together with the ambiguous 
data, make up our reconstructions of the past. 
But in spite of these ‘epistemic disadvantages’ (Turner 2007:7), archaeologists, 
and historical scientists in general, can and do build (partial) explanatory models 
of past events, based not only on inferences and deductions made by examining 
the traces of past activity, but also on observations of current patterns of 
activity, techniques for simulating, modelling, and comparing data, and the 
general  existing corpus of scientific knowledge. These models, evidently, are 
themselves also biased and influenced by personal and academic preferences 
and backgrounds, that is why continuous reassessment in light of new data and 
theories is advised. 
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Figure 16. Chronological relation of archaeological periods, hominin species, and visual 
art forms from the Late Pleistocene. 
Going back to our subject, the current state of the record, despite the problems 
mentioned, still allows us to make some general inferences about the 
development of visual art forms in the Pleistocene. The first is that personal 
ornaments are the earliest (preserved) form of visual art and, probably the most 
widespread as well. All historically recorded human groups, even those with the 
‘simplest’ technologies and smallest population sizes, have engaged in bodily 
decoration, as noted by evolutionary scholars, from Charles Darwin 
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([1879]2004:640) to Merlin Donald (1991:277).54 This suggests that personal 
ornamentation may be considered a veritable universal human behaviour, 
deeply rooted in our species. Other forms of visual art are, in contrast, not that 
common. For example, art forms such as figurative carving and painting, have 
not always been recorded either archaeologically (e.g. in the mid MSA) or 
ethnographically (e.g. among the contemporary Amazonian Pirahã and 
Huaorani). These differences should also be accounted for by origins-of-art 
models. As I mentioned before, some models have explained the absence of 
these forms in the archaeological record prior to 45,000 BP in terms of cognitive 
ability, that is, they suggest that before that time humans simply did not have 
the mental capacity to produce figurative sculpture or painting (e.g. Coolidge & 
Wynn 2005; Klein & Edgar 2002; Mithen 1996a; Morris-Kay 2010). However, 
such discrepancy can also be explained in terms of technological involvement, 
that is the purposeful manipulation of raw materials and the application of 
(previously acquired) knowledge, skill, and technique (Gibson 2012; Ingold 
2000:299). In this manner, I have suggested that what the development of visual 
art may reflect is increasing labour investment and specialization in art-making 
activities, that likely correlate with changing modes in social organization (as I 
further discuss in chapter 6). 
In a broad manner, labour investment in visual art may be understood as 
the number of actions or ‘steps’ minimally required to produce a finished 
artwork or design. For example, ochre use may require 2 to 4 steps, depending 
on the application. If applied directly to a surface, we may talk minimally of two 
steps: finding and extracting the raw material and applying it. If the surface 
requires modification before ochre may be applied to it, or the ochre piece is 
itself modified (e.g. shaped into a ‘crayon’), it would entail a third step. In the 
case of pigment production, an extra step would involve grinding or crushing 
(Henshilwood et al. 2011:222). Similarly, the production of modified personal 
ornaments like the shell beads discussed above would require at the least 3 
steps: finding/selecting the raw material, modifying it (e.g. through piercing or 
drilling with an awl or burin), and finally stringing or hanging (Tátá et al. 2014), 
but occasionally it also involved rubbing, polishing, or colouring (with ochre). 
Making beads ‘from scratch’, incising objects, and carving require even a larger 
chain of operations that includes selecting the raw material, preparing the 
surface, making or selecting adequate tools for modification, and engraving, 
54 For example, the extinct foragers from Tierra del Fuego (Argentina), Baja California (Mexico), 
and Tasmania, who depended on a very simple tool-kit, all had rich traditions of bodily decoration. 
The Fuegians are said to have been fond of wearing necklaces, pendants, bracelets and other 
jewellery made of shell and bone, and were known for their intricate tradition of body painting 
(Fiore 2008; Garson 1886). The Californians wore complex headdresses, hair and body decorations 
made of pearls and feathers hung from fibre strings, and only occasionally may have practiced rock 
painting (Aschmann 1959). The Tasmanians, for their part, had a complex system of bodily 
decoration through scarification and wore a variety of body and hair ornaments, while lacking the 
rock painting traditions of the mainland groups (Ryan [1943]1996:11-2).  
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carving or reducing the material until the final product is obtained, not to 
mention the processes of learning and practicing of skills implied beforehand. 
For example, the production of ivory beads minimally requires five discrete 
stages (Barth et al. 2009:16; White 1989:223). Incising objects involves material 
selection, preparation of the surface, and the elaboration of a design with a tool 
(e.g. a burin), either of a simple abstract or geometric pattern, as in the Blombos 
ochre (Henshilwood et al. 2009), or a complex figurative representation, as in 
the engraved portable art pieces of Palaeolithic Europe (Cook 2013:186). 
Carving figurines, for instance on ivory or wood, would entail a more laborious 
process, as would modelling in clay or stone (Cook 2013:148). As discussed 
before, even the small ivory figurines from Swabia would have taken up to 35 
person-hours to make (Cook 2013:54). Finally, figurative rock painting seems to 
have been the most labour-intensive of all Pleistocene art forms. First, the 
maker would have needed to obtain and prepare the pigments for the paint, for 
instance through grinding and mixing with some binder to create a coloured 
liquid or paste, or shaping coloured minerals into ‘pencils’ or ‘crayons’. Then, the 
maker would have required to know or find an adequate spot in the landscape 
and in the target surface itself. The latter also would have required preparation 
such as lighting aids — for example, in Lascaux several oil lamps have been 
found (Ruspoli 1987:28). Often the wall surface or background was primed 
through rubbing or scrapping, as in Chauvet Cave (Clottes 2003). Finally, creating 
the paintings themselves also required various steps, according to the motif. 
Faunal images were frequently outlined first by engraving, tracing or drawing 
(Cook 2013:180). Then, the figures could be filled in, sometimes with aid of 
brushes or pads of fibres or hair (Clottes et al. 2003:157). Overall, the amount of 
effort and time involved make it highly probable that the production of 
figurative cave paintings, from beginning to end, involved the joint endeavour of 
more than one individual, perhaps over a long period of time (Conkey 1993; 
Cook 2013:182; Lewis-Williams 1995). It is also relevant to point out that 
Palaeolithic cave painting seems to have taken place mostly in formal spaces 
reserved for such activity (ritual spaces), whereas all the other art forms appear 
to have taken place in domestic environments. 
In addition, many of the art practices I have described overlapped. Blombos 
Cave, for instance, offers an extraordinary record showing that some MSA 
populations were simultaneously making use of ochre pigments, modifying 
shells for ornamentation, and creating engraved designs by 80,000 BP. In the 
European Upper Palaeolithic, too, people who were making wall paintings were 
also producing carvings and personal ornaments. This invites the questions of 
how people could afford the time and effort to invest increasingly in visual art 
practices, why these diversified into the media left in the record, and how come 
that certain forms (e.g. painting) moved from the domestic to the formal. In my 
opinion, the growing degree of investment in visual art is likely correlated to 
specialization in the division of labour in larger groups. Division of labour refers 
to “the degree to which different individuals within a social group specialize on 
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different tasks” (Fewell et al. 2009:484). The division of labour by sex and age is 
the basis of the hunter-gatherer economy, where men, women, children, 
teenagers, and elders typically perform socially assigned activities related to 
resource acquisition and processing, artefact production, domestic activities, 
social engagements, etc. (Kaplan et al. 2000). There are, however, a small 
number of specialized tasks – that is, tasks that are done “by a single or a few 
individuals” (Ehn 2009:13). Ethnographic data from small-scale hunter-gatherer 
groups (e.g. the San) suggest that ritual performance (e.g. healing), instrumental 
music-making, and visual art practices such as rock painting are specialized 
activities, whereas the production of tools and personal ornaments (e.g. 
beadwork) are not — although they can be gender-related (Lewis-Williams 1995; 
Wiessner 1983, 1984).  
For their part, labour studies indicate that there is a positive relationship in 
human societies between the number of specialized traits and group size (Ehn 
2009:17; Jeanson et al. 2007:290). Therefore, if we assume that the patterns of 
organised labour that we see among contemporary hunter-gatherers might have 
been somewhat similar in the Pleistocene, we may (albeit sketchily) explain 
some of the patterns in the record of visual art. The earliest art forms (modified 
objects such as shell beads and engraved objects) did not involve much work. In 
the case of the shells, for example, perhaps the most laborious task involved 
their acquisition. Manufactured ornaments, in contrast, entail more effort, skill 
and time and, in some cases (Aurignacian beads), formalized manufacturing 
processes that already hint at insipient technical specialization, i.e. a single or 
few ways of producing an artefact. The time-consuming  practice of ivory carving 
in Swabia, with its conventional themes and forms, might also  indicate technical 
specialization. However, all of these visual artworks seem to have been 
produced, used, and discarded in domestic environment by various sorts of 
individuals. In contrast, figurative cave painting is not only formalized and 
labour-intensive, but also probably involved the joint work of several individuals, 
and took place in non-habitational spaces. This activity only comes into view in 
the developed Aurignacian and the Gravettian, coinciding with a higher 
incidence of sites and artefacts that suggest larger human populations (Davies 
2001).55 So, the appearance of figurative painting in the European Upper 
Palaeolithic may reflect the emergence of visual art as a specialized activity 
(done by a few individuals). The specialization of non-subsistence practices, in 
turn, may imply the specialization or reorganisation of resource acquisition and 
other tasks that allowed to free time and effort to invest in visual art practices. 
These issues will be revisited in chapter 6. 
55 This does not mean that whenever group sizes increase, complex artistic traditions will arise. 
Specialization depends not so much on group size as on social organisation (i.e. institutions). Even 
when population numbers fall, if the institutions remain, specialized work and knowledge can 
survive. Conversely, if the social institutions collapse, despite stable population numbers, 
specialization will likely be lost to a great extent (Stymne 2009). 
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This admittedly prosaic labour-based model can explain, for example, why 
figurative painting did not appear earlier, without having to invoke any changes 
in cognitive ability (e.g. Mithen 1996a), memory (Coolidge & Wynn 2005), or 
consciousness (Lewis-Williams 2002).  
2.5 Conclusion 
The archaeological record, despite its incompleteness, biases, preservation 
issues, and other flaws, remains our best source of information for tracing back 
the early history of human artistic practices. As I reviewed in this chapter, so far 
this record indicates that by 100,000 years ago, at the latest, humans were 
consistently engaging in some forms of visual art.  
Four main conclusions may be drawn from the record review carried out 
above: 
1) Visual art is a reliable archaeological marker of H. sapiens, since it is
“the only noteworthy difference” between the record of modern
humans and other hominins, particularly Neanderthals (D’Errico
2007:130).
2) The practice of ornamenting the body truly is a universal human
behaviour, and as far as we can tell, it constitutes the earliest form of
visual art.
3) Visual art did not come “with a bang” (Pfeiffer 1982:11), nor did it
evolve sequentially from simple to complex forms, as Leroi-Gourhan
foresaw it ([1964]1993:372). Rather, like any other human technology,
visual art co-evolved with social organization which in the Pleistocene,
as today, varied across geography and time.
4) The intensification of visual art production and the emergence of  novel
forms of visual art (e.g. figurative painting) in the European Early Upper




3. THE ART OF COURTSHIP: GEOFFREY MILLER’S MATE CHOICE MODEL
Courage, pugnacity, perseverance, strength and size of body, weapons of all kinds, 
musical organs, both vocal and instrumental, bright colours and ornamental appendages, 
have all been indirectly gained by the one sex or the other, through the exertion of choice, 
the influence of love and jealousy, and the appreciation of the beautiful in sound, colour 
or form; and that these powers of the mind manifestly depend on the development of the 
brain.  
CHARLES DARWIN, 1871 
In 1860, Charles Darwin wrote in a personal letter to botanist Asa Gray: “The 
sight of a feather in a peacock’s tail, whenever I gaze at it, it makes me sick!” 
(Hiraiwa-Hasegawa 2000:12). This now legendary quote reflects the problem 
that conspicuous animal traits posed for Darwin’s principle of natural selection, 
since these properties did not seem to contribute towards the survival of the 
individuals that possessed them, being even detrimental at times. Later, 
however, he arrived at the mechanism of sexual selection to explain those 
exaggerated traits that had defied him – such as the colourful plumage of the 
males of several bird species, and the huge antlers of many male ungulates –, as 
armaments or ornaments used in courtship displays (Anderson 1994:XV).  
The origins-of-art model that will be reviewed in the present chapter 
maintains that a work of art, like the peacock’s tail, is a personal advertisement 
of one’s physical, mental, and social condition. In this model, art is thus a striking 
feature that does not increase survival chances, but is imposing to rivals and 
attractive to the opposite sex, and thus increases mating opportunities. It 
further suggests that, like those animal armaments and ornaments, art evolved 
as a strategy for mating competition, to entice sexual partners and outcompete 
opponents.  
In recent years, the main representative of this hypothesis has been 
American evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey Miller, whose work will be 
examined in this chapter. Miller’s model is based on two complex theoretical 
frameworks: evolutionary psychology and sexual selection theory. The first 
section of this chapter will lay out a general background regarding some key 
concepts of sexual selection and mate choice theory. The next section will then 
describe the main line of argument of his model, placing special attention on its 
treatment of visual art. This will be followed by a discussion of Miller’s 
hypothesis in light of data from biology, anthropology and developmental 
psychology. Finally, the model will be compared with what is known about 
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mating preferences in relation to human evolution, and the visual art record in 
Pleistocene archaeology. To this aim, I will formulate some predictions derived 
from the model regarding the emergence of visual art, and see whether these 
are consistent with what is indicated by the archaeological record. This exercise 
will elucidate whether the model can offer a plausible scenario for the 
emergence of visual art.  
3.1 Sexual selection and mate choice theory:  The background 
In On the Origin of Species, Darwin presented not only his renowned thesis on 
natural selection, but he also introduced the principle of sexual selection, which 
“depends not on a struggle for existence, but on a struggle between the males 
for possession of the females” ([1859]2006:56). He would further elaborate on 
the evolutionary effects of sexual behaviour in The Descent of Man, from 1871.56 
In broad lines, he argued that whereas success in natural selection depends on 
the survival of individuals in relation to the conditions of life, in sexual selection 
success is measured by the reproductive advantage of certain individuals over 
others of the same sex and sort in relation to the propagation of the species 
(Darwin [1879]2004:243; Taylor 1996:35). The environment and competition for 
resources are major factors of natural selection, but sexual selection is mainly 
driven by  intra-species competition over mates and mating opportunities 
(Andersson 1994:8).  
Sexual selection includes several mechanisms, one of which is mate choice 
or “the outcome of the inherent propensity of an individual to mate more 
readily with certain phenotypes of the opposite sex (i.e., mating preference or 
bias) and the extent to which an individual engages in mate sampling before 
deciding to mate (i.e., choosiness)” (Kokko et al. 2006:49). The other six 
mechanisms of sexual selection that biologists have identified so far are: 
contests, endurance rivalry, scrambles, coercion, sperm competition, and 
infanticide (Andersson & Iwasa 1996). Darwin focused primarily on contests 
(fight over mates) and mate choice when he coined the term ‘sexual selection’, 
and to this day, that meaning remains its most simple and useful application 
(Andersson 1994:9) but sexual selection neither equals nor is restricted to these 
two strategies (rival battle and mate preference).57 However, mate choice is of 
56 Darwin is often quoted as the first researcher to have drawn a link between sexual selection and 
the arts, but he actually dedicated few paragraphs to this issue and his opinions concerned mostly 
the occurrence of song and music, e.g.: “I conclude that musical notes and rhythm were first 
acquired by the male or female progenitors of mankind for the sake of charming the opposite sex” 
([1859]2006:638, footnote 39).  
57 It should then be clear that whereas all mate choice is sexual selection, there reverse is not true. 
Notwithstanding, scholars, particularly in the humanities, often use both terms indistinctively. With 
the rising popularity and application of evolutionary theory in the human disciplines, this confusion 
might lead to misuses and misunderstandings. For example, art historian George L. Hersey writes: 
“Humans, like many other animals, have always made sexual choices. In this sense all the phrase 
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special interest precisely because it seems to be directly correlated with the 
evolution of the ‘ornaments’ and the extravagant traits which Darwin struggled 
to explain through natural selection (Kokko et al. 2003).  
Because the sexes generally invest unevenly in offspring, there will be some 
conflict of interest between males and females leading to different reproductive 
strategies (Trivers 1972:173). Usually, the females invest considerably more than 
the males so they will tend to be the choosier sex, whereas the males will 
compete among themselves for mating opportunities. Hence, the most common 
mating dynamics in the animal world involve male-male competition and female 
choice (Geary et al. 2004:27), although these in no way exhaust the array of 
mate choice strategies. Mate choice can take several forms (Andersson & 
Simmons 2006; Jones & Ratterman 2009). The two best-known are mate choice 
for direct benefits and for indirect benefits. In the first, individuals choose for an 
immediate fitness advantage, that is, for direct phenotypic effects such as  the 
procurement of resources, territory, parental care, protection, fertility, disease 
avoidance, etc. In the second case, individuals choose for indirect benefits 
(fitness advantages bestowed on the offspring in the long-run) on the basis of 
some trait that correlates with the desired advantage. For example, when a trait 
– such as an ornament – serves as an indicator of the genetic quality of the
individual, potential partners can use that trait as a cue of quality and may 
evolve a preference for it, as in the case of the peacock’s tail. In addition to 
selection strategies for benefits, mate choice may be based, among others, on 
sensory biases – when the selected trait exploits some perceptual preference 
that originated in a non-sexual context (Andersson & Simmons 2006:297; Jones 
& Ratterman 2009:10004),58 or on social information, i.e. ‘mate copying’ 
(Dugatkin 1992; Mery et al. 2009). Through these various strategies, sexual 
selection has provided a theoretical framework to explain conspicuous 
anatomical, cognitive and behavioural traits, like the colourful plumage and 
intricate song of many birds, and the ‘weapons’ of several mammals, such as 
antlers, tusks, and horns.59 These features apparently contribute little to survival 
effort, and at times even hinder it, but are essential for mate acquisition.  
‘sexual selection’ means is that two potential partners consider each other more desirable, or at 
least less impossible, than other potential mates, and act accordingly” (1996:2). Similarly, art 
scholar Barbara Larson states: “Sexual selection refers to an individual of one gender making a 
choice between two or more potential mates of the opposite gender” (2009:174). Clearly both 
authors mean mate choice when they talk about ‘sexual selection’, and although such inaccuracies 
might seem harmless, they may become problematic when used as the basis for evolutionary 
explanations.  
58 For example, the preference of female guppies (fish) for more intense orange-tailed males might 
be traced back to a wide-species feeding preference for orange fruit (Rodd et al. 2002). 
59 See: Anderson & Iwasa (1996:53, Table 1). Sexually selected traits, however, are not exempt from 
natural selection, which can always counter them. In fact, sexual selection is sometimes seen as a 
‘special case’ or subset of natural selection (Anderson 1994:7). But as Prum has rightly noted 
(2012:2255), Darwin formulated sexual selection precisely to account for those cases which could 
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As I explain in the next section, Miller clearly favours mate choice for 
indirect benefits,60 where the preferred trait is assumed to be a reliable indicator 
of the individual’s overall genetic quality.61 In the classical example of the 
peacock, the large, colourful, eye-spotted feathers of the long, heavy tail incur a 
huge energetic investment and, while attractive to the peahens, it makes the 
male bird less agile and more noticeable to predators. Because the state of the 
tail is correlated with the general physical condition of the male, the trait will be 
more elaborate among strong, healthy individuals. Therefore, the peacocks that 
despite the costs and risks of the tail can afford to sustain and display it 
conspicuously will be preferred by the peahens as high-quality mates; i.e. the tail 
serves as a wasteful or costly signal (Zahavi 1975:211),62 and becomes a reliable 
indicator of general genetic quality (Jones and Ratterman 2009:10004). In 
Miller’s view, many characteristics of human cognition, behaviour, and culture, 
including language, humour, music, art, and altruism (1997, 1998, 1999, 
2000a),63 evolved precisely, like the peacock’s tail, as fitness indicators “for a 
courtship function” (2001:20). 
not be explained by natural selection, that is as an alternative to, not a special case of, natural 
selection. 
60 Models of mate choice for indirect benefits also called ‘good-genes’ models, ‘costly signalling’, or 
as in Miller’s work, ‘fitness- indicator’ models.   
61Simply defined, fitness is “an organism’s expected contribution to the next generation’s gene 
pool” (Sterelny & Griffiths 1999:157), meaning its capacity to survive, reproduce and pass on its 
genes.  
62 However, alternative explanations have been put forward. Berglund et al. (1996) have suggested 
that the elaborate tail of the peacock might constitute an armament for intrasexual competition, 
rather than an ornament for courtship, and thus shaped by male-male conflict instead of female 
choice. Another recent study (Takahashi et al. 2008) has raised doubts about the categorization of 
the male peafowl’s tail as a costly signal shaped by sexual selection; and suggests that the tail might 
actually be an ancestral trait that has been lost in the females who, in fact may not even choose 
mates on the basis of their tail. Instead, it is more likely that a whole set of behaviours, including 
shivering displays and vocalizations, influence peahen preference. The study concludes that there 
seems to be no absolute correlation between the size of the tail, or the number or symmetry of its 
eyespots, and the mating success of the bird. Also, a bigger and heavier tail does not make the 
peacock more susceptible to predation. If at all, it is the peahens who suffer more predation, being 
more vulnerable while nesting on the forest ground.  
63 A similar argument has been posed by archaeologist Timothy Taylor in the past: “Culture 
provided sexual selection with a massive new scope. Mate choice was no longer solely a matter of 
sizing up the relative merits of the basic inherited personality and appearance of a prospective 
partner. Now learned skills – singing, hunting, dancing, and painting – came to play an ever greater 
role in sexual attraction. The human brain continued to enlarge, from 1.6 million years to sometime 
just after 150,000 years ago, when ‘anatomically modern’ humans first appeared. Since the period 
does not seem to have presented any obvious environmental challenge that only larger brains could 
meet, the enhanced cultural capacities of ever larger brains could have been a sexual fit. Love songs 
and nicely arranged bouquets may have been at least as important as aggression in the life of the 
species” (1996:7). 
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3.2 The bowerbird and the artist: Key arguments 
When discussing the effects of sexual selection in The Descent of Man, Darwin 
alluded to a probable correlation between the human ‘passion for ornament’ 
and the affairs of choosing a mate. In a comparative exercise with the animal 
kingdom, he suggested that just as the vivid colours and patterns of some male 
birds, like the peacock, serve them to lure females, humans turn to decoration 
to enhance their natural qualities and make themselves more attractive to the 
opposite sex ([1871]2004:640).  
Miller elaborates on Darwin’s thoughts (2000a:11) and suggests that the 
origin and proliferation of visual art probably are the product of sexual selection 
through mate choice, or a ‘courtship adaptation’ (2000:258, 2001). Human art-
production, Miller claims, is costly and wasteful, requiring energy and resources 
that could be better invested in survival efforts like foraging, rest, or defence. 
Therefore, to him, art making is not easily explained by natural selection, which 
is an economizing process that would not promote the persistence of an 
apparently superfluous behaviour. Sexual selection, on the other hand, often 
results in the development of exaggerated and seemingly useless but attractive 
traits, like the plumage of the birds-of-paradise. So for Miller, a strategy of mate 
choice that selects for indicators of ‘good genes’ provides a reasonable basis to 
explain the evolution of visual art. 
Human mating preferences and strategies 
Human mating preferences and mating strategies have been a frequent topic of 
research for evolutionary psychology. Unlike social scientists who usually claim 
that mating choices are a function of socio-economic pressures and culturally-
shaped gender roles (Wood & Eagly 2002), evolutionary psychologists defend 
the view that mating preferences are innate psychological adaptations that 
guide individuals in choosing high-quality partners (Gangestad et al. 2006). 
Likewise, mating strategies are seen as the result of the reproductive problems 
faced by humans throughout evolution (Buss 1994); for example, whether to 
invest in offspring quantity or quality, or whether to invest in parental care or in 
multiple mates, etc. As in most mammals, human mating strategies are 
constrained by parental-investment, which determines that “the sex that invests 
more in offspring is selected to be more discriminating in choosing a mate, 
whereas the sex that invests less in offspring is more competitive with members 
of the same sex for sexual access to the high-investing sex” (Buss1994:240). Thus 
women are expected to be choosier, and men are expected to engage in sexual 
rivalry and prowess displays.  
According to Miller, visual art evolved in the context of human mating 
strategies, in response to the problem of assessing the genetic fitness of a 
potential mate. He argues that because, for women in particular, it would be 
detrimental to incur the energetic costs of rearing unfit children, selecting a 
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mate on the basis of fitness indicators would have been more advantageous 
than selecting for direct benefits (1998:109):  
Choosing males for their provisioning and protection abilities eases the 
energetic burden of motherhood, but choosing males for their 
indicators of genetic quality and aesthetic displays reduces the risk of 
producing sickly, unattractive offspring that may never reproduce. 
He argues that the mental and physical abilities required for art making (e.g. 
creativity, concentration, coordination, dexterity, etc.) are condition-dependent 
indicators; that is, they are costly traits that correlate with the general condition 
of the individual, and thus are reliable indicators of genetic quality. Therefore, 
since artistic skill could serve as a cue of genetic fitness, people, especially 
women would be expected to evolve a preference for it. Seen in this light, 
artworks could actually be understood as fitness displays, “an occasion for 
demonstrating one’s ornamental skills and aesthetic taste” (2000:274). But, 
Miller states, our pronouncements regarding artworks have an effect beyond 
sexual selection. When formulating a judgement about a work of art, knowingly 
or not, one is also assessing the maker’s intelligence, creativity, skill, sociability, 
etc. which influence not only mate choice but also friendships, alliances, and all 
other types of social relations. In this sense, aesthetic judgments help us make 
“biologically significant decisions about other individuals on the basis of 
observable behavioural cues” (2001:24).  
To illustrate how evolution could have moulded artistic behaviour in a 
sexual context, Miller draws a parallel with the courtship displays of the 
bowerbird. To woo a mate, the males of this bird family build an elaborate 
arrangement out of twigs called a ‘bower’. They further garnish their 
construction using colourful and lustrous materials, like berries, shells, bones, 
nuts, feathers, flowers, shiny insects, glass, and even plastic objects. The males 
lure females to their bower construction through displays of dance and song. 
Each individual bower is different, and the birds spend much time attending to it 
and protecting it from the elements and rivals.64 Because of the use of 
specifically arranged and colourful items, reminiscent of decoration, since 
Victorian times bowers have often been referred to as ‘true artworks’ of the 
animal kingdom. Darwin himself said that the bowers “are tastefully 
ornamented with gaily-coloured objects; and this shews that they must receive 
some kind of pleasure from the sight of such things” ([1879]2004:115).65 Human 
64 The bower of the polygamous bowerbird is not a nest, its only function being for courtship 
display. Once a female approaches a bower and mates with its maker, she will leave to build a nest, 
hatch and care for the chicks on her own.  
65 This kind of statements, however, have been disputed since the early 20th century: “No one will 
deny that structures, such as, for instance, the gardens of the atlas birds [vogelkop bowerbird 
Amblyornis inornatus], which have been depicted by Beccari, are most wonderful specimens of 
animal industry. But it is undoubtedly misleading to speak of them as artistic. […] It has been 
noticed that the cock of the great bower bird amuses himself by flying to and fro in the bower 
carrying a shell in his bill, which he picks up on one side and carries to the other. On an 
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artistic behaviour, Miller says, is somewhat similar to bower building. Both are 
expressions of fitness located outside the body, and intended to attract mates 
(2000:267, 2001).66 Male bowerbirds tend to be dull coloured, so instead of 
displaying their fitness through striking plumage –like other related species do – 
they make use of their bowers. Similarly, he says, humans use art (2000a:270):  
The bowerbirds show the evolutionary continuity between body 
ornamentation and art. They happen to construct their courtship 
displays out of twigs and orchids instead of growing them from 
feathers like their cousins, the birds-of-paradise. We happen to apply 
colored patterns to rock or canvas.  
In that sense, works of art are extensions of a person, they are ‘extended 
phenotypes’ or out-of-body manifestations of the individual’s self (2000a:270). 
Examples of extended phenotypes from the animal world include a spider’s web, 
a bird’s nest, or a beaver’s dam, which are essential components of the genetic 
and phenotypic makeup of these organisms, as much as their sensory or vital 
organs. These features, Richard Dawkins explains, must have an evolutionary 
purpose, for much time and energy is expended in their making: “whatever its 
benefits, a beaver lake is a conspicuous and characteristic feature of the 
landscape. It is a phenotype, no less than the beaver’s teeth and tail, and it has 
evolved under the influence of Darwinian selection” (1989:248). Miller suggests 
that, as a personal display of fitness like the bower, visual art must have evolved 
originally as an individual activity whose resulting products were kept in the 
intimate socio-personal space of the maker for all to see and judge. Positive 
valuations of visual art displays would then bring reproductive as well as social 
success to the artist (2001:25). In section 3.4 I will consider this prediction in 
light of the archaeological record of visual art. 
In addition to being displayed for courtship purposes, according to Miller, 
visual art is consistent with a sexually selected trait in two other important 
aspects: Artistic skills appear late in ontogeny and are more prominent in 
sexually mature adults; and they are more frequently displayed by males who, as 
predicted by parental-investment theory, are generally more active in courtship 
than females (1998:117, 2000a:14).  
In short, Miller’s hypothesis states that art is a uniquely human behavioural 
trait that evolved through mate choice to serve a courtship function by signalling 
anthropomorphic interpretation such a behaviour would perhaps indicate a desire of trying some 
new decorative effect. But it seems more natural to assume that brilliant objects, even after they 
have been stored up in the nest, still exercise their irresistible attraction, and thereby tempt the 
birds to repeated trifling with them. If the supposed redecorations of the gardens be accounted for 
in this manner, then there is no reason for considering the collecting impulse in the Australian birds 
as anything more than a higher development of the same tendency which shows itself in our 
common magpies and jackdaws” (Hirn 1900:194-195).        
66 For an alternative explanation, see: Madden & Balmford (2004); Madden & Tanner (2003). These 




the artist’s fitness. This intriguing idea has generated both interest and 
opposition in the field of art studies, as reviewed below. 
The response to the ideas put forward by Miller has been rather mixed. His 
book The Mating Mind (2000a) has been well received by the general public, 
becoming a popular science bestseller. In the academic world, some scholars 
have followed his lead in using mate choice to explain various human cultural 
behaviours. For instance, Laura M. Bolt has published Musical Matings: Sexual 
Selection and the Origins of Music (2008). Literary scholar Jonathan Gottschall 
has applied the principles of sexual selection to explain universal themes in 
literary narrative, using Homer (Gottschall 2008), and global folktales (Gottschall 
et al. 2004) as examples. And in The Art Instinct: Beauty, Pleasure and Human 
Evolution (2009), the late philosopher of art Dennis Dutton built on Miller’s 
argument to suggest that the arts may well be seen as costly signals.67  
Then again, Miller’s hypothesis has been criticized for being too broad an 
explanation (Brown 2000:247). In Miller’s own words, “sexual selection through 
mate choice can potentially explain anything you can ever notice about evolved 
human behaviour as something that needs explaining. This is because anything 
you can notice about other people, your ancestors could have noticed too, and 
perhaps favoured in picking their sexual mates” (1999:80). Certainly, he has had 
no reservations using mate choice for fitness indicators to account equally for 
language, music, religion, altruism, literature, visual art (2000a) and, more 
recently, consumer behaviour (2009). But the applicability of his model has been 
challenged for many of these aspects. For example, Steven Brown has opposed 
his ideas regarding music (2000:244), Tecumseh Fitch has refuted sexual 
selection’s involvement in the origins of language (2005a:211) and music 
(2005b:12), Joseph Carroll (Carroll 2004:XX) and Brian Boyd (2009a:208) have 
both raised doubts about the influence of mate choice in the evolution of 
literature, and Catherine Driscoll (2006) has criticized Miller’s model for art and 
altruism, respectively.  
The span of Miller’s account is certainly too ample and the aim here is not 
to evaluate its applicability to each of the themes the author has dealt with, nor 
to human culture in general, but to assess the theoretical soundness of his key 
arguments regarding particularly the visual arts.  
67 Art-making, Dutton says, requires skill and coordination, insight and planning, and other 
demanding aptitudes as well as access to resources. Therefore artistic behaviour, and creativity in 
general, are indeed good markers of overall intelligence. The latter, in turn, is one of the most prized 
traits in human mate choice preferences. For this reason, Dutton suggests, art is proudly displayed, 
and the more costly and wasteful it becomes, the better it signals the artist’s quality, augmenting 
his/her status. Dutton follows Miller in granting that the arts may have evolved in courtship contexts 
but in his view, art is nowadays better characterized as a conspicuous social signal that enhances the 
status of those engaged with the arts.  
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3.3 Visual art as a courtship display: Critical assessment 
Geoffrey Miller’s research has followed the revival and success of Darwin’s 
sexual selection theory in biology, where this topic has become a prominent 
research theme over the past two decades. In this trend, mate choice 
preference patterns have been thoroughly examined and used to explain a great 
deal of animal behaviours and traits, beyond weapons and ornaments (e.g. 
territorial behaviour, life history patterns)  (Anderson & Iwasa 1996; Anderson & 
Simmons 2006). For our species, mate choice makes a strong case for explaining 
certain anatomical features of the human body, such as body hair distribution, 
and the primary and secondary sexual characters of both sexes (Darwin 
[1879]2004:652). 
Miller suggests that the influence of mating preferences might extend to 
mental and behavioural traits as well, and even artefacts. With animal examples 
like the peacock’s tail and the bowerbird’s bower, he builds up an analogy for 
human visual art. Such analogy has been around since Darwin’s time. In 1900, 
art scholar Yrjö Hirn already noted: “The attraction of the Darwinian theory is of 
course obvious. After having realised the important part which sexual selection 
plays in the ‘artistic’ activities of animals, one is naturally tempted to apply the 
same principle to all similar activities in men” (1900:238). However, there are 
several problems with this proposal, as discussed below. 
For this assessment, I focus on five key arguments put forward by Miller to 
support his model of visual art as a sexually selected trait: 1) late ontology of 
artistic behaviour; 2) sexual dimorphism in artistic production; 3) the function of 
visual art as a courtship tool; 4) the role of fitness indicators in human mating 
preferences; and 5) the evolution and structure of human mating systems. It is 
important to note that this assessment is intended for Miller’s hypothesis 
regarding the origins of visual art only, not its applicability to other traits; nor is 
it meant to evaluate the theories of sexual selection or mate choice. Some of the 
issues mentioned in this section have already been pointed out by other scholars 
regarding Miller’s ideas on music (Brown 2000), language (Fitch 2005a), culture 
(Jablonka & Lamb 2005:217), and the arts (Dissanayake 2007; Driscoll 2006), but 
are equally compelling for his model of visual art, and thus are also included in 
this review.  
1) Late ontology of artistic behaviour
Miller has emphasized that visual art, like other sexually selected traits appears 
late in life and is only fully developed by the age of reproductive maturity, often 
being displayed by adults during courtship (2000a:14). This argument is 
contradicted by the fact that the faculty to produce visual art is present in 
normally developed individuals of pre-reproductive age (i.e. children). The 
development of drawing abilities in children has been well-studied, indicating 
that this skill is often cultivated by the 2nd year of life and is generally mastered 
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by 8-10 years of age (Milbrath 1998:31). If visual art were indeed a secondary 
sexual characteristic, artistic ability would somehow influence or be influenced 
by the onset of sexual maturity. However, there seems to be no correlation 
between the two; the latter is determined by energetic, nutritional and 
hormonal signals (Harris & Ross 1987:24; Short 1976:9), whereas the first 
depends largely on genetic endowment and developmental circumstances, 
particularly the sociocultural context (Rostan et al. 2002:128). Also, visual art 
activities remain effective and important among individuals of post-reproductive 
age. Furthermore, while displays of visual art may certainly be involved in adult 
courtship, they are equally if not more prominent in other contexts, especially in 
collective rituals, ceremonies and festivities that often include individuals of all 
ages (Dissanayake 2008).  
2) Sexual dimorphism in artistic production
The mate choice model observes that, while the capacity to produce art is 
similar in both sexes, there is a certain degree of sexual dimorphism in art so 
that males will be either more productive or be “much more prone to publicly 
broadcast their cultural production” (1999:87) because they would be under 
greater pressure to show off their fitness (1998:108; 1999:72; 2000a:275). For 
Miller, this explains the predominance of male artists throughout (Western) 
history (1998:119, 1999:86, 2000a:275). This conclusion, however, is based on 
the questionable assumptions that the historical situation has evolutionary 
weight, and that men indeed produce more art than women.  
First, we cannot simply transplant the historical situation of male artistic 
dominance onto the Pleistocene. Among various traditional societies, women 
play a prominent role in art production. For example, among the San hunter-
gatherers, ochre and body painting are widely used in female initiation rites 
(Knight et al. 1995:93) and the rock art associated with these groups often 
depicts or refers to female-related themes (Solomon 1992), which makes it 
possible that women could have been the painters. Traditions of rock painting 
done by females during initiation ceremonies are known elsewhere in south 
central Africa (Zubieta 2014). Although projecting this ethnographic 
observations onto the past is also questionable, they do show that the Western 
situation is by no means universal. Second, male public visibility may be better 
explained by gender roles and the sexual division of labour than by male 
motivation to display fitness. Maternal care constraints the sorts of activities 
that women can carry out excluding, for example, those which require high 
mobility and continuous occupation, favouring home-based activities (Wood & 
Eagly 2002:708). This would limit the ‘public broadcast’ of female cultural 
production. Perhaps for this same reason, labour specialization is 
overwhelmingly a male domain. It has been recurrently observed that whenever 
a craft shifts from a household activity to the public or market domains, it tends 
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to become increasingly male dominated (Ehn 2009; Stymne 2009:23).68 But if we 
dismiss the divide between artist and artisan, and between public and domestic 
craft, it becomes clear that women are as productive as men in the visual arts.69 
Gender differences in artistic output may then be purely contextual.70 
In support of his argument, Miller has contended that human cultural 
behaviour has a lot in common with the courtship behaviour of animals, such as 
birdsong, which is used in courtship, develops alongside sexual maturity, and is 
differentially produced by males and females. Therefore (1999:88): 
Parsimony demands that if we see the same age and sex profiles for 
animal courtship behaviour and for human public cultural production, 
and if these behaviours show many of the same design features (e.g. 
high cost, aesthetic appeal, heritable variation in production ability, 
importance in mate choice), we should admit that the same theory, 
sexual selection through mate choice, might explain both phenomena. 
The main problem with Miller’s analogy is that whereas biologist have a good 
working definition of animal ‘courtship behaviour’, there is no comparable 
definition of what constitutes ‘cultural behaviour’ among humans; but even if 
we limit the argument to ‘artistic behaviour’, the similarities with animal 
courtship displays are not as straight forward as Miller suggests. Let us take 
birdsong as an example. Most biologists do agree that the primary function of 
birdsong is courtship (Naguib & Riebel 2006), but it is not limited to it. Singing in 
birds serves various functions besides sexual display, such as territorial defence, 
and individual recognition. So ‘importance in mate choice’ may well be a 
relevant ‘design feature’ of birdsong, but so are other aspects that are more 
susceptible to natural rather than sexual selection. Furthermore, birdsong is a 
trait that varies a lot between species (Naguib & Riebel 2006). For instance, 
among some birds, only the males sing and only during the mating season, 
whereas in others, singing takes place all year round and the females also sing. 
In the case of species where there is sexual dimorphism in song production, the 
disparity is correlated with differences in functional brain anatomy, i.e. the 
68 Interestingly, even among Western academics, child rearing affects female productivity (Hunter 
& Leahey 2010), and women tend to specialize less than men (Leahey 2006). 
69 Following Miller’s argument, one could easily invoke the history of haute cuisine to argue that 
cooking evolved as male sexual display, since it is well-known that most top-chefs are men. 
Whereas, universally, domestic food processing and cooking are, and probably have always been, 
predominantly female activities (Wrangham 2009:147). 
70 Like artistic production, technological production need not have been a male domain throughout 
evolution. Recent research has shown that among our closest primate relatives of the Pan genus – 
chimpanzees and bonobos – it is the females who exhibit a more extensive and avid tool-making 
and tool-using behaviour, often transmitting their knowledge and skills through the female line, 
from mother to daughter (Gruber et al. 2010). At least among these primates, then, technological 
‘output’ is not male-biased. And if we suppose that some of the skills and abilities used in visual art 
production were co-opted from tool-making, as they must have, there is no reason to exclude the 
possibility that women produced many of the early artefacts found in Pleistocene archaeological 
sites, or even that visual art production might have had a female-based origin, as suggested by 
Camilla Power (1999, 2004) and Kathryn Coe (2003). 
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brains of males and females are different. Such neural differences between the 
sexes have never been observed among humans despite the supposed 
difference in artistic output. Therefore, as Steven Brown argued for music 
(2000:250), until convincing functional evidence suggests otherwise, we must 
take as our null hypothesis the biological equivalence of the two sexes in ability, 
motivation, and production. 
Miller contends that his model explains the similarities between animal 
courtship and human cultural behaviours like art, but as the above example of 
birdsong shows, the resemblance is often only superficial. Even if courtship and 
artistic behaviours had the same patterns and features, it does not follow that 
sexual selection be the best explanatory framework, other alternatives might 
still apply. Going back to birdsong, research has shown that in many species of 
songbirds the song repertoires are not innate, but acquired during development 
and thus song is highly sensitive to the natural and social environment of the 
birds. In this aspect, birdsong in fact resembles spoken language (Naguib & 
Riebel 2006). Hence, if the similarity criterion points to the best research 
framework, as Miller argues, then “we should admit” that biological 
communication “might explain both phenomena” just as well. 
Miller does in fact acknowledge the role of visual art as a communication 
signal, however, he sees its function as restricted to sexual selection (2001:20):  
From the viewpoint of current animal communication research, art is a 
signalling system. There is a signaller (the maker of the art), and a set of 
receivers (who perceive the work of art). The prototypical functions for 
animal signals include long-range sexual attraction, short-range sexual 
courtship, sexual rivalry, territorial conflict, begging by offspring to 
solicit parental investment, warning signals to deter predators, and 
alarm signals to alert relatives of danger.  
Out of these standard function for signalling, sexual selection for 
courtship produces the most complex and aesthetically pleasing 
signals. Insofar as we praise human art for its complexity and aesthetic 
value, it seems reasonable to focus on sexual courtship as the most 
likely adaptive function of human art-production – at least in 
prehistory, if not in modern society. 
Although the prototypical functions of animal signals mentioned by Miller may 
indeed be the best known, and more commonly studied, this is but a small 
sample. Animal signals simply are “traits that are specialized for the purpose of 
communication” in general, and their diversity “is enormous” (Johnstone 
2009:155). Sexual signalling is just one of many signalling modes. To be sure, 
courtship displays are often complex, striking and ‘aesthetically pleasing’ but so 
are other signals, like the bright colours of some frogs and insects whose 
primary function is to deter predators. Good genes mechanisms (e.g. 
ornaments) do not exhaust aesthetic evolution (Prum 2012:2259). Moreover, 
unlike the bowerbird’s bower, many conspicuous animal signals frequently 
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operate in various contexts. For example, the bioluminescent displays of some 
cephalopods are used to entice prey, scare off predators, and for 
communication with conspecifics, as well as to lure mates (Mather 2004). 
Likewise, the impressive ability of chameleons to change colour serves as a 
social signal, as well as for camouflage, and sexual display (Stuart-Fox & 
Moussalli 2008). So, the fact that visual art is complex and visually pleasing is not 
sufficient to maintain that it originated in courtship. Rather, and more 
interestingly, its potential use in mate choice points towards the versatility of 
visual art as a communicative signal. 
3) Visual art as a courtship tool
Miller supports his mate choice hypothesis by drawing an analogy between the 
‘artistic’ behaviour of the bowerbird, whose function like that of birdsong is 
clearly courtship, and human art-making (Miller 2000a:273). Superficially, as in 
the case of birdsong, the similarity is clear. Both the bower and visual art may be 
seen as artificially created displays of pattern and colour. However, there are 
again more fundamental differences than parallels between the two. Firstly, 
bower-building is an instinctive behaviour, which means that even captive male 
bowerbirds that have never seen another member of their species will still 
construct bowers, even if there are no females around. In contrast, visual art 
production is not instinctive but, like language, must be learned and prompted 
by the human social milieu.71 What is more, bowers are clearly restricted by 
their function to a particular form (specific to each bowerbird species) and a 
courtship context, whereas visual art can take place in a number of non-sexual 
situations, may take several forms, and be manifested in various media.  
Moreover, the bower itself might not even be an infallible example of a 
fitness indicator. Some studies indicate that bowers may have nothing to do 
with the genetic quality of the male bowerbird (Madden & Tanner 2003). Some 
evidence suggests that the preferences of the female bowerbirds for bower 
decorations may have evolved originally through regular natural selection, as a 
sensory bias for efficient fruit foraging, and was co-opted in male sexual display. 
It may be that the females favour the bowers that for instance include more of 
their preferred berries or objects of that same colour. So, researchers have 
concluded that “the consistency of the proportional use of decorations across 
sites, and the similarity of objects that occupy similar positions, for example 
white stones and white shells, suggests that the bower conforms to a specific 
visual pattern, whose evolution can better be explained by invoking models of 
sensory bias” (Madden & Balmford 2004:594).  
But even if the bower were in fact correlated to the overall fitness of the 
male bowerbird, its analogy with the human case of visual art would remain 
71 The cases of neglected and feral children clearly show that lack of exposure to art in childhood 
will result in difficulty to produce and perceive art in adult life (see: Candland 1993). 
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unjustified. So far there is no concrete evidence that genetic quality in humans is 
in any way correlated with visual art production. As yet, there is no convincing 
data to support the notion that artistry may actually serve as a fitness signal or a 
relevant cue in human mate choice (Driscoll 2006:513).72 For example, a recent 
study originally designed to show that “creativity is desired in a potential mate” 
(Clegg et al. 2011:1), in fact ended up showing that artistic success, measured as 
high social status, is what people actually value as an attractive trait, not artistic 
creativity or skill, as predicted by Miller’s model. In conclusion, the bowerbird 
analogy is likely a classic case of projecting biological data onto human 
behaviour (Bolhuis & Wynne 2009). 
4) Role of fitness indicators in human mate choice
Miller’s model assumes that ‘good-gene traits’ guide human mating preferences, 
particularly in women. Research has shown that some such traits do play a part 
in mate choice (Gangestad et al. 2006), but sexual selection for fitness indicators 
remains controversial, as explained by biologist Malte Andersson (1994:28):  
Several empirical studies have provided support for indicator models, 
but the evidence can be interpreted in different ways. Indicator traits 
may be correlated with some direct (nongenetic) material benefit to 
the female or offspring, such as food, protection, or parental care. It 
has not yet been convincingly shown that an indicator process based 
on genetic benefits for offspring is involved in the selection of any 
secondary sex trait. 
In many cases, indeed, the apparent preference for fitness indicators might be at 
least equally explained by mate choice for direct benefits, as in the case of 
human hunting. Anthropologists Kristen Hawkes and Rebecca Bliege Bird have 
suggested that human hunting might have evolved primarily as a form of male 
display (2002), and not for meat provisioning, a scenario also suggested by Miller 
(1998:108). As Hawkes and Bliege Bird clearly show, hunting certainly is a central 
arena for male competition in forager societies, and good hunters have a high 
social status and often father more children than other men. On that basis, the 
authors favour the idea that hunting might be a costly signal, or handicap, that 
could work as a reliable indicator of male genetic quality (2002:65).73 However, 
72 Some studies suggest that women prefer ‘creative’ men at the peak of their fertile cycle 
(Haselton & Miller 2006), and that there might be a correlation between intelligence and sperm 
quality (Arden et al. 2009), but more research is needed before any relevant conclusions on the 
subject can be drawn.  
73 Costly signal or handicap models suggest that when a preferred trait, like an ornament, is 
energetically costly, only “males closer to the optimum with respect to the viability trait will be in 
better condition and will be able to maintain a more elaborate version of the ornament. Female 
choice evolves because females choosing males with more elaborate ornaments produce offspring 
with higher viability or that will be in good condition as adults […] Because the ornament is 
condition dependent, it is always a reliable indicator of genetic quality” (Jones & Ratterman 
2009:10004). However, as Gambetta has noticed, it is not necessarily the case that all honest signals 
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their work also reveals that whereas better hunters do seem to have more 
offspring, the survival rates of their children is not particularly higher (2002:61). 
So, hunting might truly be a form of male contest but that need not support an 
indirect benefits model. Women could be choosing better hunters as mates not 
for the higher genetic fitness of their offspring (indirect benefits) but for social 
prestige and securing of provisions (direct benefits). The latter is actually more 
compatible with data that fertility and fitness are greatly influenced by resource 
allocation to women, because this will determine their available energy for 
reproduction and parental investment (Harris & Ross 1987:24; Kaplan 1996). 
Selection for direct benefits is also better-suited with the general pattern of 
human reproduction which involves not only producing high quality offspring 
but also reducing the risk of early mortality (Hopkinson et al. 2013:62; Kaplan & 
Bock 2001). 
In fact, cross-cultural studies on human mating preferences suggest that the 
mating choices are guided not by indicators of ‘good genes’ (indirect benefits), 
as suggested by Miller’s model, but by direct phenotypic benefits instead, i.e. 
people generally choose potential partners on the basis of immediate returns, 
such as resource allocation, parental investment, disease avoidance, status, 
fertility, etc. Men, for instance, have been observed to show preference for 
young women, with a low waist-to-hip ratio – which are cues of imminent 
fertility and good general health (Buss 2004; Singh 2002; Zaadstra et al. 1993). 
Women, for their part, tend to prefer men who are expected to provide 
resources, protection, and/or parental care (Geary et al. 2004; Todd et al. 2007). 
This means that the correlation between certain behavioural traits and mate 
choice may still hold, but on the grounds of direct returns, not genetic fitness 
(e.g. hunting success). The types of direct benefits that are preferred, though, 
will vary across cultural contexts. So, if women prefer ‘artistic types’, as 
observed by Miller (2000a:273), it is probably due to the status of artists in 
today’s society rather than to a ‘universal preference’ for creativity (cf. Clegg et 
al. 2011). In my view, there is just not enough evidence to support Miller’s 
central premise that fitness indicators and aesthetic displays play a fundamental 
role in human mate choice. 
Furthermore, natural selection may offer an equally good explanation for 
some of the patterns attributed to sexual selection. For instance, Miller argues 
that throughout human evolution male-male competition shifted from physical 
encounters to cognitive displays and signalling through ‘extended phenotypes’ 
(1998:115, 2000a:208). Following the work of archaeologists Marek Kohn and 
Steven Mithen (1999), Miller suggests that instead of direct physical 
competition, early hominins may have used stone tools, like the handaxe, to 
advertise their fitness to potential mates, and this in turn, may be a behavioural 
are costly for the honest signaler. For example, showing one’s face is a costless honest signal of 
one’s identity (2009:182). 
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precedent for visual art (2000a:290).74 The comparative values of hominid 
canine size and body mass indicate that indeed the frequency and intensity of 
male-male aggression and competition decreased progressively in 
Australopithecines and early Homo (Plavcan & van Schaik 1997:364). And 
certainly, handaxes and reduced male aggression might be correlated, but on 
the basis of natural, not sexual, selection pressures. As Hillard Kaplan and 
colleagues suggest (2000:161), a change in the hominin dietary niche towards 
more meat consumption would have produced coevolutionary selection 
pressures for tool-making technologies, food sharing, male parental investment, 
and larger group sizes, all of which required a reduction of male-male 
aggression.  
Lastly, Miller simply assumes that all through evolution humans would have 
invariably chosen the fittest partner around (1998:108). However, recent studies 
have confirmed that social input and self-assessment are crucial in mating 
decisions. For instance, mate-choice copying is a common strategy among 
several species, including humans (Mery et al. 2009). This means that individuals 
often use social information (on the choices of others) to guide their own mate 
selection (Little et al. 2008). An individual’s own fitness also plays an important 
role in mate choice. Studies show that in humans (as among zebra finches, 
incidentally), low-quality females prefer low-quality males as mates (i.e. women 
with low self-perceived attractiveness prefer less attractive men). This strongly 
suggests that individuals may be able to adjust their mating preferences 
according to their own developmental and contextual circumstances, and this 
may be a general aspect of mate choice across species (Holveck & Riebel 
2010:158). Evolutionary psychologist David Geary and co-workers arrived at a 
similar conclusion (2004:33):  
Women’s ratings of men’s physical attractiveness are influenced by 
social comparisons and other social processes, including their own 
attractiveness and thus value as a mate, above and beyond his actual 
physical traits.  
It seems to me that the relevance of potential fitness indicators in human mate 
choice is often overestimated by Miller, whereas the actual importance of 
cultural input and context has been generally overlooked. 
74 The “sexy-handaxes hypothesis”, as it has become known, suggests that handaxes were made 
and used in the context of mate choice, acting as indicators of the maker’s quality by advertising 
traits such as good health and physical ability (Kohn & Mithen 1999; Mithen 2003). Furthermore, the 
handaxe would exploit innate perceptual bias towards symmetry, in turn increasing the 
attractiveness of its maker (Mithen 2003). Miller agrees that “handaxes must have been to hominids 
what bowers are to bowerbirds: part of their extended phenotype, a genetically inherited propensity 
to construct a certain type of object” (Miller 2000a:289). For a detailed criticism of this argument 
see: Nowell & Chang (2009). 
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5) Evolution of human mating systems
Regarding human mating systems, Miller seems to presuppose that throughout 
evolution these ran on the principle of male display and female choice, which 
are characteristic of polygynous species (like the bowerbird, and lekking birds 
like the peacock), in which the male offers no parenting effort (Jones & 
Ratterman 2009:10003). That is actually how Miller envisions hominin mating 
dynamics throughout the Pleistocene (1998:108): 
For the most part, adult male hominids must have been rather 
peripheral characters in human evolution, except as bearers of traits 
sexually selected by females for their amusement value or utility. 
However, the mating strategies of Pleistocene humans are more likely to 
resemble the primate pattern, which is very different from that of bowerbirds 
and peacocks. Primate mating strategies are much more varied and complex 
(monogamy, but also polygamy and polyandry, are relatively common among 
primates), and the male often provides at least some parental care (Fuentes 
1999). Moreover, the primate male-female pair-bond often lasts beyond 
copulation and involves more than mere reproduction, it actually constitutes the 
basis of the social system, as does the pair-bonded family in the human case 
(Aureli et al. 2008:648; Eldredge 1989:180). The evolutionary history of primate 
pairbonding, again, seems to be more closely related to mate choice for direct 
benefits – e.g. territoriality, protection, and sexual selection mechanisms other 
than mate choice, such as intrasexual competition (van Schaik & Dunbar 1990).  
Likewise, there is strong evidence that in hominin evolution it has been in 
fact the females who have been more prone to selective pressures for the 
physical and energetic requirements of bearing increasingly larger, big-brained 
babies. This is particularly evident in the marked escalation of female size from 
Australopithecus to Homo erectus and onwards (Aiello & Key 2002; Wood & 
Eagly 2001:702). In turn, this suggests that natural selection pressures in 
response to changing environments and nutritional stress were probably more 
significant than mate choice preferences in shaping the anatomy and behaviour 
of the two sexes in our genus (Pawlowski 1999).  
However, there is also something to say about the generally presupposed 
correlation between the costs of mating strategies and mating preferences. As 
biologist Richard O. Prum has observed, this is usually assumed but rarely well-
supported (2012:2263): 
Just because females are exposed to predation risks during mate 
searching, have limited energy budgets, or risk exposure to sexually 
transmitted diseases, etc., does not mean that variation in mating 
preferences will be correlated in any way with avoiding or minimizing 
any of these costs. The existence of costs of mating is not evidence of 
differential cost of variations in mating preferences, which are 
absolutely required for natural selection on mating preferences to 
occur. We will all die someday (i.e. viability is not infinite), but that fact 
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itself does not mean that we are under natural selection. To 
demonstrate natural selection on mating preferences, one has to show 
that natural variations in preference have consequences for the 
viability of the female, the number of her offspring or their viability. 
Natural selection cannot be merely assumed to exist. 
So it may well be that human females have been under greater stress of natural 
selection pressures, but that need not bear any consequences for their mating 
strategies and preferences, as is usually assumed, for example in Hawkes and 
Bliege Bird’s ‘costly hunting’ model discussed above. Prum’s point is that in 
either case, whether one argues for natural or sexual selection, the predicted 
effects on mate choice should be well substantiated. 
Finally, Miller also supposes that in evolution mate choice has been mostly a 
matter of free will and individual decision-making, merely on the basis of 
personal preferences (1998:110). However, it is quite likely that the social 
mediation of reproduction and the institutionalization of sexual relations 
happened early in human evolution (Deacon 1997; Dunbar & Shultz 2007; Harris 
& Ross 1987; Knight 1995), which would imply that mate choice has been, from 
early on, bound to cultural normativity (e.g. restrictions on marriage, 
exogamy/endogamy patterns, offspring affiliation and kinship rules). Certainly, 
in historical kin-based societies, human action is generally compelled to follow 
social roles and expectations, hence we must specially consider the influence of 
the social system on mating behaviour instead of the reverse (Meillassoux 
1972:95). On this point, Miller overlooks a great deal of anthropological data 
indicating the relevance of the social environment in human sexual selection, 
particularly the influence of parental and close kin preferences (Apostolou 2007; 
Buunk et al. 2010). In arranged marriages, for example, where parental choice is 
predominantly exercised, physical traits and attractiveness are generally less 
important, while family history and personality traits gain prominence. Studies 
of parental choice reveal that desired traits in a son-in-law often include being 
hard-worker, a good provider, and having good family provenance, and a 
daughter-in-law is valued for her hard work and good family origin above 
physical appearance (Apostolou 2007:407).  
In general, our understanding of human mating systems, past or present, is 
perhaps still too imperfect to make any universalist claims or suggest that 
humans have followed a single set of mating strategies throughout evolution 
(e.g. Buss 1994). In this regard, Geary and colleagues concluded (2004:37):  
There is not one reproductive strategy for women and another for 
men, as the strategies adopted by both sexes often vary across 
contexts, historical periods, and characteristics of the individual.  
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In sum, although there is no consensus regarding the mating systems of 
Pleistocene humans,75 there is abundant evidence that modern human mating 
strategies are not universal, but widely varied and flexible, changing according to 
specific cultural, ecological and economic circumstances (Fuentes 1999:897; 
Kaplan 1996:127; Rival et al. 1998:316; Schmitt 2005:273; Wood & Eagly 
2002:709). Thus, there is little ground to favour a single mating pattern as 
evolutionary prevalent. In fact, the diversity and flexibility of human mating 
strategies may indicate that sexual selective pressures were “never so significant 
in the evolution of the Homininae as to require selection for any strictly defined 
type of reproductive strategy in Homo” (Pawlowski 1999:266).  
In the following section, I examine the extent to which Miller’s model stands 
against the archaeological evidence from the Pleistocene. 
3.4 Test against the archaeological record of visual art 
As I have discussed throughout this chapter, the general hypothesis put forward 
by Geoffrey Miller states that many cognitively complex human behaviours 
evolved as courtship displays (1998, 1999, 2000a, 2001). More specifically, his 
model suggests that art evolved under the selective pressures of mate choice 
preferences, and predicts that visual art will be most salient in the context of 
mate acquisition and reproductive competition.  
But testing Miller’s model against the archaeological record poses a 
challenge since, as the author himself acknowledged, he did not incorporate 
specific archaeological data into his account of the origins of art (2000a:22): 
Anyone presenting a theory about human mental evolution is usually 
expected to present a speculative chronology of what evolved when, 
and to show how the current fossil and archaeological data support 
that chronology. I will attempt neither, because I think these 
expectations have too often led theorists to miss the wood for the 
trees. The human mind is a collection of biological adaptations, and an 
evolutionary theory of the mind must, above all, explain what selection 
pressures constructed those adaptations. Chronology is of limited use, 
because knowing when an adaptation arose is often not very 
informative about why it arose. Fossil and archaeological evidence has 
been enormously important in showing how many pre-human species 
evolved, when they evolved, where they lived, and what tools they 
made. This sort of evidence is crucial in putting human evolution in its 
biological and geological context, but it has not proven terribly useful in 
75 Scholars often diverge in their views of primate and human mating systems. For instance, Agustín 
Fuentes states that there is no indication that monogamy “is the predominant form of social 
grouping or mating system in Homo sapiens” (1999: 897); whereas Wendy Wood and Alice Eagly 
state that there seems to be enough evidence that “humans evolved with minimal competition 
between males and a monogamous rather than a polygynous mating system” (2002:702). 
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explaining why we have the mental adaptations that we do – and in 
some cases can be misleading. 
Miller is to some extent right that archaeological evidence by itself cannot 
explain human behaviour, but it is hardly a justification not to take the 
Pleistocene art record into account. It is how researchers interpret and use that 
evidence to infer behaviours and test those inferences which can eventually 
provide a reasonable account of cognitive evolutionary processes. Therefore, 
Miller’s choice not to integrate archaeological or fossil evidence in his  model is 
questionable. As archaeologist David Lewis-Williams has stated, any explanation 
of the origins of art “must relate to verifiable, observable, empirical data” 
(2002:48), which in this case is provided by the archaeological record. The goal 
of the present section is precisely to assess Miller’s claims in view of the material 
evidence from the Pleistocene.  
As mentioned, Miller suggests that visual artworks originated as cultural 
displays for attracting mates and outcompeting rivals (1999, 2000b, 2001). 
According to parental-investment theory (Trivers 1972), due to the energetic 
load and physical constraint of pregnancy and childcare, women are the major 
investors in reproduction and as a result will be more selective in their mating 
choices. Following Miller, female choosiness renders males more motivated to 
produce competitive fitness displays, like visual art. So, an intensification of 
visual art production in the archaeological record will correlate with periods of 
increased male-male competition and greater female choosiness (prediction 1). 
We can actually suggest two opposing scenarios in which male competition and 
female selectiveness are high: in a harsh environment and in a situation of 
abundance. As I discuss below, the second scenario would be in accordance with 
Miller’s proposal of mate choice on the basis of fitness indicators. The first is 
more in agreement with the hypothesis of mate choice for direct benefits.  
The first scenario states that women become choosier in harsh 
environments. Because resource allocation determines the energy that females 
can invest in reproduction and parental investment (Harris & Ross 1987:24; 
Kaplan 1996), women will tend to choose males that are better at provisioning 
them and their offspring. So, female choosiness will increase in periods when 
conditions require greater parental investment, to increase the survival chances 
of  mother and infant; for instance, in situations when there are more people 
than resources available (Geary et al. 2004:38; Kaplan 1996:108). Thus, under 
harsh conditions, partner provisioning to mother and child becomes crucial for 
survival, so finding a reliable, resourceful partner would be a female priority. 
Mate choice studies do indicate that in difficult or demanding environments 
where infant mortality might be high, women seek to pair up with long-term 
partners (Schmitt 2005:273). And, according to research of human mating 
strategies, women hold higher standards of selection when choosing a long-term 
mate (Buss 1994). In conclusion, this scenario predicts that an increase of visual 
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art in the archaeological record would correlate with periods of low resource 
availability (prediction 1a). 
In the second scenario, consistent with mate choice for fitness indicators, 
women are expected to choose prospective mates on the basis of indicators of 
genetic quality and courtship displays and, contrary to the previous situation, 
would become choosier in conditions of prosperity (Miller 1998:109). When 
there is abundance of resources, there will be more fit males who can afford 
complex courtship displays. Some mate choice research indicates that, like 
female zebra finches,76 women tend to become choosier when exposed to a 
greater number of potential high-quality mates with high fitness display rates.77 
So, in favourable environments women will have more fit potential partners to 
choose from and become choosier. This in turn induces male rivalry, increasing 
the quantity and quality of fitness displays. In brief, this scenario predicts that an 
intensification of courtship displays, such as visual art, would correlate with 
periods of high resource availability (prediction 1b).  
Both predictions may now be contrasted with the data reviewed in chapter 
2  from the African Middle Stone Age (MSA) between 130-70,000 years BP, and 
the European Early Upper Palaeolithic (EUP) between 45-25,000 BP.  
Several of the MSA sites with early presence of visual art (e.g. Blombos 
Cave, Sibudu, Klasies River) have yielded evidence of resource exploitation. 
Unfortunately, the data is not detailed enough to get a clear picture of the 
complete range and frequency of the species extracted. However, some trends 
can be observed. At Blombos Cave, for example, the phases contemporaneous 
with the finds of shell beads, dating to 75,000 BP, indicate that diet was broad 
and included both mammals and shellfish. At the time, this coastal site was 
surrounded by forest, which means that humans could make optimal use of 
terrestrial and marine resources (Dusseldorp 2012; Langejans et al. 2012). As 
seen in chapter 2, the period of the MSA when the earliest evidence of visual art 
becomes visible was a time of high climatic variation. However, by occupying 
locations near different sources of food (e.g. coast-forest), humans could have 
maximized their access to supplies. It then seems that the time and location of 
early visual art production is correlated with potentially favourable conditions. 
That in the MSA visual art production may have been correlated to propitious 
circumstances is further supported by the fact that it seems to decline after 
70,000 BP, when it is thought that conditions took a turn for the worse as 
consequence of the Toba eruption (Ambrose 1998b; Borroughs 2008:86). 
In the European Early Upper Palaeolithic, personal ornaments may not be a 
good indicator to quantify visual art production over time, since they are present 
76 Experiments with these birds (Taeniopygia guttata) have shown that females elevate their 
mating preference standards after having been exposed to various males with high display rates 
(Collins 1995). 
77 Women do seem to become choosier when there is an oversupply of men, being better able to 
enforce their preferences (Geary et al. 2004:38). 
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in large quantities throughout the whole period. Archaeologist Michael Barton 
and colleagues have used figurative portable and rock art as a measure (1994). 
They observe that in the climatic downturn episode leading up to the Last Glacial 
Maximum (27-21,000 BP), when mean temperature deteriorated and glaciers 
advanced continuously, there was comparatively little figurative art production. 
In contrast, during the Last Glacial Maximum itself (21-13,000 BP), visual art 
became abundant, only to wean again at the beginning of the Holocene. As 
reviewed in chapter 2, visual art seems to have flourished during the 
Aurignacian and Gravettian periods (40-28,000 BP). On the one hand, it would 
seem that a decrease in art production during the downturn episode could be 
related to harsh climate change and a decline in available resources. During the 
Last Glacial Maximum, on the other hand, may correlate with the stabilization of 
the new cold conditions, where despite the low temperatures there was great 
availability of faunal resources to be exploited, specially of large grazing 
herbivores (Gamble 1999:280-283; Guthrie & van Kolfschoten 2000:17).  
In sum, although the data available for the MSA and EUP in relation to 
resource availability and art production may be sketchy, it seems to better 
support prediction 1b that an intensification of visual art would correlate with 
periods of greater resource availability. This, in turn, would  support Miller’s 
model that in prosperous circumstances females will have more choice of high-
fitness partners, becoming choosier and thus prompting male-male competition 
which will result in an increase of courtship displays, including visual art 
manifestations. However, I have argued against Miller, that visual art is unlikely 
to constitute a courtship display. So, the correspondence between a rise in visual 
art production and favourable environments for Pleistocene human groups 
should have an alternative explanation to a sexual competition scenario. For 
example, the decrease of food resources could imply a similar decrease in raw 
material access. Likewise, in changing or harsh climatic conditions social 
relations may be affected. In chapter 6, I suggest precisely that the correlation 
observed above might instead have to do with changes in demographic patterns 
and their consequences for human social organisation, as also proposed by 
Barton et al. (1994). 
Miller has also argued that art evolved through mate choice to advertise the 
genetic fitness of an individual and so, visual artworks may be seen as ‘extended 
phenotypes’ of their makers. On this basis, he suggests that visual art initially 
emerged as an individual practice in which people could show off their personal 
skill and creativity to attract potential sexual and social partners (prediction 2). If 
that were the case, we should expect that the earliest examples of visual art 
show a great deal of internal variation (prediction 2a).  
The earliest instances of systematic visual art activity found in the 
archaeological record of Pleistocene visual art – possibly body painting and 
ornaments (i.e. beads) – do indeed point towards personal display. As it was 
discussed in chapter 2, the evidence for body painting is difficult to assess. 
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However, the data for beads is more abundant and concrete. And contrary to 
the prediction, the increasing corpus of early body ornaments (seashell beads) 
recovered from sites in North and South Africa show a low degree of internal 
variation, and a high level of standardization and formal redundancy instead 
(Kuhn & Stiner 2007a:48). In all cases, the beads were made of the shells of a 
small sea snails (often of the genus Nassarius). The consistency of raw materials 
across sites despite chronological and geographical differences is particularly 
remarkable. This seems to indicate that even when the production and use of 
early Pleistocene beads was personal, their makers were probably being guided 
by established social conventions regarding the use of specific materials and 
natural forms, and not by their own individual choices, resources or skills. This of 
course, does not exclude the possibility that people displayed the ornaments in 
their own particular way (as discussed in chapter 6). 
Finally, the fitness indicator argument implies that, in order to function as 
proper extended phenotypes the earliest visual artworks would have been kept 
on or in the vicinity of their maker at all times so that they could be seen and 
judged by potential mates and allies (prediction 2b).  
The archaeological record of the MSA does not provide a clear answer, since 
in most cases it includes only isolated finds of ornaments and beads. And even 
when these artefacts are found in association to human remains, presumably as 
grave goods, it is almost impossible to know if the buried individual either made 
or wore the ornament in question. However the record of the European Upper 
Palaeolithic is more informative. In this period there are clear examples of 
personal ornaments that were not being used exclusively by their makers, or in 
courtship contexts, as the recurrence of beads in children’s graves demonstrate 
(e.g. Krems-Wachtberg, Sungir). Furthermore, by analogy with contemporary 
hunter-gatherer societies, it is very likely that Pleistocene ornaments had a high 
exchange value and were much esteemed as gifts, transferred in trade networks 
and/or passed down the generations (Kuhn & Stiner 2007a:50). So it is unlikely 
that ornaments would have been invariably kept and displayed by their makers 
only, or that they were employed primarily for courtship. This does not mean 
that body ornaments do not convey information –however limited– about who 
made or wore them, on the contrary. It is precisely the fact that beads can 
transmit information in spite of being detached from their maker or wearer 
what probably incited humans to produce them systematically. In this manner, 
visual art might nonetheless play an important role in human mate choice. If 
visual art conveys identity and status – as suggested by Dutton (2009) – and, if 
these are important factors in mate choice, then we could expect individuals 
(male and female) to invest in visual art to influence potential partners, among 
other motives. In such case, visual artworks would work as indicators of a 
person’s social identity, rather than their genetic fitness, and might be better 
described as artefact-signals than as extended phenotypes. These possibilities 




Geoffrey Miller argues that visual art is a unique human adaptation that evolved 
to help humans solve the ancestral problem of finding and keeping a fit partner. 
In his courtship scenario, visual art is conceived as an indicator of individual 
quality to guide mate choice. Although I agree with Miller that visual art has the 
characteristics of a signal, in this chapter I have argued that contrary to his 
courtship hypothesis, visual art does not seem to have evolved under pressure 
of sexual selection. Moreover, I have pointed out that the cross-cultural studies 
on human mating systems do not support the premise that human mate choice 
is primarily informed by ‘fitness indicators’, but rather indicate that mate 
preference is  based on direct benefits. The latter is actually more compatible 
with data that fertility and fitness are greatly influenced by resource allocation 
to women, because this determines their available energy for reproduction and 
parental investment. Mate selection for direct benefits is also better-suited with 
the general pattern of human reproduction which involves not only producing 
high quality offspring but also reducing the risk of early mortality. 
The assessment of Miller’s model in view of the archaeological record 
showed that the Pleistocene data do not coincide with the mate choice 
hypothesis either. The earliest manifestations of visual art are constituted by an 
increasing corpus of body ornaments (seashell beads) that show a low degree of 
internal variation, and a high level of standardization and formal redundancy, 
which is the opposite of what one would expect if the makers were ‘showing off’ 
their choices, resources, or skills. This contradicts Miller’s ideas of visual 
artefacts as fitness displays and the notion of visual art as an ‘extended 
phenotype’. Therefore, I suggest that the function of visual art as a signal 
includes but goes beyond a courtship context, and an evolutionary explanation 
should then account for both the functional diversity and formal evolution of 
visual artworks. 
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4. LIFE ARTIFIED: ELLEN DISSANAYAKE’S ETHOLOGICAL MODEL
It seems abundantly clear that representations appearing in ritual may evoke emotion 
and may affect cognition through their aesthetic qualities. Ritual places themselves may 
be works of art, and they have, since time immemorial, been embellished by works of art.  
ROY A. RAPPAPORT, 1999 
Across all human cultures, special occasions like weddings, funerals, seasonal 
festivities, contests, and even sport matches are adorned with lavish displays of 
music, oratory and visual arts. American scholar Ellen Dissanayake has argued 
for almost four decades that this is more than a curious coincidence of cultural 
traditions. She has suggested that there must be a biological functional 
explanation for the generalized presence of artistic activities in human 
ceremonies, where the latter may be seen as art’s original source and fuel. 
 Having adopted the aims and views of ethology since the early 1970s, 
Dissanayake has recurrently made a case for art as a human universal adaptive 
behaviour. As I will explain in this chapter, she argues that art is innate and 
pleasurable, like eating or sleeping, and that like those behaviours, art too must 
have been evolutionarily advantageous and always functional. Dissanayake’s 
argument for the origin and proliferation of the arts is firmly grounded in studies 
of human ritual activities. Humans universally perform rituals to mark socially 
important situations in the life of a person or a group, and these rituals are 
invariably accompanied by artistic displays. Because of the crucial role that 
artistic performances play in ritual ceremonies, Dissanayake has hypothesized 
that the arts must have originated within that context in the remote past. In 
ritual, art acts as an expressive outlet that allows people to express and cope 
with emotion and uncertainty, on the one hand, and instigates a sense of unity 
between the participants, on the other. These functions, she argues, were 
beneficial at both the individual and group level, contributing to the survival of 
those who participated in ritual and art.  In this way the arts were retained and 
flourished throughout human evolution. On this basis, she maintains, artistic 
behaviour constitutes a true, naturally selected, human adaptation. 
Over her prolific career, Ellen Dissanayake has produced numerous papers 
and three seminal books elaborating her proposal: What is art for? (1990), Homo 
Aestheticus: Where art comes from and why (1992), and Art and Intimacy: How 
the arts began (2000). Her ideas have been highly influential not only in 
evolutionary studies of visual art (Aiken 1998; Coe 2003), but also of language 
(Fitch 2010), music (Brown 2000), literature (Boyd 2009), and religion (Wade 
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2009). She is a prolific and dynamic scholar whose ideas have been developing 
continuously through four decades. For this reason, offering a detailed 
discussion of her complete work is beyond the scope of this review. In this 
chapter I will focus mainly on those aspects of her proposal that are relevant to 
the visual arts, and particularly on her most recent work. The aim of this chapter 
is to assess Dissanayake’s ideas on the origins of visual art in light of the 
archaeological evidence from the Pleistocene. 
The first section of the chapter introduces the discipline of ethology – the 
biological study of behaviour – which has served as Dissanayake’s theoretical 
foundation. The next section lays out her specific hypothesis on the origins of 
art, highlighting key concepts and arguments, with special attention to her most 
recent work. The third section provides a critical assessment of her main 
arguments, particularly concerning the visual arts. Finally, the last segment of 
the chapter tests some predictions derived from Dissanayake’s model against 
the data from the Pleistocene record of visual art, an undertaking that has not 
yet been carried out by the reviewers of her work. 
4.1 The biological study of behaviour: The background 
Throughout the first half of the past century, the study of behaviour was 
predominantly a field of psychology. Behavioural psychology as represented by 
figures like Ivan Pavlov and B. F. Skinner, explained behaviour as a reaction to 
external stimuli and thus emphasized the study of so-called stimulus-response 
mechanisms. By the second half of the century, the discipline of ethology had 
become consolidated as the study of behaviour from a biological perspective. In 
contrast to the stimulus-response approach of behavioural psychology that 
focused on the mechanisms of behaviour, ethology turned to using the methods 
of biology to explain the causes of behaviour, its development at the individual 
level, and its evolution in a population (Lorenz 1966). In this light, ethologists set 
out to study behaviour patterns as if they were ‘organs’, that is “as attributes 
with special functions to which they were intricately adapted” (Tinbergen 
1963:413), assuming that, like the organs that constitute an individual, 
behaviour “evolved phylogenetically and is very resistant to any individual 
modification” (Lorenz 1981:107). 
In ethology behaviour is perceived as a set of naturally evolved action 
patterns characteristic of all the members of a species. Thus, it will be 
observable, specific and universal to a species. As explained by one of the co-
founders of ethology, Dutch Nobel laureate Niko Tinbergen (1963:414):  
Each animal is endowed with a strictly limited, albeit hugely complex, 
behaviour machinery which (if stripped of variations due to differences 
in environment during ontogeny, and of immediate effects of a 




Following the precepts set by biologist Ernst Mayr to study the evolution of 
biological traits (1961:1502), Tinbergen established that a comprehensive 
biological explanation of any behavioural trait should include an account at four 
distinct levels of explanation: causation, survival value, evolution, and ontogeny 
(1963:411). Causation refers to the immediate physiological and psychological 
mechanisms that trigger and control behaviour. Ontogeny refers to the 
developmental aspect of how a behaviour pattern emerges and changes through 
the life-course of the organism in its interaction with the environment. Survival 
value, or function, refers to the role the behaviour plays in the life of the 
organism, that is, how the trait contributes to its survival and reproductive 
success. This level is generally formulated as the question: “What is the 
behaviour for?”, and often constitutes the primary basis of ethological 
explanation, as Konrad Lorenz summarized (1966:274): 
If we ask ‘what for’? about a cat’s hooked retractile claws, and answer 
‘to catch mice with’, this is no profession of mystical teleology, but 
shorthand for a query concerned with causality, namely ‘what is the 
function whose survival value exerted the selection pressure which 
produced cats with this kind of claw?’ 
Lastly, evolution or phylogeny, refers to the history of the behaviour, and 
includes explanations of origin and of the plausible selective pressures that 
shaped the behaviour, with the aim of explaining how the behaviour pattern 
arose and was retained in an ancestral population. The first two levels of 
causation and ontogeny are referred to as proximal explanations as they 
correspond to the immediate mechanisms that underlie behaviour, whereas 
function and phylogeny are called ultimate explanations because they attend to 
the evolutionary history of the behaviour pattern (Mayr 1961:1503). These four 
levels of explanation have become a sort of ‘golden rule’ in evolutionary 
analyses across disciplines (Sterelny & Griffiths 1999:19).  
The first attempt to use the principles of ethology to account for art was 
undertaken by British zoologist Desmond Morris in his book The Biology of Art, 
where he suggested that art may well be seen “as a biological, or behavioural, 
phenomenon” (1962:141).  
The arts as ritualized behaviours 
One of the most prevalent subjects among ethologists has been the ritualization 
of behaviour.78 Ritualized animal behaviours typically include repetitious, 
stereotyped movements, gestures, and vocalizations displayed for instance in 
78 In 1965 this was precisely the topic of a big discussion meeting organized by British ethologist Sir 
Julian Huxley – “Discussion on ritualization of behavior in animals and man”- and attended by the 
most renowned behaviour experts of the time, such as Konrad Lorenz, Erik Erikson, and Desmond 
Morris. The 1966 proceedings of this meeting, cited at length in this section, reveal how the 




play, courtship, aggression, or under stress, such as the chest-beating of gorillas, 
or the ‘dance’ displays of many male birds. These ‘action patterns’ or behaviours 
are presumably adaptive, generally innate, and characteristic to each species 
(Lorenz 1966:274). These types of behaviours are also identifiable among 
humans, where they take on a new dimension in relation to mental capacity, as 
Julien Huxley argued (1966:259): 
The process of ritualization in man is far more complex, elastic and 
various than that in animals, and leads to a much wider range of 
results. 
In man, we find not only the adaptive canalization and 
ritualization of overt behaviour, but also that of thought or ‘inner 
behaviour’, resulting in motivated idea-systems and in internal 
(psychological or mental) organizations. 
In humans, ritualized behaviours include a variety of everyday actions such as 
greetings, manners, stereotyped gestures of aggression, affection, and emotion. 
The formalization of such behaviours through collective convention constitute 
‘proper’ ritual and ceremonial activities (Erikson 1966:523). The latter have been 
described in anthropology as “conventional acts of display through which one or 
more participants transmit information concerning their physiological, 
psychological, or sociological states either to themselves or to one or more of 
their participants” (Rappaport 1971:25).  
In both the animal and human cases, ethologists suggest, the three main 
functions of ritualized behaviours are to communicate the condition or 
disposition of the individual, to canalize emotions and to form or reaffirm bonds 
between individuals (Lorenz 1966:279). However, as psychologist Erik Erikson 
clarified, although human rituals include a combination of ritualized behaviours, 
not all ritualized behaviours qualify as ritual (1966:523).  
Erikson further suggested that the ontogeny of human ritualization begins 
with the mutuality and the bond between mother and child, and in time includes 
a wider range of individuals and groups. So, according to Erikson, the minimum 
requirements of ritualized behaviours in humans are found in mother-infant 
interactions (1966:337): 
Behaviour to be called ritualization in man must consist of an agreed-
upon interplay between at least two persons who repeat it at 
meaningful intervals and in recurring contexts; and that this interplay 
should have adaptive value for both participants. And, I would submit, 
these conditions are already fully met by the way in which a human 
mother and her baby greet each other in the morning. 
Similarly, John Ambrose proposed that the dyadic routines of greeting, smiling, 
kissing and hugging between mother and baby constitute innate ritualized 
human behaviours whose adaptive function is to maintain a strongly cohesive 
bond between the two, as a result enhancing the infant’s survival and 
establishing the baby’s basic social capacity (1966:360). In the “rites and rituals 
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conducted by communities of adults”, whose purpose is often to mark 
“recurrent events as the phases of the year of the stages of life”, the infantile 
feelings of security, unity and awe experienced in the mother-baby relationship 
are re-evoked for all their comforting and bonding effects through actions like 
repetitive utterances and gestures (Erikson 1966:340).79 
There seems to have been a consensus among early ethologists that there 
were some common elements between artistic creation and ritualization, such 
as bonding, communication, symbolism, and the manipulation of affect (Erikson 
1966:524). It was agreed that the arts –i.e. human practices such as dance, song, 
music-making, oratory, poetry, drama, and visual representation– could count as 
part of the set of ritualized behaviours of humans.80 Huxley himself wrote 
(1966:259):  
The arts involve ritualization or adaptive canalization of the creative 
imagination. […] Creative works of art and literature show ritualization 
in this extended sense, in being ‘adaptively’ (functionally) organized so 
as to enhance their aesthetic stimulatory effect and their 
communication function. 
In the works of scholars like Morris, Lorenz, Tinbergen, Huxley and Erikson, we 
already find the seeds of Ellen Dissanayake’s ideas and the basis of her 
‘artification hypothesis’ (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010), founded on the notion that 
the arts may be seen as human ritualized behaviours (1979:27). Dissanayake 
adopted an ethological approach (1974, 1979) and aimed at explaining the 
evolutionary origin of human artistic behaviour in terms of phylogeny, ontogeny, 
causation and function, as summarized below.81 
4.2 The artification hypothesis: Key arguments 
Having adopted the evolutionary ethological view, Dissanayake set out to 
explain  “how  art  arose  and why it was retained”  (1982:146).  Her starting 
point would be that art, having been observed in all human cultures, is a 
universal  feature  of  our  species,  and  therefore  it must have a selective value. 
79 Erikson’s work, as much of early human ethology (Cairns & Cairns 2006), was highly influenced by 
the Freudian theory of psychoanalysis (see for example Erikson 1966:340). Thus, there is a general 
tendency to over-emphasize the influence of early development in the behaviour of the individual. 
80 Art historian Ernst Gombrich, who also attended the discussion meeting,  disagreed that art and 
ritual could have a common purpose. He recognized that ‘’the schema used by artist is generally 
pre-formed in ritual and that here as elsewhere art and ritual, using the word in its narrow cultural 
sense, cannot easily be separated”. But he later objected: “Important as are the areas of contact 
between ritualized behaviour in animal and man, and far reaching as is their bearing on a study of 
art, I could not agree to an equation of that discharge of emotion that occurs in ritual with the 
motivations of human art” (1966:396-7).  
81 Dissanayake has made this aim explicit. However, she is not always clear about which aspects of 
her hypothesis precisely correspond to which level of explanation (see for example: Dissanayake 
2008). The present analysis is partly my personal reading of how her model matches each level. 
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Indeed, an evolutionary maxim dictates that evolved species-specific behaviours, 
particularly complex and costly ones, probably improve survival chances 
otherwise, if their cost were higher than their benefit, natural selection would 
tend to eliminate them over time. As anthropologist Roy Rappaport explains 
(1971:23): 
Anything which is universal to human culture is likely to contribute to 
human survival. Phenomena that are merely incidental or peripheral, 
or epiphenomenal to the mechanisms of survival are hardly likely to 
become universal, nor remain so if they do.  
Dissanayake’s first premise, then, is that art-making is a universal innate human 
behaviour, meaning that any normally developed individual of our species, will 
be able to make art (independently of any judgment of quality), and what is 
more, will have a natural predisposition towards it.82 So, to have persisted as it 
did, she argues, art must have served an important function that throughout 
human evolution somehow contributed to the survival and reproductive success 
of the individuals that presented it. To find out what this function may have 
been, she first asks what is ‘the core’ or the common element to all the arts, and 
concludes that it is a sense of ‘specialness’ (1980:401): 
If there is such a thing as a ‘behavior of art’ we must assume that it 
developed in human evolution from an ability or proclivity that our pre-
paleolithic ancestors could have shown. I should like to suggest that 
this root proclivity is the ability to recognize or confer ‘specialness,’ a 
level or order different from the everyday.  
The proclivity for specialness, which she calls “making special” (1982, 1990, 
1992, 1999, 2000) and more recently “artification” (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010), 
refers to the act of transforming something ordinary (e.g. an activity or object) 
into something extra-ordinary by treating or making it in a special manner. To 
her, this universal tendency towards artification has been moulded by natural 
selection (1992:56), and is “the ancestral activity or behavior that gave rise to 
and continues to characterize or imbue all instances of what today are called the 
arts” (2008:252).83 Hence, her model attempts to unravel the human tendency 
to ‘make special’ or to ‘artify’ in terms of Tinbergen’s scheme of four levels of 
explanation. 
82 With the term ‘art’ or ‘art behaviour’ Dissanayake denotes ‘all the arts’: music, dance, 
performances, storytelling, and the various forms of visual ornamentation and representation, or 
visual art (1999). Her evolutionary model further makes no distinction between art and craft, nor 
between ‘great’, or ‘fine’ Art and kitsch, or ‘folk’ art.  To be sure, the aesthetic value of artworks is 
irrelevant to the discussion of the evolution of art as a trait, just like the correct spelling of modern 
languages would be of no concern to research on the evolutionary origins of human speech. 
83 To draw a sketchy biological analogy, if the different arts were emotions, ‘making special’ or 




This level of explanation refers to the evolutionary history of the behaviour, that 
is, its origin in an ancestral population, its development through time, and the 
potential selective pressures that shaped it.  
Dissanayake has suggested that the ancestral interactions between mother 
and child constitute the evolutionary behavioural basis of artification 
(2008:253). She situates the origin of this behaviour early in human phylogeny, 
by the time of Homo erectus, some 250,000 years ago (1979:29, 1982:148, 
1992:51). Most researchers agree that the human pattern of growth and 
development, otherwise known as ‘life history’, started to take its present form 
among H. erectus, who shows a significant increase in brain and body size with 
respect to previous hominins (Hopkinson et al. 2013:62). These changes had 
major implications for hominin females (Aiello & Key 2002). On the one hand, 
the energetic costs of motherhood became higher as infant growth slowed 
down. And on the other hand, the extended period of child dependency 
strengthened the human mother-child bond, which is the strongest and longest-
lasting among all primates (Bell 2001:226). According to Dissanayake, the most 
important component of the mother-infant interaction, which creates and 
structures the bond between the two, is baby-talk. In her model, baby-talk, with 
its typical stereotyped, exaggerated and ritualised movements and vocalizations 
constitutes a human universal adaptation that underlies both ritual and art 
behaviour (1980:401). 
Like the ritualization of behaviour, the process of artification is achieved 
through the operations of formalization, repetition, exaggeration, elaboration, 
and manipulation of expectation (Dissanayake 2007:9).84 For instance, bodily 
movements when repeated and exaggerated become dance; speech, patterned 
and embellished, becomes poetry; song emerges from elaborated, amplified 
vocalizations; and in visual art, regular objects and surfaces are made special by 
emphasizing their shape, pattern, texture, and colour (1999:36, 2008:252). The 
roots of these basic operations, as Erikson noted, are already present in the 
communications between mother and baby (Dissanayake 2008, 2009, 2010). In 
baby-talk the participants formalize, repeat, exaggerate, elaborate, and 
manipulate their expressions, sounds, and movements to engage and sustain 
each other’s attention. The mother (or caregiver), for example, employs baby-
talk to attract the child’s interest, to which the baby responds with loud 
vocalizations and exaggerated movements. Furthermore, this interaction 
generates the release of pleasurable prosocial hormones (oxytocin), reinforcing 
the bond between mother and infant (Dissanayake 2010:3), and generating an 
emotional response that is also found in the aesthetic response to the arts 
(Dissanayake 2001:98).  
84 At least three of these operations – formalization, repetition, and surprise – are also cited by 
Erikson as basic elements of ritualization (1966:339). 
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In sum, Dissanayake suggests that the typical stereotyped, exaggerated and 
repeated actions that constitute the mother-baby dyad served as the 
evolutionary basis for ritual and artistic behaviour, they constitute art’s 
phylogenetic precedent (2001:98, 2008:253, 2010:4).  
Ontogeny  
This level of explanation relates to the development of a behaviour in the life-
course of the individual, from infancy to maturity, and how it shows up in 
interaction with the environment. It refers to questions of innateness, learning, 
conditioning, etc. 
In Dissanayake’s model, art is understood as an innate proclivity that shows 
up in early infancy becoming increasingly complex with age. As mentioned 
before, the operations that constitute the basis of artification are first exercised 
in babyhood during spirited interactions with caregivers (i.e. formalisation, 
repetition, exaggeration, elaboration, and surprise). These are further developed 
during childhood in play (Dissanayake 2010:4).85  
Regarding practical ability for visual art, Dissanayake argues that humans 
also show an inborn impulse to manipulate objects and make artefacts. This is 
prominently present in visual art-making, where children from an early age 
spontaneously begin playfully exploring form and composition. In this manner, 
“children’s drawings emerge from a self-propelled impetus to initiate and then 
follow their mark-making impulse where it leads – often to the operations of 
artification” (2010:5). 
Thus, in Dissanayake’s view, the ontogeny of art is mostly innate, and 
intensely developed in early infancy and childhood, whence it becomes later co-
opted in normalized adult artistic behaviour (Dissanayake 2010:6).  
Causation 
This level of proximal explanation refers to the immediate mechanisms and 
motivations or ‘causes’ (e.g. physiological, psychological) that trigger a 
behaviour. 
Dissanayake understands the arts as a derived category of human ritualized 
behaviours that in several aspects overlap with play and ritual, but which involve 
a particular aesthetic dimension. Huxley noted that “human ritualized activities 
have a strong autesthetic or self-rewarding component” (1966:259), which has 
been also highlighted in artistic behaviour (Morris 1962:158). As discussed 
above, ethologists and psychologists have often used the term ‘ritualized 
85 For Dissanayake, play is very similar to art in various aspects. Both are ‘removed’ from reality, 
carried out in special contexts with special rules, both are pleasurable and encourage novelty and 
creativity, and both develop innately (1974:215). In fact, in her earlier work, she suggested that art 
may have evolved from play (1974, 1979).  
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behaviour’ to refer to repetitive, stereotyped actions of a pathological nature, 
like the compulsive movements of caged animals and distressed children.86 
Many animals turn to ritualised behaviours to release tension, that is to canalize 
and reduce anxiety in stressful situations (Rappaport 1971:25). Humans, too, 
perform repetitious movements  to calm down under stress. Erikson suggested 
that because this type of behaviour arises in similar circumstances among both 
animals and humans, it “seems to provide a ‘natural’ link with a possible 
phylogenetic origin of ritualization in its more stereotyped and driven forms” 
(1966:337).  
According to Dissanayake, as the cognitive capacities of hominins increased 
with encephalization, individuals would have become progressively concerned 
with vital life-changing and life-threatening situations (e.g., birth, death, 
puberty, marriages, seasons, hunts, migrations, etc.), which caused uncertainty 
and stress. Ceremonies, Dissanayake argues, were developed in hominin 
evolution as a communal strategy to cope with the anxiety and uncertainty 
generated by those situations, and because artistic behaviours were innately 
pleasurable, they were eventually co-opted in ritual ceremony (1992:59-60): 
The arts, biologically endowed predispositions, have been 
physically, sensuously, and emotionally satisfying and pleasurable to 
humans. By using elements that pleased and gratified the human 
senses […] and arranging and patterning these elements in unusual 
‘special’ ways, early humans assured the willing participation in, and 
accurate performance of, ceremonies that united them. The arts 
‘enabled’ ceremonies because they made ceremonies feel good. Before 
they were ever consciously used to make things special, the 
satisfactions of rhythm, novelty, order, pattern, color, bodily 
movement, and moving in synchrony with others were fundamental 
animal pleasures, essential ingredients of life. Using these bodily 
pleasurable elements to make ceremonies special –elaborating and 
shaping them– the arts, and art, were born. 
In ceremonies, which involve a collective and emotion-laden event that marks 
significant occasions in the life of an individual or a group, many of the artifying 
operations and behaviours take place because they replicate the comforting 
feeling of the mother-child interactions, thus “relieving tension and anxiety and 
instilling a sense of coping with uncertainty” (2007:10). So, the naturally 
pleasurable and soothing ritualized behaviours of the mother-infant dyad were 
collectively re-enacted by jointly engaging in repetitive and stereotyped actions, 
displays, utterances, and movements, some of which eventually constituted 
what we now call ‘the arts’ (1999:36, 2008:252). In time, different media were 
incorporated to reinforce the effects of ceremonies. These new components, 
intended to attract and sustain attention, were embellished to make them 
86 Although Morris and Erikson, for instance, oppose the use of the term ‘ritualization’ in this 
clinical sense (Erikson 1966:523). 
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perceptibly extra-ordinary:87 “In the visual arts, ordinary objects like the natural 
body, the natural surroundings, and common artifacts are made special by 
cultural shaping and elaborating that make them more than ordinary” 
(Dissanayake 1999:36). In this manner, Dissanayake sees ritual ceremony as the 
probable context in which the arts originally evolved and flourished (2008:257), 
and sees the canalization of emotion along with its pleasurable and therapeutic 
effects against uncertainty as the original motivation or proximate cause of art 
behaviour (2001:98; 2008:254, 2009:156). 
Function 
In evolutionary terms, function refers to the survival value of a behaviour, or the 
effect for which it was selected. It accounts for the plausible ways in which the 
behaviour may have conveyed a survival and reproductive advantage to the 
organisms that manifested it. 
In Dissanayake’s model, as explained above the aesthetic elements that 
constitute the arts were innately gratifying to humans but offered no real 
survival or reproductive advantage until they were incorporated in ritual. In this 
context, she explains (2001:98): 
The arts may serve […] as ways of creating and sharing emotional 
communion with other humans, thereby transmitting group knowledge 
and instilling a sense of ‘coping’ that could relieve individual anxiety, 
and foster one-heartedness and social solidarity. 
Hence, besides providing an emotional outlet and being self-rewarding, ritual 
interactions have the effect of forming a bond between participants (Erikson 
1966:524; Lorenz 1966:276). And the arts, by attracting and directing collective 
emotion and attention in ritual, also give rise to or support shared feelings and 
ideals, thereby strengthening social cohesion among the partakers in a 
ceremony. For Dissanayake, this may have added adaptive value (1992:52):  
Groups whose individual members had the tendency to make things 
special would have had more unifying ritual ceremonies, and thus 
these individuals and groups would have survived better than 
individuals and groups that did not.  
Dissanayake, thus, argues that the arts coevolved with ritual ceremony, 
acquiring adaptive value and social function by providing psychological relief and 
promoting social cohesion, which can potentially enhance survival of individuals 
and groups (1999:39, 2001:98).  
Summarizing, Dissanayake’s model for the origins of art states that the 
ritualized behaviours that constitute artistic activities are a human biological 
adaptation with a) [phylogeny] a deep evolutionary history in the hominin 
lineage that may go as far back as Homo erectus; b) [ontogeny] a developmental 
87 The process of “making special” or “artification”.  
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basis in mother-baby interaction and infant play whence; c) [causation] they 
became co-opted as self-rewarding emotional outlets; d) [function] whose 
psychological effects of reducing anxiety and promoting unity between 
individuals ultimately conferred adaptive benefits to those who engaged in 
them.88 It should be noted that this model refers to the origins of the 
‘behavioural basis’ of all the arts, that is of ‘making special’. So, on the one hand, 
Dissanayake envisages the emergence the human tendency for making special 
early on in human evolution, but on the other hand, she perceives the origins of 
visual art, in particular, as a late development, unique to our species (2007:12). 
4.3 What is art for? Critical assessment 
Ellen Dissanayake’s model states that art behaviour is a natural human proclivity 
towards making things special – or ‘artifying’. Thus, she has argued that adopting 
an ethological approach will help to explain the evolution of this behaviour of 
art, as well as the origin of all the practices we now know as ‘the arts’. The 
following assessment concentrates on three main problems in her model. First, 
it may not be viable to formulate a unified explanation for the evolution of the 
arts as a whole because they constitute different traits. Second, the evidence for 
visual art does not support a view of art as an innate biological predisposition 
expressed in a universal pattern of ontogenetic development. And lastly, the 
ethological framework adopted by Dissanayake, by overemphasizing function 
and adaptive value, and asking ‘what is art for?’ might not be an appropriate 
strategy to solve crucial questions of emergence and development in evolution. 
Nevertheless, the assessment also indicates that the model does identify 
important effects and selective pressures that might have contributed towards 
the retention and success of human artistic practices. 
The evolutionary diversity of the arts 
As mentioned before, the artification hypothesis is concerned with explaining 
the origins of a general behaviour of art, which includes all the arts. Dissanayake 
has defended the view that an ethological explanation of the origins of art 
should account for all its forms, and that models that are based only on one of 
the arts (e.g. music, storytelling, visual art) are inadequate (2008:250). While I 
agree that research on the evolution of one art form should not be used to 
88 This is how the four aspects work together in her model: “Adult aesthetic response (to arts like 
poetry, music, and dance, which unfold in time) is built upon the same fundamental or innate 
competencies and sensitivities to temporal and dynamic elements that are spontaneously used by 
mothers in babytalk to engender and sustain affiliative emotion and accord. If this is so, engaging in 
the arts may serve […] as ways of creating and sharing emotional communion with other humans, 
thereby transmitting group knowledge and instilling a sense of ‘coping’ that could relieve individual 
anxiety, and foster one-heartedness and social solidarity” (Dissanayake 2001:98).  
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formulate a general model for all the arts, I also believe that a monolithic 
explanation of art is both unattainable and undesirable. The main reason for this 
is that music, storytelling, and the visual arts, i.e. the manifestations that 
Dissanayake considers as variants a single behaviour of art, may in fact 
constitute very different traits in themselves, which evolved at different 
moments, under different selective pressures, with their own cognitive 
mechanisms and functions. 
For example, several researchers have suggested, as Darwin did, that music 
and dance may have a very long evolutionary history, perhaps pre-dating 
language ability (Brown 2007; Cross & Morley 2008; Dunbar 2004; Fitch 2005b; 
McDermott & Hauser 2005; Mithen 2009). In fact, some scholars suggest that 
singing might have constituted an early proto-linguistic communication system 
that eventually supported the rise of speech (Dunbar 2004; Fitch 2005b; Mithen 
2009). The origin of musical abilities has recently received much attention from 
evolutionary and cognitive scientists (Brown 2007). As a result, several 
important advances have been made towards an evolutionary explanation of 
music.89 These studies in fact seem to support Dissanayake’s model. Cross-
cultural evidence indicates that there are some innate components to music 
perception and production. Humans are responsive to music and rhythm from 
early infancy (Fitch 2005b). Moreover, McDermott and Hauser (2005) have 
noted that music is nearly universally produced from an arrangement of pitches 
similar to the pentatonic and diatonic scales. And, at least one genre of human 
music has been identified as truly universal: lullabies, slow in tempo, simple, 
repetitive and infant-directed. All three points seem to support a scenario of 
music origins related to human mother-infant interactions (Cross & Morley 
2008; Dissanayake 1992, 2000; Fitch 2005b). In contrast, as Dissanayake herself 
(2007:12) and others have noted (Coe 2003; Lewis-Williams 2002; Zilhão 2007), 
the visual arts evolved later and separately. From our review of the 
archaeological record in chapter 2, it becomes evident that visual art certainly 
did not flourish until the Late Pleistocene, which in itself requires clarification.  
Finally, neuroscience research has shown that linguistic abilities, musical 
faculties, and visual art-making (e.g. drawing and painting), each involve 
different cognitive mechanisms, and are located in different areas of the brain 
(Fitch 2005b; Zaidel 2010). This is most clearly observed in persons with 
Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s diseases whose memory, as well as visual and 
linguistic capacities are often impaired, but generally are still be able to 
remember and even learn songs and melodies, as the curious neurological 
anecdotes of Oliver Sacks ([1985]2011) illustrate. This indicates that musical 
memory is independent of visual and linguistic memory (Prickett & Moore 
1991). Neuroimaging studies of music perception and production point towards 
the possible existence of music-specific cognitive processes and circuitry in the 
89 Music is minimally defined as “structured sounds produced directly or indirectly by humans” 
(McDermott & Hauser 2005:30). 
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human brain (Brown 2007; McDermott & Hauser 2005). Similarly, patients with 
impeded linguistic faculties (e.g. dysphasia, apraxia) can retain normal visual-
artistic abilities (Donald 1993:742; Humphrey 1998), which are more related to 
visual-motor skills. This implies the dissociability of language and visual art; i.e. 
that language and visual art are not neurologically interconnected. Therefore, if 
the aim is to account for the evolution of ‘the arts’, they should be separated as 
independent sets, each with their own ontogenetic and phylogenetic history and 
mechanisms. In this assessment I concentrate particularly on Dissanayake’s 
views related to the emergence and development of visual art. 
Against the innateness of visual art 
Dissanayake has often argued that art is likely to be a human adaptation 
because it is an innate behaviour; i.e. it arises spontaneously in children – is 
unlearnt, it follows a fixed pattern of development, and it is universal (1992:xix; 
2007:2).90 There is, however, little ground to support at least the first two of 
these three statements with regards to visual art. First, visual art does not arise 
spontaneously in ontogeny. Certainly, when stimulated, children are highly 
motivated to engage in visual art-making. In literate societies where the 
development of drawing skills is particularly encouraged from an early age, 
children do acquire this aptitude relatively easily (independently of talent). For 
this reason, some researchers have suggested that the development of drawing 
skills to some extent mirrors the gradual process of language acquisition (Kellog 
1970; Morris 1962). However, neither visual art nor language are unlearnt. 
Several studies in deaf (Mayberry 2010) and socially isolated children – 
neglected and ‘feral’ children (Candland 1993) – confirm that there is a critical 
period for language learning, meaning that “a lack of language acquisition in 
early life impedes the ability to learn language throughout life” (Mayberry 
2010:286). And although I am not aware of comparable studies for visual art-
making, at least the cases of neglect also indicate that children do not 
‘spontaneously’ engage in, for instance, drawing (Candland 1993:34). Visual art, 
like language, is a behaviour that depends on human social interaction. 
Second, Dissanayake follows the classical Piagetian models of child 
development which suggest that visual art production follows a fixed pattern of 
progressive stages. These models, based on the maturation of children’s 
drawings (Baker & Kellogg 1967; Kellogg 1970; Morris 1962), suggest that the 
achievement of visual representation follows an inner scheme of universal 
succesive phases that start with making marks and lines (scribbles), to 
geometrical shapes, to composite figures, and culminate with representational 
sketches (Dissanayake 2010:5). Certainly, most children in modern literate 
societies are encouraged to start experimenting with drawing by the age of two, 
90 Innate traits are “determined by factors present in and individual from birth, even though the 
traits in question may not emerge until later in development” (McDermott & Hauser 2005:30).   
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when they begin to develop the muscle co-ordination required for the 
manipulation of tools like crayons or pencils (Morris 1962), producing only lines, 
scribbles, and eventually circles. Between the ages of three and five, they 
gradually go from typically drawing circles, to cross circles, to ‘mandala’ and 
‘sun’ motifs, to making more complex aggregates eventually arriving at 
representational images. Over the next few years children will master drawing, 
independently of their talents. However, this pattern does not seem to be either 
innate nor universal. The ‘scribble’ stage, may be parsimoniously explained by 
the development of motor skills (e.g. hand-eye coordination and dexterity). As 
for the others, more recent data from developmental psychology suggests that 
there is a strong social component to children’s art-making, and thus the 
content of these supposed stages more likely correspond with the instructor’s 
influence and expectation, and even peer-pressure. For example, when infants 
develop Theory of Mind and a sense of their social self, the influence of their 
cultural environment grows stronger, constraining individual ‘creative freedom’, 
as developmental psychologists Francesca Happé and Pedro Vital explain 
(2009:1370):  
Typically developing (TD) children lose aspects of originality in, for 
example, their art as a result of acquiring stereotyped forms from their 
peers (think, for example, of rays drawn on a sun or birds drawn as 
‘ticks’). Without doubt, the obligatory and automatic recognition of 
others' mental states, and the desire to be viewed by others as part of 
the in-group, place blinkers on most TD young people.  
Furthermore, despite the universalist claim, the model is based on Western case 
studies (e.g. Kellogg 1970). However, (figurative) representation should not be 
seen as the highest level of development of visual artistic behaviour either at the 
individual or the species level, as psychologists Jeniffer Drake and Ellen Winner 
make clear (2010:167): 
At the heart of artistic talent is the ability to master one’s culture’s 
representational conventions. It is a mistake […] to see Western-style 
realism as the prime sign of artistic talent, when this style is but one of 
the many possible representational conventions. 
In contrast to innateness, the statement of universality is better supported. As 
explained in the previous chapter, there is enough evidence to claim that some 
forms of visual arts are, at least since the Late Pleistocene, truly universal (e.g. 
body ornamentation). But if this claim is meant to include all forms of visual art, 
it becomes weaker. The above does not necessarily disprove that visual art 
constitutes a human adaptation. As philosopher Nicholas Shea has recently 
discussed, evolutionary research on human behaviour needs to detach 
innateness from adaptation, and being an adaptation from being unlearnt, and 
do away with explanations of the type “X is an adaptation → X is innate → X’s 
development does not depend upon learning” because “many recent human 
adaptations depend crucially on learning” (2012:2235). Early ethologists also 
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recognized that much of human behaviour depends upon “man’s unique 
learning capacity” so that “the process of human ritualization in psychological 
evolution has a primarily ontogentic, not a phylogenetic basis; is directed mainly 
by psychological selection, not by the genetic mechanism of natural selection” 
(Huxley 1966:258). So, visual art may be universal, though not innate, and it may 
have adaptive value, without necessarily being an adaptation. 
Following Erikson, Dissanayake has also suggested that the interactions 
between mother and child constitute the behavioural basis of artification, 
especially baby-talk, which she also considers a human adaptation that underlies 
ritual and artistic behaviour (Dissanayake 2001, 2008:253; Miall & Dissanayake 
2003). Nonetheless the assertion that baby-talk is a universal human parenting 
strategy has been disputed by cross-cultural studies of parental caregiving and 
child development (Tomasello et al. 2005:688). Some scholars have pointed out 
that many cultures do not interact with infants in this manner, but that on the 
contrary, the most common pattern of infant care found in ethnography shows 
that babies are often fed and further left alone to rest (Lancy & Grove 
2010:147). In general, young babies and toddlers are not usually talked to or 
interacted with, for they are perceived as lacking understanding. In some 
extreme cases, as among the Korowai of West Papua, newborn babies are seen 
as ‘inhuman’ or non-persons (Stasch 2009:165). Frequently it is not until children 
become relatively independent (at 4 or 5 years of age) and can assume a social 
role that they become incorporated into day-to-day social interactions (Lancy & 
Grove 2010:152). Moreover, the ways in which mothers communicate with their 
infants also vary, and do not always comply with the typical high-pitched kind of 
baby-talk Dissanayake describes; for example among the Amazonian Pirahã, 
mothers use humming, or ‘hum speech’ when addressing their babies (Everett 
2010:186). Dissanayake’s, and Erikson’s, assumptions seem to be modelled after 
an archetypal idea of motherhood. As developmental psychologist Suzanne 
Gaskins has noted, in childhood studies, “many of the underlying assumptions 
and many specific patterns of interaction (such as social games, face-to-face 
interaction, and motherese) experienced by Euro-American infants that have 
been assumed to be universal are not” (2006:288).  
Another issue is that the mother-infant relationship in the Homo lineage 
probably is not ‘a unique adaptation’, but part of a caregiving behavioural 
control system present in all mammals (Bell 2001; Panksepp 1998). This neuro-
affective system is mostly driven by hormonal cues that promote emotional 
preference and attachment between mother and offspring. In primates, and 
even more so in humans, the scope of the system incorporates not only primary 
care and safety of the offspring, but also the teaching of survival skills, emotional 
security, and life-long mutual support (Bell 2001:224). The consequences of the 




It may be suggested, in the light of both Erikson’s account and the 
pseudo-infancy prevailing in some rituals, that ritual recaptures a state 
having its ontogenetic origin in the relationship of pre-verbal infants to 
their mothers. […] There are also phylogenetic implications. If ontogeny 
has a phylogeny and if the mother-child relationship among humans is 
but a variant of the primate or even mammalian pattern, it may be that 
the basis of the numinous is archaic, antedating humanity. 
Indeed, if the human mother-infant bond is but an extension of the mammal or 
primate pattern, it would not be, as Dissanayake has suggested, “an adaptation 
in hominins that evolved to address the problem of ensuring continued care of 
highly altricial infants” (2010:3). And whereas this does support her argument 
that making-special behaviour has a deep evolutionary history in the hominin 
lineage, it still leaves unexplained why clear evidence of ritual and art-making 
only appears in the Late Pleistocene.  
The problems of function as explanation 
As a final discussion, various scholars have taken issue with Mayr’s and 
Tinbergen’s four levels of evolutionary explanation, upon which the ethological 
analysis of Dissanayake’s model is also based. To recapitulate, these are the 
‘proximate levels’ of causation and ontogeny, and the ‘ultimate levels’ of 
function and phylogeny. Criticisms have focused particularly on three points: the 
conflation of correlation and causation, the problems of ‘reverse engineering’ 
from current function, and the division between ‘proximate’ and ‘ultimate’ 
causes. 
The first point, is that in trying to identify the causes of a behaviour, 
researchers often point to the preceding conditions that accompany it, but these 
do not necessarily hold a causal relationship, in other words “what causes 
something to happen has nothing to do with the number of times we have 
observed it happening” (Sayer 2000:14). Furthermore, identifying the conditions 
in which a behaviour or trait evolved is not sufficient explanation for its 
evolution. In this case, Dissanayake’s observation that ritual ceremonies always 
incorporate artistic displays and that both art and ritual share many 
characteristics (e.g. ‘specialness’) is not sufficient to support the argument that 
the latter acted as cause for the evolutionary development of the first. Pre-
existing conditions are not the same as causes, and the fact that two 
phenomena are observed to co-occur recurrently does not mean that they are 
causally linked.91  
The second issue has been raised by palaeontologist Stephen J. Gould and 
biologist Richard Lewontin, who noted that asking the question “what did a 
91 This is a logical fallacy known as cum hoc ergo propter hoc. For example, up until the 19th 
century people used to think that ‘bad air’ or miasma (i.e. bad odours) caused diseases like cholera 
and plague, evidently there is a connection between the two but as we now know, bad odours are 
more usually an effect or a symptom of disease-prone conditions, rather than a cause of disease. 
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behaviour evolve for?” can generate hypotheses that fail to distinguish between 
current function from cause of origin (1979:581). To take one of Gould’s classical 
examples, by observing the current function of feathers in birds, one could easily 
assume that feathers ‘evolved for’ flying, or alternatively for display, and be 
satisfied with either explanation. However, feathers may have evolved in 
dinosaurs for thermo-regulation and were only later repurposed, i.e. exapted, 
for flight and courtship in birds (Gould 2002:1226). So, the fact that a trait or 
behaviour functions in one way or context in the present, does not necessarily 
indicate what it ‘evolved for’.92 Therefore, “one must not confuse the fact that a 
structure is used in some way with the primary evolutionary reason for its 
existence and conformation” (Gould & Lewontin 1979:587). For this reason, 
answering the question “what was art selected for?” by ‘reverse-engineering’ on 
the basis of the current function of the behaviour may not be the best approach, 
since it can easily lead to ‘just-so-stories’ of phylogenetic origin. As Dissanayake 
herself has noted (2007, 2008), there are currently a dozen ‘competing 
scenarios’ on the adaptive function of art, all taking different effects of art as a 
starting point. Additionally, even if a current function could be traced back in 
phylogeny, it would not imply that the trait is a specific ‘adaptation for’ that 
function. Evolutionary processes are generally not that simple, there may be 
selection without adaptation, adaptation without selection, random drift, and 
‘secondary’ adaptation – a.k.a. exaptation. In sum, evolutionary explanations 
need not couple function, selection and adaptation in a linear relationship. So, 
even if visual art does have self-rewarding, therapeutic and bonding functions, 
and even if these were originally developed in ritual contexts, it cannot be said 
that art was ‘selected for’ these effects. 
Finally, as in the first point, the ‘proximate’ and ‘ultimate’ levels of 
explanation are often said to refer to the immediate and the evolutionary causes 
of a behaviour, respectively. But as Martin Mahner and Mario Bunge explain, 
this is problematic (1997:40):  
The distinction between proximate and ultimate causes has become 
common-place in biology. In order to explain any morphological or 
behavioral feature, such as the behavior of migrating birds, we would 
have to take two levels of (alleged) causation into account. The 
proximate level consists in the physiological mechanisms that produces 
or triggers the behavior, such as the effect of diminishing daylight and 
temperatures on the phsysiology of the bird, or the developmental 
pathways in the case of a morphological character. The ultimate cause, 
by contrast, would be the evolutionary history of the organ or behavior 
as contained in the ‘genetic program’, which thus has to be regarded as 
a material as well as final cause. 
92 Gould coined the term ‘exaptation’ to denote “the cooptation of a preexisting character for an 
altered current utility”, as opposed to adaptation, which is “the origin of a character directly for its 
current utility” (2002:671). Exaptation then involves “the re-use by natural selection of a structure 
with previously different purposes” (Pievani & Serrelli 2011:3). 
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As will be obvious from the previous considerations, what is called 
‘proximate causes’ may indeed be such, but there are no such events 
as ultimate causes. Undoubtedly, the history of an individual and, 
particularly, the history of its genetic material are determinants of the 
developmental processes leading to its current morphology and 
behavior, but they do not cause it. What is true is that the history of a 
system provides some of the conditions or circumstances of the 
system’s possible changes. Therefore, the expression ‘ultimate cause’ 
should be replaced by the expression historical condition, or distal 
cause in the case of a genuine past cause.  
Certainly, phylogenetic history is relevant for understanding the origins of a trait, 
but it does not offer a cause of origin.  
Finally, Kevin Laland and colleagues have recently noted that Mayr’s model, 
by conceiving of causation and ontogeny as ‘proximate’ causes, diminishes the 
importance of developmental processes in evolution. Whereas, it is now 
recognized that developmental and epigenetic mechanisms can have strong 
selective powers (Laland et al.2012:1515): 
Mayr’s proximate/ultimate distinction has proven problematic because 
it builds on an incorrect view of development that fails to address the 
origin of characters and ignores the fact that proximate mechanisms 
contribute to the dynamics of selection.  
The implications of the three issues raised above is that while separating 
evolutionary accounts in different levels of explanation may be a useful heuristic 
tool of analysis, in reality these four aspects do not work separately, they are all 
integrated in the organism, its current functioning and its history.93 These 
criticisms also have an impact on Dissanayake’s model for the evolutionary 
origin of art. Especially, the point that a trait’s function should not be equalled to 
its evolutionary cause. Whereas selection does work on effects (Gould 
2002:672), pointing these out does not inform us about how the behaviour 
arose. Indeed, the effects, results or outcomes of artistic practice (e.g. stress 
reduction, social cohesion, aesthetic pleasure, etc.) may have acted as selective 
pressures towards retaining art behaviour, but they do not explain either how 
visual art came about, or how it developed into its observable forms, and the 
latter questions should be the focus of evolutionary explanation.94
93 As philosopher of science Brett Calcott has noted, the proximate-ultimate dichotomy is also not 
useful for explaining how group-level properties emerge from individual-level interactions (e.g. 
cooperation, complexity), or the mechanisms that are involved in such a process (2013:260). 
94 Therefore an account in terms of mechanisms is preferred to one in terms of function: 
“Mechanismic explanation differs also from functional or teleological explanation, as in ‘feature A 
evolved (or was set up) for function B, which is necessary for (biological or social) viability.’ Indeed, 
conjecturing that a certain system is driven by such-and-such mechanism(s) involves no reference to 
adaptation or value, particularly usefulness to the given system or some other system – all the more 
so since certain feature of either organism or social systems can be maladaptive. The emergence of 
an interesting new thing or property of a thing should certainly be explained in terms of some 
mechanism or other but not necessarily by reference to its value, which may be nil or even negative 
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In conclusion, while Dissanayake’s model probably points out some 
significant selective pressures for human artistic behaviour, it is not sufficient as 
an explanation of how (visual) art emerged in human evolution (the specific 
circumstances under which it is expected to have arisen). Pointing to a 
correlation with ritual, where in time the visual arts were just ‘added’ to 
enhance ceremonies (2007:12) says little, in any case, about why visual art 
developed when and where it did (the forms and changes observed in the 
archaeological record).  
However, it is possible to retain the notion of the visual arts as ritualized 
behaviours without having to allude to a ritual origin. In fact, what early 
ethologists like Huxley and Lorenz called ‘ritualization’ was the process by which 
an ordinary movement, gesture, or vocalization acquires a communication 
function, i.e. becomes a signal. They suggested that the arts also went through 
such a ritualization process, and for this reason had a lot in common with animal 
ritualized behaviours (i.e. signals). However, as Erikson well said (1966:523), not 
all ritualized behaviours are (what anthropologists call) ritual or involved in 
ritual. In its original connotation, I agree that visual art may be seen as ritualized 
behaviour, in other words, that it may have originated from common behaviours 
that later became co-opted in communication. I elaborate on this in chapter 6. 
4.4 Test against the archaeological record of visual art 
Dissanayake’s account for the origins of art, like Geoffrey Miller’s, incorporates 
little archaeological evidence. She has focused mainly on suggesting a biological 
motivation for artistic behaviour, rather than ‘reconstructing’ the emergence or 
development of ‘the arts’ (1992:37). And like Miller’s, her model is difficult to 
contrast against the early archaeological evidence of visual art. However, by 
following the author’s line of reasoning, again it is possible to deduce some 
predictions to be tested against the Pleistocene record.  
The hypothesis laid out by Dissanayake suggests that visual art evolved in 
collective ritual contexts, selected for the adaptive function of reducing stress 
under uncertainty, while promoting intra-group social cohesion. This model 
predicts that art will be most prominent in the context of communal rituals and 
ceremonies. Therefore, a noticeable increase of visual art will correlate with an 
increase in communal ceremonial activities (prediction 1a) and signs of emerging 
group identity (prediction 1b). And because, Dissanayake argues, “groups whose 
individual members had the tendency to make things special would have had 
rather than positive [… ] To be sure, some human actions are purposive, but indicating their (known 
or conjectured) purpose, function, or usefulness performs only part of the job. We also need to know 




more unifying ritual ceremonies, and thus these individuals and groups would 
have survived better than individuals and groups that did not” (1992:52), the 
model would expect artistic behavoiur to be under strong selective pressure of 
environmental stress and intensive group-group competition (prediction 2).95 
Unambiguous evidence for ritual and ceremonial activity is difficult to 
identify in the material record, and is often a point of debate in archaeological 
interpretation (Ross & Davidson 2006). It is clear that not all ceremonies leave 
an archaeological print, but by analogy some remains are interpreted as traces 
of ceremonial behaviour. From ethnographical and historical data, it is known 
that rituals and ceremonies may take place on a daily basis, and in a domestic 
environment; take for example the keeping of a home altar, morning prayers, or 
collective dining. But the types of ceremonies Dissanayake actually seems to 
have in mind – e.g. public gatherings with lavish displays of visual and other arts 
– are special-purpose activities that generally require special preparations and a
determined time and place (Rappaport 1971:28). 
Ian Watts has argued that the notable intensification of red ochre 
exploitation in the record of African Middle Stone Age sites “permits the 
inference of habitual collective ritual” (2009:80). But, as I explained in the review 
of the ochre record, this evidence is ambiguous. An increase in ochre use, even if 
used for body painting, need not imply that humans were carrying out the kind 
of communal ritual ceremonies Watts and Dissanayake seem to have in mind. 
For instance, body painting could have been an everyday, non-ceremonial 
(although highly symbolic) custom, as it is today among the Namibian Himba 
women whose hair and bodies are permanently covered in a mix of butter and 
red ochre. Also, many African Middle Stone Age ochre finds come from contexts 
with traces of multiple activities. They have often been found along with stone 
tools and food remains that indicate the sites were likely base camps where 
people carried out day-to-day subsistence activities rather than special 
ceremonial ones, for example at Pinnacle Point (Marean et al. 2007) and 
Blombos Cave (Henshilwood & D’Errico 2011:82).96 Naturally, the fact that the 
ochre has been found in these locations does not preclude its use in other 
places; it is still possible that the ochre was processed in these domestic 
locations and the pigments obtained were applied and/or displayed elsewhere. 
The repeated occurrence of ochre in Late Pleistocene burials (Watts 2002:1) 
does seem to suggest the probable use of red pigment in funerary ceremonies, 
but the data from ochre can be ambiguous, as we have already discussed in 
chapter 2. So, depending on how the evidence is interpreted, the prediction that 
95 Dissanayake recognizes, though, that some scholars report the opposite: that abundance of 
resources promotes the need for competitive ceremonial displays of prestige items (e.g. visual art). 
However, for her, the emergence of art is better explained by its contribution to social cooperation 
rather than competition (1992:238, 2010:6). 
96 With the exception of a recent find of 100,000 year-old ochre-processing toolkits at Blombos 




an increase of visual art production should indicate more intensive ceremonial 
behaviour (1a) might find some support in the African MSA record of ochre use 
(cf. Power 1999, 2004, 2009).  
It is not until the Upper Palaeolithic in Europe that we observe better-
defined signs of the ceremonial use of space. For instance, the painted caves of 
France and Spain do not show evidence of having been used for regular 
habitation, which indicates that they often were reserved for the special 
purpose of painting and associated activities, which probably included some 
ceremonial activities (Conkey 1993:108).  
The Pleistocene shell bead finds from Middle Stone Age sites like Blombos 
Cave in South Africa and Pigeons Cave in Morocco have been interpreted by 
some scholars as indicators of group identity (Wadley 2007:682). However, 
these items seem to be too standardized over time and space to signal group 
differences (Kuhn & Stiner 2007a:48). As discussed in the record review, many of 
the beads from different sites are made of the same marine snail family 
(Nassarius) and show similar perforation and modification patterns. Objects that 
are meant to tell groups apart from one another should be easily identified as 
distinct.97 Like linguistic dialects, which clearly signal specific group affiliations, 
material social markers should show relative regional and temporal stylistic 
variability (Wobst 1977). Instead, the formal redundancy and stylistic 
consistency of these earliest ornaments might relate to individual within-group 
social identity in the African Middle Stone Age before 75,000 BP (Kuhn & Stiner 
2007b:46; Malafouris 2008b:408), as I will discuss in chapter 6. Again, it is in the 
record of the European Upper Palaeolithic, especially from the developed 
Aurignacian onwards, where we clearly see regional stylistic variations in 
material culture (like tool types and personal ornaments) that might speak of 
interaction between distinct groups (Gamble 1999:363; Gilman 1984; Vanhaeren 
& D’Errico 2006). The idea that the earliest signs of visual art might correspond 
to emerging group identity (prediction 1b) is thus not well supported by the art 
record of the African Middle Stone Age up to 75,000 BP, but might apply to the 
evidence of the European Upper Palaeolithic particularly after 30,000 BP. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the living conditions in Africa around 100-75,000 
BP seem to have been relatively favourable for modern humans, with small 
populations benefiting from diverse productive environments. Under such 
circumstances, group-group competition is not generally expected to act as an 
important selective pressure. At the same time, because bands in a rich and 
stable environment are relatively self-sufficient and scattered, cooperation 
between groups and across large distances is weak (Ambrose 2010:140). In the 
absence of intensive inter-group competition or cooperation, group identity 
would remain underdeveloped, and markers of group affiliation would be 
97 Nonetheless, we cannot discard the possibility that it was how these items were displayed by 




unnecessary (Wobst 1977; Wiessner 1983). Hence, the conditions of 
precariousness and group-group competition expected by Dissanayake’s model 
(prediction 2) are not met for the African MSA before 75,000 BP.  
The archaeological predictions deduced from Dissanayake’s artification 
hypothesis are not entirely consistent with the earliest record of visual art in the 
African Middle Stone Age. Nevertheless, some of the circumstances assumed by 
Dissanayake seem to apply well to the conditions of the European Upper 
Palaeolithic. So, her model appears to better explain not so much the origins of 
visual art as the emergence of particular (collective/group) art forms. For 
instance, the conditions of intensified intergroup interactions, either through 
competition or cooperation, that might select for internally cohesive groups and 
collective identity might be reflected in the regional styles of Upper Palaeolithic 
tool technology and visual art (Gilman 1984). This prospect will be revisited in 
chapter 6. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this analysis, I have argued that Dissanayake’s artification hypothesis is too 
broad in trying to account for all ‘the arts’ as a single behaviour of art (see also 
Davies 2005:304; Lewis-Williams 2002:67). I have suggested that, on the 
contrary, what she calls the arts may be better approached as different 
behaviours with individual evolutionary histories. Furthermore, I have pointed 
out that an ethological approach is desirable and useful to enquire about 
evolutionary origins, but that it should avoid relying too heavily on ‘reverse-
eingeneering’ from current function and on a priori assumptions of the 
innateness of behaviour, for these blur the importance of ontogenetic 
development in evolution. Finally, I have shown that the original ethological 
connotation of art as ‘ritualized behaviour’ actually refers to its role as a 
communication signal, but not necessarily to ritual in the anthropological sense, 
and it is in that original sense that it should be understood. 
The assessment of Dissanayake’s hypothesis against the archaeological 
record of visual art in the Pleistocene revealed that it cannot satisfactorily 
explain the origins of visual art behaviour in the African Middle Stone Age prior 
to 75,000 BP, although it might account for the emergence of new (collective) 
art forms in the European Upper Palaeolithic by 30,000 BP which indeed might 
be related to an increase of ritual behaviour and inter-group competition. This 
point will be taken up again in chapter 6. 
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5. ART IN MIND: STEVEN MITHEN’S MODEL OF COGNITIVE EVOLUTION
We have both reason and need to search for a link only if there is something to be linked, 
only if, for example, it has been decided that there is a space to be found that separates 
chimpanzees from human beings. The Mental Ladder was the chain, of course, just as the 
fossil record has come to be the supposed chain that links all living beings, past and 
present, extinct or breathing on today’s ladder. Each new fossil find of a supposed 
hominid fossil brings new guesses as to the nature of the link in structure and behavior 
between ourselves and those very remote genetic ancestors.  
DOUGLAS K. CANDLAND, 1993 
Over two decades ago, British archaeologist Steven Mithen, armed with a broad 
knowledge of prehistory and psychology, set himself the difficult and ambitious 
task of proposing an evolutionary model not only for the origins of art, but for 
the modern human mind, in his seminal book The prehistory of the mind: A 
search for the origins of art, religion and science (1996a). His proposal – well 
informed by archaeology, palaeoanthropology, evolutionary psychology, 
cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and philosophy of mind – emphasizes 
the symbolic nature of human cognition and conceives of visual art as a 
cognitive faculty intended to encode and communicate ideas between 
individuals, and has had a great impact in the fields of cognitive archaeology, 
and in studies on the origins of art. 
 The aim of this chapter is to carry out an assessment of the key 
arguments in Mithen’s proposal as presented on The Prehistory. Although I will 
also use relevant work in which he has developed the arguments expressed in 
The Prehistory, the latter contains the core of Mithen’s origin-of art model. 
Moreover, even when the author has somewhat modified his position since that 
publication, this is still his most  influential work and continues to be widely 
cited. For this reason, it constitutes the main focus of this assessment.  
The chapter development includes an overview of the ideas that underlie 
Mithen’s model in the realms of archaeology and cognitive science, a description 
of his main arguments regarding the evolution of the modern mind and the 
origins of visual art, and a discussion and evaluation of some of the key features 
of his model in view of recent data from cognitive and evolutionary science. 
Finally, I examine some predictions from his proposal in light of recent 
archaeological data.  
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5.1 The evolution of human cognition: The background 
Mithen’s model for the evolution of cognition and the origins of art, firstly, 
belongs to a long scholarly tradition in archaeology concerned with explaining 
the changes in the archaeological record of the Late Pleistocene, and in 
particular of the European Upper Palaeolithic. He attempts to account for the 
differences in the material culture of extinct and living humans in terms of the 
evolution of cognitive abilities in the Homo lineage. In second place, it fits within 
the domain of cognitive archaeology, the aims of which is explained below. 
As discussed in chapter 1, for most of the past century, prehistorians were 
preoccupied with explaining the seemingly abrupt changes observed in the 
archaeological record of the European Upper Palaeolithic, which pointed to a 
sudden ‘explosion’ of several objects and traits that define modern human 
populations (Pfeiffer 1982:42); among others: specialized tools (e.g. harpoons, 
knives, awls, nets), the use of various raw materials for tool-making (e.g. bone, 
wood, antler, ivory), the structured use of space, the exploitation of a wide array 
of resources for food (e.g. plants, seeds, small animals, aquatic resources), 
burials with grave goods, exchange, personal ornaments, and visual art. 98  
To many scholars, Mithen included, these changes were best explained by 
an enhancement in human cognitive ability that allowed the populations of the 
Upper Palaeolithic to create and exploit culture at a rate never before reached 
by any other hominin group. Thus, explaining the archaeological record could 
not be decoupled from explaining the evolution of human cognition. 
Cognition encompasses all the mental processes involved in the way 
organisms learn about and interact with the world. For humans, these include 
perception, attention, memory, language acquisition and use, problem-solving 
and decision-making, among others. Explaining how cognitive processes work is 
a key theme in psychology and neuroscience. Up to the 1960s, psychological 
research was dominated by the behaviourist approach which explained 
behaviour as a reaction to external stimuli and thus emphasized the study of so-
called stimulus-response mechanisms.99 However, by that time some cognition 
scholars including George Miller, Noam Chomsky and Jerry Fodor, started to see 
behaviour in a different light, as the result of cognitive operations triggered by 
environmental inputs. They were attracted by the idea that the mind could be 
modelled after a computer, “both the computer and the human mind should be 
thought of as ‘symbol systems’ – physical entities that process, transform, 
elaborate, and, in other ways, manipulate symbols of various kinds” (Gardner 
1987:34). Under their influence, psychological research gradually shifted away 
from behaviourism and toward a cognitive information-processing position, 
which focused on investigating mental representations and the ‘inner workings 
98 For a full list of Upper Palaeolithic innovations, see: O. Bar-Yosef (2002, 2007).  
99 Behaviourists considered psychology to be the science of the physical, observable movements 
organisms make in space, i.e. observable behaviour (Baars 1986:7). 
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of the mind’. This conceptual change is known as ‘the cognitive revolution in 
psychology’ (Baars 1986; Gardner 1987; Miller 2003). As psychologist Howard 
Gardner explains, the cognitive paradigm is the belief that talking about human 
cognitive activities is to speak about mental representations, separate from the 
biological/neurological and sociological/cultural aspects of behaviour; that the 
computer is a good model of how the human mind works; and, that cognitive 
research should focus on operative mechanisms and de-emphasize affective, 
cultural, and environmental factors (1987:6). The study of language, understood 
as the primordial symbol system, is also central to the cognitive paradigm.  
The cognitive view then, promotes a view of cognition as symbol-
processing. Here, the mind’s function is to create and process symbols which 
themselves are generated in the brain to represent knowledge or reality. Hence, 
symbolism is detached from the traditional semiological sense of a code or 
system of meanings, and redefined as a psychological  (cognitive) mechanism 
and a form of knowing (Sperber 1975).100 The priority given in this perspective to 
symbolism as the most relevant aspect in the evolution of human cognition is 
summarized by cognitive psychologist Merlin Donald as follows (1993:737):  
Symbolic representation is the principal cognitive signature of humans 
and the main phenomenon whose arrival on the scene has to be 
accounted for in any scenario of human evolution. 
The cognitive paradigm has also had a profound effect in how art has been 
approached since. Whereas behaviourism had generally understood art as a 
non-cognitive or affective activity, the cognitive perspective established the 
processes of art-making and art perception as mental activities originating in the 
brain (Efland 2002:56). 
In archaeology, the cognitive view generated a branch concerned with “the 
study of the ways of thought of past societies (and sometimes of individuals in 
those societies) based upon the surviving material remains” (Renfrew 1993:248). 
Cognitive archaeology, or the ‘archaeology of mind’, has two main fields of 
study: reconstructing past symbolic systems through the analysis of material 
culture, and reconstructing the evolution of human cognition (Renfrew 
1993:249). The work of Steven Mithen is well positioned in the latter area of 
research. One of his main aims has been to put forward an evolutionary scenario 
for the human mind, using the archaeological record “to reconstruct the past 
thought and behaviour of our ancestors, and the selective pressures for 
cognitive evolution” (Mithen 1998a:9). The evolution of human cognitive traits 
and their manifestation in the archaeological record is a recurrent theme in the 
work of Mithen and other prominent cognitive archaeologists like Iain Davidson 
(Noble & Davidson 1996) and Thomas Wynn (Coolidge & Wynn 2009), and of 
100 The basic premise is that language – as a symbol system – structures human thought, and thus 




palaeoanthropologists and Pleistocene archaeologists such as Richard Klein 
(Klein & Edgar 2002), and Francesco D’Errico (Henshilwood & D’Errico 2011). 
 Mithen’s own ideas on cognitive evolution will be presented in the 
following section. For the moment, it suffices to mention that in general terms, 
his work follows closely the model for the origins of the human mind proposed 
by cognitive psychologist Merlin Donald (1991, 1993). Donald suggested that the 
evolution of mind had developed through the hominin line from apes to modern 
humans in three stages of increasing complexity. The three transitions between 
stages were marked by shifts in the nature of consciousness which turned the 
‘episodic’ primate mind into the ‘mimetic’ mind of early hominids, into the 
‘mythic’ mind of early Homo sapiens, and eventually into the ‘theoretic’ modern 
human mind. According to this model, the episodic mind that still characterizes 
primates and our close ape relatives changed with the emergence of what 
Donald calls ‘mimesis’, a representational form of communication through 
gesture and mime that made possible, among other things, the voluntary 
expression of emotion, the transmission of skills, the planning of actions, and 
the coordination of group behaviours. Mimesis would have been the main 
means of communication among early hominins and acted as a foundation for 
linguistic ability. The next shift towards the mythic stage was brought about by 
the development of phonology, or speech. In Donald’s view, this was a late 
development, as recent as 45,000 years ago. But its consequences were 
enormous. Speech allowed for a more complex social life, and a faster means of 
transmission and accumulation of cultural knowledge. Narrative originated in 
this phase and myths became the basis of social structure. The mythic mind 
would have been characteristic of early ‘sapient humans’. The final and most 
complex of all stages, the theoretic stage, is typical only of recent historical 
human cultures and is characterized by the use of symbolism and of artefacts as 
external ‘memory storage and retrieval’ devices. The ultimate cultural 
development of this stage is represented by the recent invention of writing 
systems. In sum, Donald argues that “During the past two million years humans 
have passed through three major cognitive transitions, each of which has left the 
human mind with a new way or representing reality and a new form of culture” 
(1993:737). 
Mithen follows Donald in seeing symbolism as the most important human 
cognitive capacity, in placing the evolution of (syntactic) language late in human 
evolution, and in seeing external symbolic storage as the key innovation that 
drove the development of modern human culture and cognition. Mithen uses 
the archaeological record to illustrate the process of human cognitive evolution 
(1996a:227).  
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5.2 The prehistory of the mind: Key arguments 
Mithen has made a name for himself as one of the few archaeologists who have 
ventured into the domain of the cognitive sciences. His model of the evolution 
and workings of the human mind and of how these processes are reflected in 
material culture has been highly influential in archaeology and across disciplines. 
In this section, I will lay out what are the central premises of that model. 
The evolution of the human mind 
One of the most dominant views in cognitive studies since the late 1980s has 
been that of modularity. This is the hypothesis that the human mind is 
constituted by specialized domains or modules shaped by natural selection to 
solve the different problems faced throughout evolution (e.g. foraging, mating, 
competing, cooperating, etc.). Evolutionary psychologists, for instance, have 
often compared the human mind to a Swiss army knife, meaning that it may be 
thought of as one device made up by different specific problem-solving 
mechanisms (Pinker 1994, 1997; Tooby & Cosmides 1992). Mithen instead 
suggests that the Swiss army knife mentality, composed of separate working 
modules, was typical of Early Humans (all Homo ancestor species),101 but not of 
Modern Humans. In his view, modern cognition is characterized precisely by an 
‘intermodular’ mind. To explain the evolution of modern cognitive 
intermodularity, Mithen invokes the metaphor of the mind as a cathedral built in 
three stages (1996a:64).102  
Accordingly, the construction of the ‘mind’s cathedral’ consisted of laying 
down a foundation upon which to build the mental edifice. This basis 
corresponds to general intelligence, i.e. a general-purpose learning and 
problem-solving mechanism. General intelligence is common to all apes, and for 
this reason Mithen supposes that it must have a long time depth in the primate 
order. 
In a second stage of construction, chapels for special purposes were built 
around the central nave of general intelligence. In Mithen’s view, this change 
occurred early in the evolution of the hominin line, where there was a trend 
towards increased mental modularity, i.e. cognitive specialization. The ‘chapels’ 
101 With the term ‘Early Humans’, Mithen denotes Homo erectus, H. heidelbergensis, H. 
neanderthalensis, and ‘archaic’ H. sapiens. (1996a:116). 
102 In this aspect, Mithen’s model is well within the Western tradition of modelling the evolution of 
cognition: “Curiously, theories of the mind have often been divided into three parts, the number 
‘three’ appearing to hold a magical import for intellectual philosophers. The three-category notion 
arose during the Middle Ages and reappeared in nineteenth-century thought, when it became 
known as faculty psychology. Each of the three aspects, or faculties, of the mind – reason, emotion, 
and will – was now thought of as a separate faculty. Cognition (reason), emotion, and motivation 
(the will) remain central in our times, as examination of any university curriculum in the study of 
psychology will show” (Candland 1993:193).   
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would constitute the cognitive domains evolutionary psychologists refer to, but 
whereas the latter conceive of a virtual infinity of such specialized modules, 
Mithen argues that throughout evolution hominins managed relying on four 
basic cognitive domains or intelligences: social, natural, technical and linguistic. 
Like the chapels in a cathedral, these stood apart and functioned independently 
of each other. The first chapel to have been erected was social intelligence for 
interacting with others. This is already present in chimpanzees and thus must 
have been the earliest mental module to arise. The second to emerge was a 
natural history intelligence for understanding the natural world and for foraging. 
Then, technical intelligence evolved for making and using tools.103 It is in this 
long ‘second stage of construction’, Mithen suggests, that the preconditions for 
the eventual development of visual art were set (2001). These were: a) the 
ability to make intentional marks, which probably became established with the 
use and fabrication of tools; b) the capacity to recognize and classify natural 
signs, such as the sights and sounds of other individuals and properties of the 
environment; and c) the faculty of communicating intentionally with 
conspecifics.  
In Mithen’s view, the mind of early Homo and all derived species, including 
Neanderthals and the first H. sapiens, ran mainly on general intelligence and the 
modules of social, natural history and technical intelligence. These humans 
eventually excelled on each of these domains, and so we see that, for instance, 
Neanderthals were highly social, had an extraordinary understanding of their 
environment, and produced very complex and efficient tools. However, their 
material culture remained more or less static throughout their thousands of 
years of existence. Mithen attributes this apparent cultural stagnation to the 
fact that they were unable to make connections between their mental domains, 
so that they could not bring different types of information into a single idea, 
restraining their capacity for innovation (2005:232).  
For Mithen, the human mind worked in this way until recently in 
evolutionary time when, sometime in the evolution of our species, linguistic 
intelligence emerged specifically for spoken language acquisition and use. 
Mithen reckons that earlier hominins, including Neanderthals, must have had 
some sort of prosodic ‘proto-language’ that was probably used only to regulate 
social situations, that is only to communicate with and about other people.104 
So, language was present in the hominin mind but lacked modern syntax and 
was restricted to the social domain (Mithen 2005:264).105 The evolution of fully 
modern syntactical language (with grammatical rules and structures) would have 
103 This scheme is partially based on the work of cognitive psychologist Howard Gardner, as 
presented in his book Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences (1983).  
104 Mithen has recently suggested that Neanderthals, and perhaps other extinct hominins, had a 
communication system based on holistic, manipulative, multi-modal, musical and mimetic 
utterances: music-like, emotion-laden vocalizations used as part of social interactions, which were 
accompanied by body gestures, mimesis and dance-like movements (2005:175, 2009:9). 
105 As in Robin Dunbar’s scenario of language evolution (Dunbar 1996a). 
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caused the walls that separated the cathedral’s chapels from the central nave to 
collapse, allowing the flow of information between them. This means that 
language could now be used to talk about anything: tools, animals, social 
interactions, or the weather. In this manner, knowledge from one domain of 
intelligence could be applied to another in novel ways, triggering creativity and 
innovation. The ‘creative explosion’ of the European Upper Palaeolithic would 
reflect the transition from a social to a general-purpose language (1996a:192): 
As soon as language started acting as the vehicle for delivering non-
social information and ideas into the domain of social intelligence, 
reflexive consciousness could also get to grips with the non-social 
world […] As a result, the whole of human behaviour was pervaded 
with the flexibility and creativity that is characteristic of modern 
humans.  
Mithen calls the ability to use information across mental domains ‘cognitive 
fluidity’, a concept that is central to his hypothesis for the origins of visual art.  
Chronology 
Like Donald, Mithen favours a late chronology for the full development of 
modern human cognition. Based on the archaeological evidence of the Late 
Pleistocene, he places this transition at 50,000 years ago (1996a:20, 2000a:217, 
2001:47). The latter date refers to the minimum age for the colonization of 
Australia, which serves as an indicator of modern cognition as this event 
involved planning, abstract thinking, organization and the manufacture of 
complex sailing technologies (as discussed in chapter 1). 
In keeping with ‘cognitive transition’ models (e.g. Klein & Edgar 2002; 
Coolidge & Wynn 2009), Mithen’s work highlights a ‘lag’ between the 
emergence of anatomical and cognitive modernity. It argues that even though 
the fossil record shows that before 100,000 years BP there already were 
populations that probably looked much like present-day people (e.g. Qafzeh, 
Klasies River), the archaeological evidence indicates that they did not start 
thinking and behaving like present-day people until much later. Signs of 
‘modern’ practices like ritual, planning, abstract thinking, and art-making are 
only sporadic among early humans. For example, there are ‘flashes’ of 
modernity in sites like Blombos Cave, but they are few and far between. Even 
after the colonisation of Australia, some 60-50,000 years ago, the signal remains 
weak until the European Upper Palaeolithic (40-30,000 BP), whose innovations 
in culture and technology finally indicate a ‘fully developed’ modern mind. The 
discontinuity of the evidence for modernity poses a problem, as he explains 
(2000a:211-2):  
It is not until between 60,000 and 30,000 years ago that the 
archaeological record is transformed in a sufficiently dramatic fashion 




[However,] if we wish to align ourselves to the notion of a pan-
human psychology then we would have to place this mutation 
happening at 100,000 years ago at the very latest. For after that date 
modern humans had become dispersed and most probably existed in 
fragmented populations throughout the world. Any universal biological 
trait would by necessity have had to have appeared before this date.  
Mithen’s solution has been to argue that either prior to 60,000 years ago, “the 
mentality of the Early Modern Humans appears to drift in and out of cognitive 
fluidity” (1996a:183) or, more recently, that the changes in the record after that 
date may be attributed to socio-demographic factors such as group size and 
rates of social transmission (2005:262). Mithen has characterized his position as 
“gradualist, with regard to the cognitive capacities that allow symbolic 
behaviour, and discontinuist as regards the manifest appearance of such 
thought, this arising from one further step in the gradual evolution of such 
capacities” (2000b:149).  
The origins of visual art  
Mithen suggests that out of the cognitive evolution sketched above, visual art 
emerged as an external support for symbolic ideas (1996b, 2001, 2007). It 
should first be clarified that Mithen’s conception of art is different from that 
held by the models discussed in the two previous chapters. Mithen defines art as 
“visual symbolism” (1996c:149) and delimits it as the group of artefacts “which 
are either representational or provide evidence for being part of a symbolic 
code, such as by the repetition of the same motifs” (1996a:175). He then focuses 
on visual art, and representational art in particular.  
Mithen’s model of the evolution of visual art somewhat parallels his 
scenario of the evolution of human cognition. He argues that before the 
emergence of our species, hominins had developed four mental abilities that 
eventually supported the emergence of symbolic thought and visual art: 
intentional mark-making, the classification of signs, intentional communication, 
and attribution of meaning (1996c:175). First, the ability to make intentional 
marks probably became established with the use and fabrication of tools. Then, 
the capacity to recognize and classify natural signs, such as the sights and sounds 
of other individuals and properties of the environment, is probably an ancient 
trait as well. Third, the faculty of communicating intentionally with conspecifics 
is also present in apes and thus must have been available to our earliest 
ancestors. Finally, the ability to attribute meaning to marks and objects arose 
exclusively in our lineage. These four elements, Mithen concludes, “could only 
have been integrated to form the high level cognitive process of visual 
symbolism after accessibility between the social and non-social cognitive 
domains had arisen” (1996c:150); i.e. after the emergence of syntactic language.  
For Mithen, language and cognitive fluidity made visual art not only possible 
but also necessary. The appearance of symbolic and abstract thought brought 
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about by a fluid mind required new ways of expressing symbols beyond vocal 
language. It called for external material supports in which ideas could be stored 
or ‘offloaded’. This made it possible to “reduce the computational load on 
individual minds, expanding the possibilities of information storage, and 
enabling information and ideas to migrate between different individuals” 
(1998b:182). He has suggested, for example, that the prehistoric art of Europe 
encodes information about the natural resources that were available for 
exploitation to Palaeolithic hunters. Once set in a material medium, this 
information could be used to instruct young members of the group, and to plan 
optimal foraging strategies (1988a, 1988b, 1990). In this sense, art objects may 
be conceived of as “a tool for storing information and for helping to retrieve 
information stored in the mind” (1996a:192). In Donald’s model, the 
‘externalization of memory’ also constitutes the ultimate transition that led to 
the cognitive reorganization of the modern mind (1993:745). 
For Mithen visual art flourished in response to that novel communicative 
need, and as the result of humans being able to use artefacts as signifiers. In this 
manner, the visual arts became “not only the products of a new way of thinking, 
but also their source” (2001:49), constituting a veritable ‘extension’ of the 
human mind (1998a, 2000, 2007). Through using material culture as a means to 
store and transmit information, there started “a positive feedback loop that 
generated a transformation in human mind, behaviour and culture within a 
short period of time – the creative explosion” (1998b:181). Archaeologically, this 
event is manifested in the diversification of technology (the incorporation of raw 
materials other than stone, new tool types and artefacts) the exploitation of a 
wider range of resources for food, the population of new territories, and the 
creation of figurative art. 
Finally, Mithen explicitly describes art-making as “creating artefacts or 
images with symbolic meaning as a means of communication”(1996a:183). So, 
he sees art basically as a medium of communication through which people could 
better discuss and exchange information with one another about, for instance, 
animal behaviour or the weather, and use that information to their advantage. 
This, he explains, would have had a highly adaptive value by allowing humans, 
for example, to monitor environmental conditions, better plan foraging 
strategies, or facilitate landscape exploration (1996a:195, 2001).  
The completion of the sequence of mark-making, classification and 
communication only became possible with the advent of language and cognitive 
fluidity (1996b:213). In Mithen’s view, these two components working together 
are what allowed humans to acquire the unprecedented ability to encode ideas 
and meanings in material culture and develop imagination and creativity (2007).  
Mithen’s model, in conclusion, suggests that the basic capacities for art-
making were established in our hominin predecessors, and converged gradually 
at a time before 50,000 BP. In contrast to the two models reviewed in the 
previous two chapters, Mithen’s scheme allows for the possibility that art, along 
Chapter 5 
132 
with other modern human practices such as religion and science, be an 
exaptation or “non-functional by-product from an integration of the cognitive 
domains that had evolved in the early human mind” (1998b:183). This is a 
prospect that I will revisit in chapter 6. 
To recapitulate, Mithen’s proposal (1996a, 1996b, 1998b, 2000, 2001, 2005, 
2007) suggests that modern complex behaviour is the result of a major redesign 
of the human mind – cognitive fluidity – brought about by modern language. 
This cognitive change caused different domains of intelligence (technical, social, 
natural, linguistic) to interact and pass information between them, recombining 
it in new creative ways. One of the main implications was that humans became 
able to ‘extend their minds’ into material culture, i.e. communicate through 
symbols, by attributing meaning to objects and using them to express and 
exchange ideas. Visual art (in its representational variety) was the product of 
such ability.  
5.3 A mind for art: Critical assessment  
The present section aims to present current debates on the main aspects that 
structure Mithen’s hypothesis of the evolution of the human mind and the 
origins of visual art. This assessment focuses in particular on two points: 
Mithen’s scenario of cognitive evolution and the problems of inferring cognitive 
capacities from technology and art. 
The prehistory of the mind revisited 
Mithen’s view, as laid out in the previous section, involves minimally three 
stages of cognitive evolution: 1) from primate general intelligence, to 2) hominin 
domain-specific intelligence, to 3) modern inter-modular general intelligence 
(2007). Using data from neuroscience, I argue that Mithen’s assertions about 
modern primate and human mentality seem to be correct, but that his ideas 
about the cognition of extinct hominins are not that well supported, which 
weakens the basis of his general argument. 
The first stage of Mithen’s model involves the evolution of general 
intelligence, common to all primates and highly developed in apes (1996a:89, 
2001:33). Certainly, comparative cognitive research on primates suggests that 
general intelligence is prevalent across species (Reader et al. 2011). Studies with 
great apes (chimpanzees and orang-utans) indicate that their cognition is 
actually not that different from ours regarding perception and the 
understanding of the physical world (Hermann et al. 2007; Tomasello & 
Hermann 2010). For example, apes, like human children, are able to understand 
the intentions, goals and perceptions of others and how these affect their 
actions, that is, they “understand that others have goals and behave toward 
them persistently, and that this is governed by what they perceive” (Tomasello 
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et al. 2005:685). Thus, general intelligence does seem to be deeply rooted in 
primate phylogeny, as indicated by Mithen (e.g. 2001:50). 
In the second stage of Mithen’s model, members of the Homo lineage 
evolved a specialized, compartmentalized intelligence for specific problem-
solving, constituted by natural history, technical, and social intelligence 
(1996c:148): 
It is most reasonable to infer relatively high degrees of social, 
technological and natural history intelligence prior to the transition. In 
many respects these appear to be similar to those of modern humans, 
and consequently we find considerable evidence for continuity across 
the transition. However, there also appear to have been major 
differences. Natural history intelligence does not appear capable of 
achieving the same degree of fine grained environmental adaptation as 
found among modern humans, and to be separate from technical 
intelligence. Similarly, the cognitive processes involved in the working 
of stone appear to be restricted to that material, although the working 
of bone or antler appears to require similar skills of manipulation and 
special thought. Overall, we may suggest that while high levels of 
social, technical and natural history intelligence were present, the 
cognitive abilities within each were restricted to that specific domain, 
i.e. Lower and Middle Palaeolithic hominids had high degrees of mental 
modularity. Their intelligence is most appropriately characterized as 
‘domain specific’. 
Mithen argues, thus, that in the Early Human mind, tool-making pertained to the 
domain of technical intelligence and, for its part, ‘proto-language’ originated in 
and was limited to the module of social intelligence (1998b:181). He further 
claims that it was not until these two modules converged, late in human 
evolution, that cognitive modernity became possible. However, recent research 
indicates that, on the contrary, tool production and language ability may very 
well have a shared neural foundation, as suggested by James Rilling (2008:26):  
Human tool use depends on a network of left hemisphere cortical 
regions that overlaps extensively with regions involved in language and 
gestural communication, supporting a common evolutionary origin for 
these abilities.  
These results are supported by functional brain imaging carried out on 
individuals while they were engaged in making simple stone tools, and which 
show a significant overlap in the patterns of activation of brain circuits between 
language and tool-making, suggesting that these “are likely to have evolved in a 
mutually reinforcing way” (Stout et al. 2008:1947). And while, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, musical and linguistic ability seem to be disassociated, the 
contrary seems to apply to motor and linguistic ability. For instance, language 
impediments often co-occur with some motor disabilities in both children with 
inborn and developmental disorders and in adult stroke and cerebellar lesion 
patients, pointing to shared cognitive processes between the two (Hill 2001; 
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Schmahmann 2004). As Tomasello and colleagues have suggested, the 
uniqueness of human cognitive abilities probably owes more to the way in which 
we deal with social situations and work together towards common goals, 
aspects that likely evolved “in the context of the imitative learning of complex 
tool-using and tool-making activities” (2005:687). Hence, Mithen’s idea that for 
most part of our evolutionary past technical and social intelligence were 
separate domains seems unfounded. Rather, throughout human evolution new 
behaviours often have co-opted the neural networks of other functions 
(Jablonka & Lamb 2005:308), so that communication between cognitive domains 
has probably prevailed in the hominin brain. 
Finally, Mithen suggests, between 100-50,000 years ago, the three modules 
or cognitive domains of the hominin mind started working together through 
cognitive fluidity, which brought about our modern type of mentality. Indeed, 
the human mind does seem to be intermodular rather than domain-specific. The 
existence of mental modules of the type put forward by evolutionary psychology 
(Tooby & Cosmides 1992) has not been confirmed by cognitive neuroscience. 
Neuroimaging studies do indicate that there is some degree of neural 
localization of various brain functions (perceptual and cognitive). For instance, 
visual-spatial attention (involved in face recognition, object recognition, and 
reading, among other operations) is regulated by at least three brain areas: the 
posterior parietal lobe of the cerebral cortex, a portion of the thalamus, and 
areas of the midbrain related to eye movement (Posner et al. 1988), and 
constitutes a separate subsystem from auditory-spatial attention (Bushara et al. 
1999). But functional localization does not equate to the specialized domains 
envisioned by the ‘Swiss army knife’ hypothesis, rather, specialization is a 
gradual constructive process in which “every module is functionally connected 
to at least one other module” (Bunge 2010:166), as neuroscientist Olaf Sporns 
makes clear (2010:195): 
Functional integration in the brain must be able to cut across cognitive 
domains and is thus essentially intermodular in character. Brain 
modules must therefore be able to influence each other, through ‘weak 
ties’ that enable globally efficient information flow. Modules of brain 
networks define communities of structurally and functionally related 
areas, but they do not represent or support discrete mental faculties.  
Seen in this light, a module would be like a ‘hub’ where various neural networks 
interconnect. So, modularization is not inborn “but emerges in the course of 
individual development” (Bunge 2010:166). The neural plasticity implied by the 
brain’s ability to perform separate functions without the necessity of specialized 
domains had already been observed by the founder of modern 
neuropsychology, Alexander Luria ([1967]2002:22):  
The fact that in the course of human history, man has developed new 
functions does not mean that each one relies on a new group of nerve 
cells and that new ‘centres’ of higher nervous functions appear like 
those so eagerly sought by neurologists during the last third of the 
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nineteenth century. The development of new ‘functional organs’ occurs 
through the formation of new functional systems, which has never 
happened in animals and which is a means for the unlimited 
development of cerebral activity. The human cerebral cortex, thanks to 
this principle, becomes an organ of civilization in which are hidden 
boundless possibilities, and does not require new morphological 
apparatuses every time history creates the need for a new function. 
Mithen’s cognitive fluidity or ‘intermodularity’ may then actually be understood 
in Luria’s terms, or in the interactive-network view suggested by Sporns,106 and it 
seems to be in accord with the findings of neuroscience, as is his suggestion that 
the present-day human mind is structured mainly by a general-purpose 
intelligence. To be sure, “most of the higher aspects of the human brain/mind 
arise largely from the interaction between general-purpose neural systems of 
the multimodal cortical association areas and the very basic life experiences 
encoded by more ancestral emotional/mind systems that all mammals 
share” (Panksepp & Panksepp 2000:116). So, as Mithen suggests, it appears that 
modern human cognition is guided by general-purpose mechanisms (e.g. 
learning and memory) that regulate both brain function and behaviour, but that 
are flexible enough to combine and allow for new operations to occur (Bolhuis et 
al. 2011:3). At the same time, this plasticity – largely  shaped by developmental 
and sociocultural experience (Heyes 2012:2095) – can help explain cognitive 
variability across human populations without appealing to differences in mental 
capacity. 
In short, Mithen’s conclusions regarding general intelligence and the 
modern human mind seem to be consistent with current neuroscientific data, 
but his scenario of a previous domain-specific, modular stage does not. 
Moreover, if general intelligence is prevalent among primates, as is in modern 
humans, by the law of parsimony and because stasis is more common than 
change in evolution (Eldredge 1989; Gould 2002:884), it is more likely that 
general intelligence has been the standard mode of cognition throughout the 
whole of hominin evolution.107 This point weakens Mithen’s model because he 
sees the change in cognition as the cause, and the explanation, of modern 
human culture (1996a:195):  
The critical step in the evolution of the modern mind was the switch 
from a mind designed like a Swiss army knife to one with cognitive 
fluidity, from a specialized to a generalized type of mentality. This 
106 This suggests the possibility that brain functions are not controlled via a central system nor by 
independent mechanisms but by networks that interact and work together towards specialization 
(Sporns 2010). 
107 As philosophers of biology Kim Sterelny and Paul Griffiths explain: “The most parsimonious 
hypothesis about an evolutionary tree is the one that requires the fewest possible evolutionary 
changes, for change is rare in comparison to non-change. Such a hypothesis is assumed to be most 
likely to capture the actual sequence of past changes” (1999:200).  
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enabled people to design complex tools, to create art and believe in 
religious ideologies.  
So, if the initial assumption that early humans had a modular mind 
compartmentalized in different domains of intelligence is inconsistent, then 
there is no need to invoke a radical ‘transition’ towards a cognitive fluid mind. In 
fact, it is quite possible that cognitive fluidity has been an important factor in the 
evolution of human cognition, not its result. Evidently, it is very difficult to assess 
whether extinct humans had a specialized modular type of cognition or not 
(Langbroek 2012; Lewis-Williams 2002:110). However, the available evidence, in 
my opinion, does not support Mithen’s view that cognitive evolution went from 
primate general intelligence, to hominin domain specific intelligence, to modern 
intermodular general intelligence (2007).  
Technology and art: Products of the mind? 
In this section, I will review the tenet that cultural objects and behaviours (e.g. 
languages, symbols, artefacts) are in themselves the direct products of mental 
activity. To be sure, I do not question that the human mind is involved in the 
realisation of all human action, but I do question the notion, recurrent in 
Mithen’s work, that the form of material culture follows from cognitive capacity. 
In the paragraphs below, I argue that the objects and traces of activities that are 
found in the human archaeological record are not just the products of ideas, but 
more importantly of human actions and interactions (Ingold 1993).  
In his interpretation of the hominin archaeological record, Mithen takes the 
presence or absence of technological traits as a relatively direct reflection of 
cognitive ability, that is, he sees technological sophistication (i.e. complexity and 
diversity) as constrained by the mental capacities of the tool makers. Along 
these lines, for instance, he states that the Neanderthals “were unable to design 
specialized hunting weapons because they could not bring their technical and 
natural history intelligence together into a single ‘thought’” (2005:233). In this 
way Mithen often ascribes the apparent technological ‘stagnation’ of technology 
up to the Late Pleistocene to the way the hominin mind worked (2001:39):  
There should be little doubt that Early Human society was highly 
competitive, and a more efficient hunting technology would have 
provided individuals with considerable advantages. They seem not to 
have been constrained by technical skill from making these, and 
consequently one must conclude that the constraint was on their 
imaginative capacity to invent better weapons.  
He attributes this constraint to the notion that the hominin specialized cognitive 
modules constituted separate intelligences (technical, natural, and social) that 
could not work in unison, restricting creativity and imagination. Two issues arise 
from this proposal, on the one hand, as discussed above, there is no evidence 
that the human mind was ever structured in separate mental domains. On the 
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other hand, among modern humans, technology is in no way a direct indicator of 
cognitive capacities, so there is no reason to believe that hominin tool types 
were constricted merely ‘by imagination’, disregarding economy, diet, or social 
organization. This was precisely one of the issues raised by philosopher of mind 
John Sarnecki and evolutionary anthropologists Matthew Sponheimer in their 
critique of Mithen’s work. They rightly argued that (2002:176):  
Changes in behaviour [e.g. tool production] do not necessarily issue 
from changes in biology [e.g. brain structure], and since archaeology 
bespeaks behaviour, it cannot ipso facto be used as evidence of 
biological change. This does not mean, of course, that biological 
changes could not engender observable changes in the archaeological 
record, but only that archaeological changes are not sufficient to 
demonstrate changes in hominid biology. 
Surely, in human evolution “biological and technological advances do not go 
hand in hand” (Tattersall 2009:112), i.e. there is no one-to-one correspondence 
between cognition and technology. The importance of cultural constraints must 
also be taken into account in the development of technology. Likewise, “having 
the cognitive capacity and use for a given construct is by no means a guarantee 
that the construct will become available. Moreover, the availability of 
technological advances does not mean that they will be inevitably adopted” 
(Sarnecki & Sponheimer 2002:182). Sociocultural constraints, for example, also 
have to be considered, that is, although cognitive capacities are necessary for 
technological innovation, the absence of the latter is not a reliable indicator of 
the state of the former. Other factors such as tradition and convention are just 
as, and perhaps more, important in shaping material culture, at least among 
modern humans. This means that socio-economical explanations of the 
archaeological record may work just as well as cognitive ones, and have the 
advantage of being potentially more testable than the former. 
As for visual art in particular, Mithen emphasizes figurative representation, 
i.e. image-making, (1996a:175) as the core characteristic that indicates highly 
developed mental capacities. But as I have argued for technology above, these 
cannot really be taken as a measure of cognitive ability. For example, in 
archaeology it is well-known that the pottery of Europe’s earliest farmers (e.g. 
Linear Pottery Culture, or LBK) is decorated predominantly with linear, abstract 
and geometric patterns (Bahn 1992:292). We know that Neolithic peoples were 
well perfectly capable of making images because they did produce them in other 
media, but if we were to look only at their pottery in the light of Mithen’s 
reasoning, we could argue that they were constrained by their imagination and 
‘could not think of making images on pottery’, which of course would be an 
erroneous conclusion. A contemporary example is provided by the Pirahã 
(mentioned already in chapter 4), who have been taught to draw by missionaries 
and are clearly able to do it, nevertheless have not adopted any type of image-
making into their cultural repertoire (Everett 2005). These cases show that the 
absence of representational art cannot simply be attributed to absence of 
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certain mental abilities (e.g. intermodularity, syntax language) or to cognitive 
constraints on ‘imagination’ or ‘creativity’. As Lyn Wadley noted “artwork [as in 
representational art] is the most obvious example of symbolic storage outside 
the human brain yet it is not universally practiced by hunter-gatherers and it 
cannot therefore be used as the sole criterion for modern symbolism and 
modern behaviour” (2001:215). To be sure, Wadley has also pointed out that 
Donald’s model is useful in archaeology because it allows cognitive and cultural 
‘modernity’ to be recognized in the record (2001:208). As I noted in chapter 2, I 
agree that symbolism can be a useful identification criterion, however, the 
archaeological absence of symbolic objects cannot be used as a reliable indicator 
of mental evolution.  
Mithen has also argued that the key element in the transition towards a 
modern human mind was not the onset of symbolic thought itself, but the 
invention of symbolic artefacts, that is, a new class of objects that could serve 
for ‘storing’ memories, information, and ideas (1996a:180). Hence, whereas 
Donald’s model focuses on “visuosymbolic invention” as the highest 
development of ‘external symbolic storage systems’ (1993:745-6), Mithen’s 
encompasses all of material culture. Indeed, he suggests that, somewhere 
between 100 and 30,000 years ago, the human mind ‘extended’ into material 
culture (2000:208).108 The changes in the archaeological record of the Late 
Pleistocene, for Mithen, reflect the point at which (the different populations of) 
modern humans ‘discovered’ how to use material culture as an ‘extension’ of 
the biological mind (2000:217), i.e. as symbols. Accordingly, this novel way of 
using material culture opened the possibilities of saving, exchanging, and 
disseminating ideas among individuals and populations which, in turn, allowed 
for new and increased mental abilities, setting off a continuous feedback loop 
between material culture and cognition (Mithen 1998b, 2000, 2001, 2007).109 I 
108 In the sense of Andy Clark’s ‘extended mind’ hypothesis (Clark 1998, 2003, 2004; Clark & 
Chalmers 1998). This is the proposal that human cognition is not constricted to the brain and its 
processes, but rather extends into the external environment by incorporating material supports, like 
cultural artefacts, into its functions. It is argued that these objects then become as much part of the 
cognitive process as the computational operations of the brain themselves. For instance, a 
notebook used to retrieve information can play the same role as memory thus, according to the 
‘extended mind’, the notebook becomes part of the cognitive system. However, I would argue that 
remembering and reading information on a notebook actually entail different processes, even if the 
result (recalling) be the same. Furthermore, as Bunge points out, all of material culture has an effect 
on its producers and users, so if one sees the notebook as part of the ‘extended mind’, “why not 
generalize, and regard the kitchen as belonging to the ‘extended gut’, the gym as part of the 
‘extended musculo-skeletal system, and so on? This won’t do, as brains cannot be replaced, 
repaired, or set aside like tools.” (2010:167). A similar criticism has been made by Kim Sterelny 
(2010:467-8). Indeed, although material culture unquestionably has an impact on the cognitive 
process, and vice versa, they are not the same.   
109 In recent research, Mithen has proposed that not only is material culture an extension of the 
mind, but also that the brain may be understood as a cultural artefact. Since the time of the 
‘explosion’, the human brain, like any technological device, has continued to evolve under the 
pressures of the cultural environment. During a person’s lifetime, the plasticity of the brain allows it 
to change and adapt according to the individual’s needs and the stimuli provided by the 
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do not question the mutual impact of ‘artefacts and brains’, this dialectic has 
long been acknowledged (e.g. Engels [1876]2012) and studied (e.g. Vygotsky 
[1930]1978), and is one of the main premises behind the topical concept of the 
‘human niche’ (Whiten & Erdal 2012:2126). However, I do contend the 
suggestion that cognition leads and culture follows. Cognitive capacity is 
evidently a necessary condition for behaviour, but not a sufficient one. The 
emergence of symbol systems, as suggested by Vygotsky, should be understood 
in the light of human technological and social histories as well (Luria & Vygotsky 
1992:84).  
Mithen, for his part, attributes the advent of symbolism to cognitive fluidity, 
which in turn, he explains as “a consequence of (syntax) language” (2005:264). 
Because he, like Donald, sees the latter as a recent development, he directly 
attributes the lack of art and ‘advanced’ technology among Early Humans to 
their lack of language and intermodularity. For example, he says that among 
Neanderthals, “the absence of symbolic objects must imply the absence of 
symbolic thought, and hence of symbolic utterances. Without these, by 
definition, there was no language” (2005:229). And elsewhere he states: “words 
are symbols and so if the Neanderthals were using audible symbols, I find it 
inconceivable that they were not also using visual symbols. The converse must 
also be the case: no visual symbols, no spoken symbols” (2009:9).110 However, 
the lack or scarcity of visual symbols from the archaeological record of either 
Neanderthals or early H. sapiens may be clarified by several factors other than 
cognitive constraints and the pre-supposed absence of modern language. 
 Furthermore, there is now sufficient evidence from palaeoanthropology, 
neuropsychology, genetics, linguistics and archaeology to argue for a long 
chronology of language, going as far back as half a million years. Several lines of 
research indicate that speech may well be a shared derived trait of several 
lineages, including at least Neanderthals and Homo sapiens, inherited from a 
common ancestor (Homo erectus, ergaster, or heidelbergensis). Around 500,000 
BP some hominins already presented basic anatomical features involved in the 
production and perception of speech. H. erectus, ergaster, and heidelbergensis 
possessed a modern-like hyoid bone (Martínez et al. 2008), which regulates the 
movements of the tongue and larynx allowing the production of speech sounds 
in extant humans. They also possessed enlarged hypoglossal and thoracic 
environment. Equally, throughout evolution, cultural inputs literally and metaphorically shaped the 
human brain and the mind (Mithen & Parsons 2008).  
110 Mithen’s argument may be expressed in the conditional form “if p then q”, i.e. If there are visual 
symbols, there are spoken symbols. If the second premise is not-p, or there are no visual symbols, 
the conclusion not-q, or there are no spoken symbols, commits the logical error of inversion, which 
“is made by denying the antecedent and leads us to (incorrectly) deny the consequent. Given the 
two premises ‘If p is true then q is true. p is not true,’ it would be fallacious to conclude that ‘q is not 
true’” (Bennett 2004:130). Indeed, the conclusion not-q is erroneous because the relationship 
between the premises is one of condition, not of causation, so q being true does not depend on p 
being true. Thus, if not-p, q may still apply, or not. 
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vertebral canals (Ambrose 2001:1751; Dunbar 2004:123) which allow fine 
respiratory control during speech. The morphology of their inner ear was also 
similar to that of modern humans (Martínez et al. 2004), making it adept to 
perceive speech sounds. Furthermore, casts made from skulls of the mentioned 
species show that the size and form of their brains must have sufficed to 
accommodate the neural regions known as Brocca and Wernicke areas, where 
much of the linguistic operations seem to take place (Bruner 2010). Another clue 
may be found in the foraging and technological techniques of archaic humans. 
For instance, the 400,000 year-old wooden hunting spears found in 
Schönningen, Germany, show that sophisticated cooperative big-game hunting 
took place (Thieme 1997). This complex activity is thought to have been 
impossible to carry out without the support of linguistic exchanges (Pathou-
Mathis 2000). On the same lines, the sophistication of some Neanderthal lithic 
industries has been taken to reflect a degree of cognitive complexity that must 
have allowed for articulate language (Ambrose 2001). Finally, recent genetic 
data has shown that Neanderthals possessed a similar variant of the FOXP2 gene 
as modern humans do; this gene is supposed to be largely involved in linguistic 
capacity and its presence in the Neanderthal genome may suggest that these 
hominins were capable of speech (Trinkaus 2007). Taken individually, none of 
these pieces of evidence can be said to positively demonstrate the occurrence of 
spoken language among other hominin species (Buckley & Steele 2002; Dediu & 
Levinson 2013; Fitch 2009), but taken together they hint at the possibility that 
this trait was already in place long before the emergence of our species. On the 
one hand, given the evidence, models that rely too much on the incidence or 
absence of language to explain the archaeological record have become 
increasingly suspect. On the other hand, it has been noted that assessing what 
these different lines of evidence actually mean in regards to the evolution of 
linguistic ability and cognition is extremely difficult. That is, the presence of 
some language-related features does not necessarily mean that they were 
involved in speech production; many of the mentioned traits also take part in 
other functions. However, perhaps the initial assumption should be that spoken 
language is a derived trait of considerable time depth in the Homo genus (Dediu 
& Levinson 2013).111  
Also, as I discussed in the case of technology (and elaborated further in 
chapter 6), among modern humans factors like labour investment, demography 
and social organisation offer better and more testable explanations than 
language.112 Regarding Neanderthals, archaeologists Wil Roebroeks and 
111 Linguists Dan Dediu and Stephen Levisnon (2013) have recently presented a convincing case for 
attributing full-fledged language abilities to  other hominins: minimally Neanderthals, Denisovans, 
and our common ancestor Homo heidelbergensis. Their paper also offers a good review of the 
evidence for and against seeing language as a shared hominin trait. For a counterargument see: 
Berwick et al. (2013). 
112 This is not to say that language has not played an important role in the evolution of human 
cognition and culture, it surely has, but that when it comes to language and visual art “the two 
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Alexander Verpoorte have argued for example that energetic constraints may 
have played an important role in the types of activities that these hominins 
invested in. Neanderthals had a larger body mass and high activity levels related 
to their dependency on big-game hunting, which means they had higher 
energetic requirements than modern humans (2009:160). The latter in 
combination with their high mobility and small groups could mean that it may 
not have been cost-effective for Neanderthals to invest in stylisation since they 
probably “had little need for durable symbols of group membership and 
individual identity, and they seldom exchanged distinctive durable goods to 
maintain relationships across territorial boundaries” (Kuhn & Stiner 2001b:124). 
In contrast, as I will discuss in chapter 6, modern humans might have developed 
visual art precisely as part of a social strategy to solve the same problem of 
energy acquisition, by means of cooperation with others.113  
To summarize, Mithen ultimately explains the appearance of ‘modern’ 
cultural traits in the archaeological record of the Late Pleistocene (e.g. 
technological diversification and sophistication, and visual art) as result of a 
neural/biological change, and sees the change as swift and abrupt. The 
alternative I will explore is that the Late Pleistocene record is the result of the 
long coevolutionary history of cognition, material culture and social 
organization, and thus should be seen in a broader perspective, for, as Bunge 
suggests, “every major social change is likely to be biological, psychological, 
demographic, economic, political, and cultural – either simultaneously or in 
succession” (1997:417). Thus, attributing a complex phenomenon such as the 
emergence of symbol systems among Pleistocene humans to a single cause or 
event (e.g. language or cognitive fluidity) is potentially flawed.  
5.4 Test against the archaeological record of visual art 
One of Mithen’s main aims throughout his work has been to make sense of the 
prehistoric archaeological record by coupling it to hypotheses on the evolution 
of human cognition. As discussed above, the main neural changes he suggests as 
causes for the development of the Pleistocene archaeological record have left 
phenomena appear to be mutually independent” (Deregowski 1993:758). The ‘advent of modern 
language’ cannot by its own explain the changes in the Late Pleistocene archaeological record 
(Roebroeks 2010), which we now know to be more complex than most existing models of human 
cognitive evolution, including Mithen’s, concede. More importantly, as I mentioned at the beginning 
of this section, the very idea that language should be considered a cognitive ability may be put into 
question. Topical perspectives suggest that language had rather be understood, first and foremost, 
as a communication system (Bunge 2010:196), but may also be explained as a social strategy 
(Dunbar 1996, 2003), a technology (Dor & Jablonka 2010) or an emergent feature of human 
cooperative interactions (Tomasello 2008). I would argue that the same would apply  to  visual art.   
113 As Geoffrey Miller points out, innovation is costly (2000b). So perhaps, instead of asking why 
Neanderthals did not innovate, as Mithen does, we should ask how modern humans became able to 
overcome the costs of innovation. 
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no trace in fossil remains (Mithen 2000:212). Nevertheless, his model does make 
some general predictions about the effects that those cognitive changes may 
have brought about in the material culture, and it is these expected 
consequences which may be contrasted with recent archaeological and 
palaeoanthropological data.  
Mithen’s proposal suggests that cognitive fluidity should be manifested in 
the archaeological record as greater technological diversity (e.g. more artefact 
types, use of various raw materials, and an increase of composite and 
specialized tools) and cultural complexity (e.g. evidence for religious ritual and 
art) in comparison to previous periods. He maintains, for example, that tool 
diversity arose “owing to a new connection between natural history and 
technical intelligence” (1996a:169), and once this connection was made “it 
resulted in a constant innovation of new technology” (1996a:170). Visual art 
(e.g. personal ornaments), for its part, would have resulted from “an integration 
between technical and social intelligence” (1996a:173). From these statements, 
we can formulate the prediction that, according to Mithen, the earliest evidence 
of visual art will co-occur with an increase in technological innovation and 
diversity (Prediction 1). Accordingly, once visual art is present in the 
archaeological record, novel tool types and raw materials are expected to 
appear as well, and existing forms are expected to present greater variation. We 
can now examine whether this proposition is consistent with the archaeological 
data, as reviewed in chapter 2. 
The confirmation of prediction 1 is problematic. It seems that in most 
instances visual art does co-occur with a wider variety of artefacts than in sites 
with no art, but this is not consistent. For example, in one of the earliest 
occurrences of shell beads, in Pigeons Cave in Morocco (c. 82,000 BP), the 
ornaments were found alongside typical Middle Palaeolithic artefacts 
(Bouzouggar et al. 2007:9966). However, the evidence from the African Middle 
Stone Age, reviewed in chapter 2, seems to be more in keeping with Mithen’s 
expectations. In sites like Klasies River Mouth and Blombos Cave, by 75,000 BP 
different forms of visual art (pigment use, personal ornaments and engraved 
objects) coexist with innovative stone tool types (e.g. blades, bladelets, 
microliths, bone tools), carefully made in fine-grained raw materials 
(Henshilwood & Dubreuil 2011:371; Soriano et al. 2007; Wadley 2001:203). 
These MSA sites also have provided evidence that their inhabitants had a 
broader dietary niche than earlier humans, and that they had a formal division 
of space at camps with separate habitation and work areas, suggesting 
“symbolically organized behaviour” (Wadley 2001). 
For its part, the overall archaeological record of the European Upper 
Palaeolithic in principle fits the prediction of Mithen’s account better, 
particularly regarding the co-development of figurative art and greater 
technological variability in relation to the Middle Palaeolithic (Bar-Yosef 2002, 
2007), but when examined in more detail, some inconsistencies appear. For one, 
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the record of the Middle Palaeolithic associated with the Neanderthals is not as 
static as presented by Mithen, and there actually was some temporal and 
geographical technological variability in that period (D’Errico 2007; Jöris & Street 
2008; Roebroeks 2008). Furthermore, art aside, the archaeological composition 
of earliest phase of the Upper Palaeolithic in Europe, the early Aurignacian (45-
30,000 BP), is actually not that different in composition from the previous 
Mousterian, the record shows equally low typological diversity (Davies 
2001:205), and a similar scope of resource exploitation as the Middle 
Palaeolithic (Bar-Yosef 2004). The real break in the record described by Mithen 
in fact comes much later, around 30-28,000 BC (at the end of the Aurignacian 
and the beginning of the Gravettian). In the latter phase indeed all of the 
‘markers’ of modernity identified by Mithen co-occur, but this is some 15-10,000 
years after the assumed colonisation of Europe by ‘cognitively modern’ H. 
sapiens (Higham et al. 2011).  
The previous prediction, that the emergence of visual art will coincide with 
an increase in technological diversity and sophistication actually stems from the 
a more general implication of Mithen’s hypothesis, which is that once cognitive 
fluidity is ‘fixed’, all its potential should be released generating a sort of cultural 
‘big bang’ that should be observable in the archaeological record (Prediction 2). 
However, as seen in chapter 2, the archaeological record from the African 
Middle Stone Age indicates that many of the traits that the cognitive fluidity 
model uses to identify modern behaviour (e.g. artefact diversity, specialized tool 
types, the use of organic raw materials, personal ornaments, exchange 
networks, etc.) show a mosaic-like pattern of incidence and often did not co-
occur. So, it is more probable that, as Sally McBrearty and Alison Brooks have 
argued  (2000:531-2):   
The transition to fully modern human behavior was not the result of a 
biological or cultural revolution, but the fitful expansion of a shared 
body of knowledge, and the application of novel solutions on an ‘as 
needed’ basis. The complex content of human cultures has been built 
incrementally, with cognitive equipment present since at least 250 ka.  
Therefore, no fundamental neural restructuration need be invoked to explain 
the differences in the archaeological record of modern humans. The hypothesis 
of a piecemeal evolution of modern human cognition, which coevolved with 
modern anatomy, is better supported by the archaeological data.  
In brief, it is possible that whereas the co-occurrence of visual art with 
technological innovation and variability, and with other ‘modern’ behaviours 
may indeed indicate changes in the ways human populations lived and 
interacted, a) these changes need not necessarily be cognitive, and b) the 
absence of one is not prescriptive of either the presence or absence of the 
other, which, in turn, c) indicates that the correlation is not causal. 
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Finally, Mithen’s model and main premise suggests that once the earliest 
symbol systems appear in the archaeological record, we may speak of human 
cognitive and behavioural modernity. As suggested in chapter 2, modified body 
ornaments could provide such evidence, as Mithen himself has also suggested 
(1996a:194): 
Describing beads and pendants as ‘decoration’ risks belittling their 
importance. They would have functioned to send social messages, such 
as about one’s status, group affiliation and relationships with other 
individuals, just as they do in our own society today. […] To have 
produced such artifacts required not only specialized social and 
technical intelligences – as possessed by Early Humans – but also an 
ability to integrate these. 
Hence, according to Mithen’s own hypothesis, cognitive modernity should have 
begun before 100,000 years ago. This is in fact what he has argued in recent 
work (2005:251), attributing the changes of the Late Pleistocene to changes in 
demographic conditions (2005:261-2): 
In summary, amid a continuation of tool-making traditions that stretch 
back at least two hundred and fifty thousand years, there are sporadic 
traces of new behaviour in Africa of the type that archaeologists 
associate with modern, language-using humans.  
It was not until after 50,000 years ago that many of the new 
behaviours became permanent features of the human repertoire. This 
date was once taken to be when language and modern behaviour first 
appeared. That was before the African archaeological evidence had 
become well known, before the genetic studies and fossil discoveries 
confirmed the appearance of modern humans by 195,000 years ago, 
and before the significance of the FOXP2 gene for language had been 
revealed. But the date of around 50,000 years ago nevertheless marks 
a striking change in the archaeological record.  
This is now explained by the passing of a demographic threshold 
after Homo sapiens had become entirely dependent upon 
compositional language for communication.  
Most researchers have also turned to explaining the cultural patterns of the Late 
Pleistocene in terms of demography and social organization instead of 
attributing these changes to biological transitions (D’Errico & Stringer 2011). This 
is precisely the possibility that will be explored in the next chapter. 
5.5 Conclusion 
In the tradition of cognitive archaeology, Mithen’s model lays emphasis on 
mental capacity as the key feature that determined our development as species, 
and uses cognitive criteria to make sense of the archaeological record so that 
the earliest occurrence of visual art is attributed to the emergence of ‘cognitive 
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fluidity’, and ultimately to language. In the same manner, the model sketches 
progressive stages of cognitive evolution ascribed to particular species of 
hominins in a type of ‘mental ladder’ from chimpanzee to modern humans.  
I have argued in this chapter that such a model is incompatible with current 
views in evolutionary thinking, which highlight variation, diversity, and 
contingency as important aspects of the evolutionary and developmental 
processes (Langbroek 2012; Levinson 2012; Shea 2011). Also, I have argued that 
1) the proposed switch from a modular hominin mind to an intermodular
modular mind is not well supported by current comparative neuroscience; 2) the 
absence of alleged markers of cognitive fluidity and ‘mental modernity’ – tool 
variability and visual art – is not necessarily correlated with cogntive evolution, 
and 3) visual art  perhaps should not be understood primarily as the product of 
mental ability, but of human technological activities and social interactions.  
To conclude, Mithen’s model is based on the assumption that material 
culture is the product of cognition, therefore it requires cognitive fluidity to be 
an exclusively modern human trait because without it, the model is unable to 
account for the technological and cultural differences between modern and 
‘archaic’ humans. However, if we see material culture for what it actually is, 
namely the product of a mixture of factors like social organization, environment, 
economy, demography, and history, we should be able suggest explanations that 
do not need to invoke any sudden neural changes to account for the 
development of modern human culture. 
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6. ART SIGNALS: COMMUNICATION, COOPERATION, AND THE ORIGINS OF
VISUAL ART
A fundamental characteristic of man, one that distinguishes him from animals, is that he 
endures and separates from his body both the apparatus of technology and that of 
scientific knowledge, which then become the tools of society. Art is the social technique of 
emotion, a tool of society which brings the most intimate and personal aspects of our 
being into the circle of social life. 
LEV VYGOTSKY, 1925 
The present is an interesting period in the study of the origins of visual art. New 
data is rapidly becoming available thanks to the efforts of research teams and 
the advance of analytical techniques in various fields. In chapter 2, for example, I 
reviewed recent finds from Africa that now situate the earliest systems of 
personal ornamentation beyond 100,000 years ago, and new dates and 
discoveries from the European record, which also suggest a greater antiquity 
and diversity than previously thought for the visual art of this region. It is 
perhaps a good moment to reconsider received views and suggest novel 
scenarios able integrate these recent data with topical theoretical issues in 
human evolution studies. This chapter is a first attempt at that. In it, I will argue 
that the earliest forms of visual art coevolved with characteristically human 
modes of social organization and cooperation strategies.  
 The first section includes a brief recapitulation of the main problems raised 
by the assessment of the models examined in chapters 3, 4, and 5, a discussion 
of communication signals, and the implications of defining visual art as such. 
Subsequently, I propose a tentative scenario for the early production and use of 
visual art as a signal by suggesting that it may have acted as a marker of social 
identity in cooperative interactions. To this aim, I discuss the role of individual 
recognition and memory in cooperation, and the possible function of ornaments 
as visual aids for identifying potential cooperative partners. Finally, the 
propositions of this scenario are examined according to the archaeological 
record of the Late Pleistocene. 
6.1 Introduction: Visual art as a communication signal 
In the previous three chapters, I have presented and examined three different 
evolution-based views on the origins of visual art. In chapter 3, I reviewed 
Geoffrey Miller’s model, which places the emergence of visual art in the 
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evolution of human mate choice strategies, and defines it as a fitness display. In 
the next chapter, I went over Ellen Dissanayake’s proposal that visual art 
coevolved with ritual to promote communal unity. Finally, in chapter 5, I looked 
at Steven Mithen’s model, which sees visual art as a mental extension or 
material medium for ideas, brought about by cognitive evolution. 
These models, as I have discussed, mainly attend to the question of what art 
is for and hypothesize answers by looking at some of visual art’s current effects. 
The issue is that all three offer accurate descriptions. Clearly, some visual art 
practices may and do affect human mate choice, as pointed out over a century 
ago by Hirn: “there is no reason to doubt that the savage beaux and belles really 
have increased their chances by putting wooden slabs in their lips and ears or 
pins of bone through their nose” (1900:208). Similarly, a quick look at the 
ethnography of forager groups – and at our own lives – would soon make it 
evident that the visual arts, as Dissanayake argues, are closely associated to 
ritual and religion, and are often pleasurable. Lastly, the use of signs and 
symbolic systems, such as visual art, as tools of cognition (to recall, teach, 
inform, learn, etc.) has long been known to psychology (see Vygotsky 
[1930]1978), and play an important part in human existence, as suggested by 
Mithen. Given that all of the effects of visual art described above are known to 
exist, how to asses which of the three models, if any, can best inform us about 
the circumstances in which visual art originated? I have suggested that the best 
manner is to weigh them against the archaeological record.  
Once put side by side the evidence from archaeology, it becomes evident 
that none of the models can fully account for three pressing issues in the 
explanation of visual art’s origins:  
1) Timing; or why visual art arose when it did – as far as we now know,
between 130-100,000 BP.
2) Uniqueness; or why visual art seems to have flourished only among
Homo sapiens populations.
3) Form; or why it developed into the varieties and media that we find in
the archaeological record.
Whereas Miller and Dissanayake do not address any of these issues specifically, 
Mithen’s cognitive model accounts for the first two, but fails to deal with the 
third. Therefore, we are left with three accurate descriptions of the various 
functions and effects of visual art, some of which may be ancestral, but no 
explanation for origin and development, as inferred from the material 
evidence.114 Furthermore, the very fact that visual art is able to fulfil different 
functions and have several effects on behaviour and cognition (attract attention, 
enhance beauty, lure mates, express ideas, evoke emotions, promote unity, aid 
memory, etc.), also remains largely unexplained. 
114 For more on this issue, see also: De Smedt & De Cruz (2010:706). 
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In sum, like the proverbial blind men and the elephant, each accurately 
describing one of its features but failing to understand the whole, the three 
models reviewed in the previous chapters have worked on describing different 
aspects of visual art, its effects, and its history, but often without reflecting on 
what visual art is, or how it came about. In this chapter, I sketch out a tentative 
model that can potentially reconcile evolutionary functional accounts of the 
origins of visual art with the archaeological record by defining visual art as a 
communication signal.  
I have noted before that implicitly or explicitly all of the models I have 
discussed, at some point, refer to visual art as a signal. Miller in fact calls visual 
art a ‘fitness signal’. Dissanayake, for her part, conceives of it as ‘ritualized 
behaviour’, which is another term that ethologists have used for ‘signalling 
behaviour’ (Lorenz 1966); and Mithen describes visual art as a material medium 
for storing information, that is to say, as a stimulus that conveys information – a 
signal. This is not coincidental but indicates that visual art complies with the 
characteristics of a communication signal and, like most signals; visual art can 
have many functions and effects. As Alexander Alland pointed out (1977:93):  
Art can be used in a number of ways, to differentiate social groups, to 
hoard wealth, to mark the boundaries of an ethnic group, to reinforce 
religious beliefs, or to provide individual pleasure to artist and observer 
alike. Most of the functions listed are culture-dependent, however, and 
rest upon the ease with which art can be used to carry a sign load 
because of its ancient relationships to language and communication.  
Conceiving of visual art as a communication signal not only clarifies its array of 
functions, but can also account for its origin and development, and provide 
exploratory answers to the issues of timing, uniqueness, and form, as I elaborate 
throughout this chapter.  
This view has larger implications for Pleistocene art studies as well. First, it 
refutes the idea that visual art is by nature non-utilitarian and demystifies its 
emergence .115 In other words, it does away with the non-question of ‘why 
would visual art have emerged and been retained in evolution, when it has no 
apparent practical purpose?’.116 Second, it allows us to build an account for the 
115 In their encyclopaedic World History of Art, art historians Hugh Honour and John Fleming, 
for example, state that early Homo had already taken a first step towards the making of 
art by acquiring awareness of form and function through stone-tool making. Then they 
suggest that Neanderthals may have gone even further, as indicated by the burial from the site of 
La Ferrassie in France, which included some grave goods and “a kind of monument – a large stone 
from which pairs of concave cup-like marks had been pecked out. It is impossible to be certain of 
this, of course, but if the markings on the stone had a commemorative, magic or at any rate non-
utilitarian purpose, the second step towards the making of art had been taken” (2005:24, my 
emphasis).  
116 Although often posed as a heuristic device, this non-question still gives away that a main 
motivation for investigating the origins of art is in fact its apparent lack of practical use. Certainly, 
far fewer researchers have concerned themselves with explaining the origins of spear points or of 
cooking utensils. For example, in 1900 Finn aesthetician Yrjö Hirn wrote “How is it that mankind has 
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development of visual art based on the available material evidence, and to 
suggest plausible scenarios for the relations between visual art, maker, and 
perceiver and how these could be manifested in various contexts. Third, it helps 
us to overcome the ‘myth’ that visual art is unique to our species because we 
are ‘special’.117 This implies seeing visual art minimally as ‘just another’ (albeit 
remarkable) mode of human communication, and not as a ‘special product’ of 
human cognition, since, as anthropologist Ruth Finnegan has said, “animals draw 
on combinations of communicative modes, suitable for their own environments, 
lifestyles and bodily potential”, and “humans are no exception” (2002:26). From 
such perspective, visual art is precisely just one particular way in which our 
species, due to its singular evolutionary trajectory, performs the widespread 
biological operation that is communication (Finnegan 2002:52). Finally, because 
communication is a dynamic process, this view expects visual art and its 
conceptualization to change across time and geography, and also provides the 
tools to better understand those variations.  
Overall, conceiving of visual art as a communication signal can offer both a 
definition and a framework to understand its different functions and effects in 
human cognition and behaviour.118 It also allows us to understand visual art as a 
purposeful and meaningful practice, and to put it in a broader evolutionary 
perspective, alongside other communicative behaviours.  
In this chapter, I offer a preliminary outline for an alternative explanatory 
model for the origins of visual art, based on a definition of visual art as a 
communication signal. I draw on Martin Wobst’s model of style as information 
(1977) to suggest that visual art arose as an indicator of identity in social 
networks of distantly related individuals. It may seem evident that items of 
come to devote energy and zeal to an activity which may be almost entirely devoid of a utilitarian 
purpose is indeed the riddle, sociological as well as psychological, which would seem in the first 
place to claim the attention of the philosopher” (p.15). It is still so today, for example, physiologist 
Gillian Morris-Kay recently wrote: “One important question remains: art is a wonderfully enjoyable 
aspect of human culture but not essential to survival, so why did artistic creativity arise?” (2010:174, 
my emphasis). 
117 We evidently tend to think of modern humans as unique and special, the only survivors or a long 
hominid lineage, and we tend to attribute our ‘success’ to exclusive modern human traits, such as 
language, intelligence, art, religion, etc. (Gould 2002:912). To illustrate this, Misia Landau (1991) has 
drawn an excellent analogy between narratives of human evolution and hero folktales. 
118 There are some parallels with other authors who have explained the evolution of visual art as 
part of human communication, either as signal, as information, or information-enhancer (e.g. 
Alland 1977; Coe 2003; Dissanayake 1982; Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1988). The main difference, though slight, 
is fundamental: for these authors, visual art has been selected or adapted ‘for’ a specific content or 
function (information exchange, altruism, cohesion, etc.). In other words, it is the content or 
function which provides the selective environment for visual art. However neither content nor 
function exist independently of form, since they are properties and “every property is a property of 
(possessed by) some thing or other” (Bunge 1977:502). Conversely, in the present argument, it is the 
effectiveness of form, dictated by the process of signalling-response, which provides the selective 
environment of visual art, allowing for existing forms to acquire novel functions, which in turn can 
generate new forms.  
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personal ornamentation can signal social identity, such as membership to a 
certain group or class (e.g. age group, gender, position, status, occupation, etc.). 
On this basis, various scholars have suggested before that visual art originated as 
a means of expressing identity (Kuhn & Stiner 2007a:47; White 1992), and 
marking social membership, for example to distinguish the in-group from the 
out-group (Coe 2003; De Smedt & De Cruz 2012). However, they ha ve not 
clarified the basic issues of why would signalling identity matter at all, and how 
material culture became a medium for it. All other primates rely only on facial 
and vocal recognition and still have complex social lives. Monkeys, for example, 
are able to recognize all the other members of their group and that suffices to 
manage their social relations (Pokorny & de Waal 2009). Humans, in addition, 
can identify themselves through language, and have the ability to remember the 
faces and names of hundreds of other people (Haxby et al. 2002) so, why use 
artefacts to communicate identity, and why do it increasingly frequently by 
100,000 BP? As a possible answer, I revisit Polly Wiessner’s work on style 
investment among hunter-gatherers, and particularly her prediction that signals 
of social identity would “appear first in the archaeological record with the 
origins of regular, delayed, and unbalanced reciprocal relationships” (1983:258), 
because they help mediate cooperative interactions. That is, I explore the idea 
that visual art arose as one of these signals to convey not only identity but also 
certain qualities such as trustworthiness, initiative, and intent, which are 
relevant for engaging in cooperation.  
In brief, I argue that humans are a ‘cooperative species’ (Bowles & Gintis 
2011), which means that we often have to make decisions on the basis of others’ 
properties, behaviours and what we know about their history of interactions. In 
the case of our intimate group, we are most probably well acquainted with the 
other member’s personalities and activities. However, we can hardly keep track 
of everyone else’s actions and, unfortunately, people’s properties, behaviours, 
and histories most often are not directly observable; that is where signals come 
into action (Gambetta 2009:169). Via signals, we are able to perceive and display 
those unknown and unobservable qualities that affect how people interact with 
each other. Within a person´s immediate social circle, signalling identity is likely 
to be relatively redundant. But when individuals interact with people outside 
their familiar group, signalling identity will become more relevant. As Wobst 
suggested (1977), this relevance is proportional to the quantity and quality of 
interactions with out-group individuals, reaching a peak among ‘middle-
distance’ targets, i.e. people with whom one is sufficiently familiar so that the 
outcome of the interaction matters socially, but not familiar enough so that the 
history of past interactions with one another is completely transparent. 
Therefore, when engaging in cooperation beyond the effective network of daily 
interaction, people will often rely on reputation to make decisions about 
whether or not to engage in reciprocal cooperation with others (e.g. give, ask, or 
expect help). Reputation, in turn, is closely linked to (social) identity. However, 
neither reputation nor identity are visible or explicit. For this reason, when 
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people interact with individuals beyond their core social group, they are likely to 
contrive signals that convey or display identity, from which reputation can be 
inferred. Visual art, I suggest, functioned as such a signal. 
Figure 17. Theoretical structure of the models analysed previously and the one sketched in 
this chapter. 
In this manner, the model outlined in this chapter does address the issues of the 
relevance of identity signalling and the use of artefacts for this purpose, by 
linking visual art to individual recognition in cooperative strategies, and offers a 
novel scenario to explain the emergence and development of visual art practices 
in the Pleistocene. In support of the model, I first argue that visual art has all the 
characteristics of a communication signal and in the following section, I discuss 
the proposed coevolution of human reciprocal behaviour and visual art.  
Signal evolution  
The concept of the signal is pervasive in many natural and social disciplines, from 
microwave signals in physics, to animal warning signals in biology, to digital 
signals in computer technology, to status signals in sociology. I will focus here on 
the concept used in biological communication studies, where a signal is 
understood as any act or structure (stimulus) that conveys information to other 
organisms and affects their behaviour (Otte 1974).  
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Animal signals are often intentionally emitted and inform others about, for 
instance, the identity, presence, state, or intention of the sender, or about an 
element in the environment (Croft 2000:98; Endler 1993; Otte 1974). In this way, 
a signal reduces uncertainty and ‘instructs’ an agent on how to behave in a given 
situation (Sinha 2004:224). Because signals coevolve with their effects, they are 
effective to the extent that the response they produce is affected by the signal 
(Johnstone 2009). That is, signals are the result of a coevolutionary process 
between the signaller’s intentions and the signalee’s response (Scott-Phillips 
2008). Signals must be detectable so they will not only coevolve with the sensory 
and cognitive systems of emitter and receiver, but also with the signalling 
environment. The latter will co-determine which signals ultimately become 
successful (Endler 1993). So, effective signals must be within the hearing or 
visual range of conspecifics, and must be distinguishable against the background 
and avoid interference. Signals, therefore, are usually under selection to comply 
with certain properties that increase their detectability, discriminability, and 
memorability (Guilford & Dawkins 1991). Some attention-grabbing, memorable 
components include typical signal properties like redundancy, conspicuousness, 
stereotypy, contrast, pattern, novelty and exaggeration, which perhaps not so 
coincidentally are often listed among the characteristic properties of art 
(Dissnayake 2007:9; Dutton 2009:52).  
Signals must stimulate the receiver’s perception (Endler 1993; Otte 1974), 
therefore it should make sense that visual art incorporates and exploits sensorial 
biases and preferences (Aiken 1998, 1999; Hodgson 2006; Prum 2012; 
Verpooten & Nelissen 2010). Detectability is particularly pressing in visual 
signals, whose efficacy often rests on emphasizing elements like colour, 
contrast, movement, intensity, and size, to draw attention. Visual signals are 
most common among terrestrial diurnal animals, and are often displayed on or 
through the body. However, as in the case of the bowerbird, some species also 
exploit exatrasomatic resources in signalling behaviours, and this is an ability 
that humans have evidently developed to a maximum degree, providing “a 
prominent dimension of human visual communication” (Finnegan 2002:97). That 
humans make extensive use of visual signals is foreseeable since visual 
perception is central to primate cognition (Tomasello 2008:195). Primates have 
a “diurnal lifestyle based on color vision” and “vision-based communication may 
be the key feature that has spurred on the dramatic development of the primate 
neocortex” (Dunbar 1998:183), a brain area involved in sensory perception, 
social skills, and language. 
Visual art then,  makes use of the  visual  properties of materials and 
objects, such as colour, size, texture, shape, etc., all of which can often be 
altered by human intervention, to grab attention and influence the viewer. As 
ethologists have noted, some human perceptual biases have deep biological 
roots, whereas others are culturally bound (Eib-Eibesfeldt 1988). For instance, 
stimuli that display redundancy, rhythm, and exaggeration are effectively 
attended and recalled by humans (Rossiter 1982) but also by most mammals and 
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birds (Krebs & Dawkins 1984:386), and the response to certain visual stimuli like 
bright colours, and lustrous textures is shared by all primates (Dominy 2004; 
Fernandez & Morris 2007). However, whereas colour perception is also an 
ancient trait (Regier et al. 2005), colour categories and connotations tend to be 
culture-dependant (Roberson et al. 2005). So, visual art also uses cultural 
systems of affective and aesthetic values as an arresting strategy – i.e. that 
which is socially considered relevant, good, pleasing and beautiful (Grammer et 
al. 2003:401; Verpooten & Nelissen 2010). The latter are particularly important 
for memorability, since the evoking emotion increases the likelihood of recalling 
objects and events (Dissanayake 2008:257; Levine & Edelstein 2009). Visual art is 
a successful signal precisely due to the (positive or intense) aesthetic, affective 
and cognitive responses it induces in the perceiver.  
Because signals must draw attention, most often they are exapted from pre-
existing behaviours (through the process that ethologists called ‘ritualization’),119 
making use of the organism’s pre-established perceptual capacities and biases 
(Krebs & Dawkins 1984:386). If visual art is indeed a signal, then it is likely that, 
as most signals, it originated from the functional co-opting of pre-existing biases 
and behaviours, i.e. as an exaptation.120 Naturally, visual perception has been 
co-opted and shaped into visual art as a communication signal, but also have 
certain behaviours. For instance, various authors have indicated that the playful 
behaviour of chimpanzees by which they ‘decorate’ themselves with twigs or 
leaves must have been present in our Homo ancestors, and may constitute a 
precursor of body ornamentation (Alland 1977:39; Dissanayake 1974:215; Luria 
& Vygotsky 1992:29; Morris 1962:164). As discussed earlier in chapter 2, the use 
of coloured pigments (primarily red ochre) has a deep presence in hominin 
contexts going back some 200,000 years, or more (Barham 1998). This might 
have started as a strictly practical behaviour that later became ‘recruited’ for 
signalling purposes, as suggested by Tomasello and colleagues: “media that 
were used for symbolic group marking are expected to enter the archeological 
record for utilitarian functions initially” (2012:690). Moreover, behaviours most 
often precede and shape cognitive and anatomical changes (Jablonka & Lamb 
2005:290), for example dietary habits such as meat-eating and cooking are likely 
to have greatly influenced the development of the hominin brain and body 
(Aiello & Wheeler 1995; Wrangham 2009). So it is plausible that practices such 
as applying coloured pigments to the body for utilitarian reasons and ‘playful’ 
decoration tuned human cognition towards the use of colour and ornaments for 
symbolic communication. Finally, the manipulation of form in the production 
and use of tools and artefacts is a basic hominin ability (Coward & Gamble 2008) 
that provided a further context to imbue objects with visual references and 
meanings that could be used in communication (Finnegan 2002:175). So, the 
119 As discussed in chapter 4, in ethology ‘ritualization’ is related to the transformation of a 
common behaviour into a signal. And it is precisely in this way that some ethologists explained the 
human arts (Huxley 1966:259). 
120 For a lengthy discussion on the concept of exaptation see: Pievani & Serrelli (2011). 
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cognitive, motor and social skills involved in visual art making were already in 
place since early on in the evolution of our species (Gibson 2011), and built upon 
each other over time until they eventually converged in the practices and 
artefacts that we now identify as visual art, as suggested too by Mithen (1996a).  
Signal-response coevolution may also account for two of the most salient 
aspects of visual art: its aesthetic appeal, and the affective response it 
provokes.121 The aesthetic aspect of visual art refers to the use of existing visual 
biases to grab the attention of the viewer towards the signal. The process of 
aesthetic evolution in biological signals requires two minimal conditions a) a 
signal perceptible by another individual, and b) sensory/cognitive evaluation by 
the receiver leading to preference/choice. The action of preference will result in 
differential success among signals. Thus, aesthetic evolution may be understood 
as “an emergent property of choice based on sensory and cognitive evaluation 
of a signal” (Prum 2012:2259). Signal preference need not rely on the relevance 
or ‘honesty’ of the signal content at all, but can derive from pre-established 
biases, and detectability. As discussed above, in evolution behaviours often 
shape anatomy and cognition. In the same manner, perceptual biases can shape 
signals: “preference evolves before traits, and traits evolve in response to pre-
existing preferences” (Prum 2012:2261). The affective aspect of visual art, for its 
part, relates to the reaction induced in the viewer and refers to the subjective 
experiential feelings triggered by perceptions, which are generally understood in 
terms of valence; i.e. goodness or badness, or positive and negative (Panksepp 
2005:3). And, as mentioned before, whereas the aesthetic qualities have a clear 
biological origin, the affective properties of visual art will also have a strong 
cultural basis.  
Finally, “once a signal comes into being, the stage is set for its 
diversification, i.e. the signal then may give rise to several functionally distinct 
signals” (Otte 1974:391). This ‘branching out’ of signals might clarify the various 
manifestations and functions of a complex signal like visual art. 
In sum, as a signal, visual art manipulates the formal properties of objects to 
stimulate bio-cultural perceptual biases in order to make them increasingly 
detectable, discernible, and memorable, and thus effective as signals (Eibl-
Eibesfeldt 1988:37). And very possibly, out of the convergence of pre-existing 
behaviours in the hominin lineage like playful exploration, symbol use, and 
121 ‘Aesthetic’ is meant here in its strict etymological sense, as referring to perception by the senses 
(OED online, consulted in August, 2011). The independence of cognitive/perceptual and affective/ 
emotional systems is a key topic in neurology (Panksepp 1998:26; Sacks 1985; Zajonc 1980, 1984, 
2000). But the distinction made here between the aesthetic (perceptual) and the affective 
(emotional) aspects of visual art is mainly intended as a heuristic means to explore potential 
selective pressures that may have been involved in ‘recruiting’ certain artefacts as visual signals. In 
reality, affect and cognition ordinarily function conjointly (Zajonc 1984:117), therefore “aesthetic 
and affective responses cannot be understood in any depth as isolated phenomena” (Ulrich 
1983:86). As Bunge explains, “cognition and emotion, though separate, are connected and 
modulate one another” (2010:170). 
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artefact production, visual art emerged, innovatively and effectively using 
aesthetic and affective resources for communication. All cultural traditions 
“exploit neuropsychological biases and processes, neglecting some of them, 
while amplifying others and building elaborate conceptual structures on top of 
them” (Levinson 2000:21), and visual art is no different.  
Visual art, then, complies with all the characteristics of a visual 
communication signal: it is a stimulus intentionally emitted to convey 
information to others (about the sender or the environment) and influence their 
behaviour. Its key mechanisms are display (by the emitter) and response (by the 
receiver). Furthermore, visual art is clearly coupled to human visual perception 
and affect. As noted by Vygotsky, “any work of art is a system of stimuli, 
consciously and intentionally organized in such a way as to excite an aesthetic 
reaction” (1971:24). And because sensory systems, signals, and signalling 
behaviour coevolve, many of the general properties of signalling systems should 
be predictable from a knowledge of the environment, general behaviour, and 
neurobiology of a species (Endler 1993:222). In this sense, visual art is not 
extraordinary, on the contrary, it ought to be a somewhat foreseeable form of 
communication for an artefact-producing, symbol-using, highly visual, diurnal 
social hominin.122 Lastly, the emergence of visual art as an exapted signal 
potentially explains, on the one hand, the early intermittent occurrence of visual 
art-like activities in the archaeological record, in a time before visual art became 
well-established as part of the human behavioural repertoire, and on the other, 
the relationship between visual art and perceptual biases.  
Visual art, evidently, is neither the only human visual signal, nor the only 
form of material culture that participates in human communication. Other 
examples of visual signals include gestures, body movements and mannerisms, 
visual codes, and sign systems, among others. And in one way or another, all of 
material culture, which in broad terms includes all materials affected by human 
intervention (Ter Keurs 2006:6), actively participates in most aspects of human 
existence (Conkey 1985:305; Coward & Gamble 2008:1976; Finnegan 2002:137; 
Ingold 2007; Schiffer 1999:89). What I suggest in the following sections is that 
visual art, in particular, could have become a recurrent and meaningful human 
practice through its involvement in human communication, particularly within 
the context of cooperative strategies.  
6.2 Who art thou? Cooperation, memory & identity 
Recent thinking about biological communication has turned on the paradigm of 
communication as an ‘arms race’ (Krebs & Dawkins 1984), where animal 
communication is seen as process in which signallers basically seek to manipulate 
122 This would also explain the independent ‘invention’ and development of similar visual art forms 
among different cultures at different times.  
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receivers for their own benefit. Current views instead see communication as an 
operation whose goal is to coordinate behaviour between sender and receiver, 
where “common interest explains why signalling is done at all” (Godfrey-Smith 
2013:16). This sets cooperation alongside competition and conflict of interest as 
an important evolutionary force for communication. In group-living social 
animals, especially, cooperation towards common goals seems to be an 
important incentive for evolving communication systems (Fitch et al. 2010).  
In the human case, topical approaches to language evolution stress that 
social interactions and organised cooperative activities were strong selective 
forces in the development of language and speech (Aiello & Dunbar 1993; 
Buckley & Steele 2002; Croft 2000; Dor & Jablonka 2010; Dunbar 1996; Fitch 
2010; Gärdenfors 2004; Sinha 2009; Tomasello 2008). Moreover, as I discussed 
in chapter 1 (1.3), there is a growing consensus that cooperation has greatly 
influenced the ‘human niche’, in which our characteristic mental, 
communicative, and technological faculties evolved (Bowles & Gintis 2011:196; 
Coward & Grove 2011; Gardenförs et al. 2012; Moll & Tomasello 2007; Whiten & 
Erdal 2012), as stated by anthropologist Agustin Fuentes (2004:715): 
Cooperative behavior has been an important aspect of niche 
construction in humans for millennia. Human cooperative social 
interactions would have affected the environments humans inhabited, 
altering the very structure and pressures within those environments 
and, in turn, shaping the selection pressures early humans would have 
faced. 
Cooperation, in brief, played an important role in the evolution of human 
cognition, communication, and culture. In particular, I will argue that if 
cooperation has been important in shaping human communication, and if visual 
art indeed is a form of human communication, it follows that visual art too, at 
least in part, might have been shaped by the effects of cooperation. I explore 
this possibility below. 
Cooperation, individual recognition and reputation 
Cooperation is the collective action by two or more individuals who interact or 
coordinate their behaviours to achieve some common goal for mutual benefit 
(Smith 2003:402). Cooperative behaviours are common among animal species; 
some examples include cooperative breeding, collective hunting, predator 
spotting, food sharing, grooming, group guarding and defence, among others 
(Dugatkin 1997). Modern humans are particularly good cooperators and have 
evolved unique forms and strategies of cooperation (Bowles & Gintis 2011; 
Tomasello et al. 2012).  
As previously suggested (1.3), “human social interaction and organization 
are fundamentally cooperative” (Tomasello & Vaish 2013:239), and this is 
reflected in the human way of life, which often involves working together with 
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others towards a mutual goal. Among all cooperative strategies, reciprocity (help 
someone who might help you later) is the most salient form of human 
cooperation (Dugatkin 1997:167), and may well be considered as “the basis of all 
human economies, divisions of labor, and specialization” (Kaplan et al. 
2000:173). Reciprocal interactions have some minimal requirements, as 
explained  by social psychologist Nicholas Emler (1990:182): 
Human social existence leans substantially on patterns of cooperation 
that, as with other social vertebrates, involve contingent or reciprocal 
altruism: individuals exchange favours. However, reciprocation is often 
long delayed and, among humans, often imperfect; in other words, 
relations of credit and debt may endure for long periods. For such an 
exchange system to work individuals must be identifiable to one 
another, they must have a capacity to recall favours given and received, 
and they must have some continuity of association.  
Hence, in multi-partner or delayed return contexts, there are some necessary 
conditions for reciprocity to be effective, which include: individual recognition of 
partners, recalling previous behaviour – in order to respond appropriately 
(Dugatkin 2002) –and, recurrent interaction between partners. The first two 
conditions, individual recognition and keeping track of past interactions,  impose 
high costs on memory capacity. Since individuals benefit from recalling whether 
engaging in cooperative action with others may be beneficial or 
disadvantageous, memory is one of the most important cognitive devices 
involved in decision making related to reciprocity. Therefore, in social species 
the extent of cooperation is expected to increase with memory capacity and the 
ability for individual recognition (Crowley et al. 1996).  
Over evolutionary time, modern human ecology combined a series of 
factors that have favoured the development of a way of life strongly based on 
cooperative relations (Tomasello et al. 2005). Many aspects of modern human 
subsistence, resource exploitation, and reproduction, among others, depend on 
the successful collaboration between several (related and unrelated) individuals. 
As I will discuss later in this chapter, the social organisation of Pleistocene 
humans is characterized by the hunter-gatherer band, which broadly consists of 
a group of individuals that often forage together, share resources with each 
other ( e.g. food, tools, information), and live in close proximity to each other 
(Ingold 1999). We tend to think of the band as a household or collection of 
families (or domestic units), but actually, unlike the primate troop, the band is 
not necessarily constituted by related individuals, but can be based on 
friendships or partnerships. This is crucial for understanding the way human 
cooperation works and the motives that underlie it. 
Like many other primates, human foragers typically exploit clustered 
seasonal food patches (Kaplan et al. 2000:167) so, bands separate or come 
together according to the temporal and spatial availability of supplies, forming 
so-called fission-fusion groups (Aureli et al. 2008; Grove et al. 2012; Hamilton et 
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al. 2007). These groups enhance foraging efficiency by finding and exploiting 
food resources in sync, fomenting cooperation instead of competition among its 
members (van der Post & Semmann 2011). However, because resources are 
spread in patches over large areas, cooperation partners do not often stay in 
each other’s immediate vicinity. Rather, they cooperate briefly with many 
different individuals, increasing the size of the cooperation network to improve 
its efficiency. This promotes delayed reciprocity and with it, the necessity to 
encode information about ‘who did what’ and to remember such knowledge 
over longer periods (Aureli et al. 2008:637).123 Therefore, individual recognition 
acts as a key mechanism that makes it possible to monitor the behaviour of 
various partners simultaneously (Crowley et al. 1996). Collaborative foraging 
further favours reciprocity as well as mutualistic collaboration and 
interdependence, because survival relies not only on individual skills but also on 
the ability to work together with partners and the skills of those partners. And 
the nature of band membership, based not on blood relatedness but on free 
association, would support the development of strategies to monitor others’ 
behaviour and promote one’s own (Tomasello & Vaish 2013:239). 
In short, delayed reciprocal cooperation favours enhanced memory related 
to identifying others and recalling past behaviour whereas free partnership and 
partner choice promotes behaviour regulation strategies. The convergence of 
these factors gives rise to reputation-based cooperation. Reputation is a created 
social identity collectively constructed through communication (Emler 
1990:181). That is, reputations are formed by the collective information about 
someone (or something), and generate an expectation of behaviour or 
interaction. Reputations are, then, collectively constructed but they become 
part of the social identity of individuals (or groups, objects, institutions, etc.).  
Reputation is particularly important in systems of indirect reciprocity – e.g. 
“you helped my friend John, so I will help you”. This form of cooperation is called 
‘indirect’ because the reciprocal return is not obtained from the original 
recipient, but from another member of the community (Suzuki & Akiyama 2005). 
This typically human form of cooperation is fundamental to the functioning of 
social institutions, from trade, to apprenticeship, to child-rearing, to religion 
(Alexander 1986:107), and it depends heavily on reputational information, since 
the previous cooperative behaviour of the recipient has not always been directly 
observed by the helper.  
As I discussed above, human subsistence hinges on the skills and abilities of 
partners as much as one’s own. So, survival will depend to a great extent on 
123 Reciprocal altruism, however, is not a uniquely human strategy. Apes and monkeys, many of 
whom also live in fission-fusion groups, have cognitive capacities that allow them to identify the 
members of their own group as well as those of rival groups, and remember how they have 
interacted with each other in the past (Dautenhahn 2003; Pokorny & de Waal 2009), and 
occasionally engage in delayed reciprocal altruism. The strategy of indirect reciprocity, in contrast, 
is uniquely human and both, more intricate and cognitively demanding.   
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choosing the right partners — and being chosen as a worthy partner (Tomasello 
& Vaish 2013:239). For this reason, “people should prefer to deal with others 
they know and know about or people about whom they can more readily 
become informed. And people should, in practice, seek to inform themselves 
about the people they know and deal with regularly” (Emler 1990:182). 
Consequently, people should invest in strategies for identifying others and 
learning about their reputations, on the one hand, and for building a good 
reputation for themselves, on the other (Tomasello 2008:200). In other words, 
we can expect people to monitor others’ reputations (e.g. through observation 
or gossip) and manage one’s own (e.g. through cultivation and promotion) in 
order to choose and be chosen as a good cooperation partner (Semmann et al. 
2004). These strategies should be cost-beneficial since they increase the chances 
of receiving aid in the long-run (Nowak & Sigmund 1998:573).124 In this sense, 
reputation may be seen as a social currency (Semmann et al. 2004), that is a 
“social credit that individuals can draw on to obtain advantages at a later time” 
(Blau 1964:269).125  
Because knowing someone’s reputation does not require direct interaction, 
but can be inferred or learned from third parties, social information, or gossip, 
might be an important regulator of cooperation systems (Dunbar 1996; Emler 
1990:182; Enquist & Leimar 1993; Gärdenfors et al. 2012:208; Nettle & Dunbar 
1997; Smith 2003:420). Moreover, it is probable that moral feelings and social 
emotions (e.g. gratitude, shame, guilt, pride) coevolved with human cooperation 
strategies as psychological mechanisms for guiding and monitoring altruistic 
behaviour (Bowles & Gintis 2003:438; Fessler & Haley 2003; Tomasello et al. 
2012:684; Tomasello & Vaish 2013:240). Strategic investment in reputation is 
further reinforced by additional social mechanisms such as policing, coercion, 
and punishment against uncooperative behaviour (Richerson et al. 2003; Boyd & 
Richerson 2006:469), and social preference for cooperative individuals (Bowles 
& Gintis 2011:197; Tomasello & Vaish 2013). This clarifies why “humans’ concern 
for reputation is an important incentive for cooperation” (Tomasello et al. 
2012:679).  
Considering the above, it makes sense that being able to recognize 
individuals and keep score of their interactions with others would have been 
crucial for the evolution of typically human cooperative strategies, such as 
delayed and indirect reciprocity. In the words of behavioural biologists Elizabeth 
Tibbetts and James Dale (2007:535): 
Humans seem to have the ‘perfect storm’ of selection pressures that 
might favor recognisability. We are extremely social, interacting 
repeatedly with large numbers of individuals, each with varying roles in 
our lives. We are extremely cooperative, and we make complex 
124 In other words, “a good reputation in the community is like a high credit rating” (Blau 1964:259). 
125 The ‘rules’ of cooperation based on reputation apply not only at the individual level, but also at 
the levels of communities, institutions, and even nation states (Downs & Jones 2002). 
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decisions about whether and how much to cooperate based on kinship, 
friendship and social reputation […] These behaviors require accurate 
individual recognition and the cognitive ability to associate complex 
information with each individual’s identity.  
To conclude, it is likely that reputation played an important facilitating role in 
the evolution of cooperation in human societies (Bowles & Gintis 2011:94; 
Suzuki & Akiyama 2005). However, keeping track of others’ identities and 
reputations is constrained by memory capacity (Gärdenfors et al. 2012:209; 
Rossano 2010). In the next section, I discuss some strategies that humans have 
developed to overcome this cognitive constraint, and the possibility that visual 
art may have evolved as one such strategy. 
The social network 
A network is constituted by the connections, ties, or relations that bind 
individuals in a social structure. These links and their nature, as well as the 
composition of networks are very relevant for understanding the evolution of 
human cooperation (Apicella et al. 2012; Fehl & van der Post 2011). Particularly 
interesting is the possibility that cooperation may originate as an emergent 
property of network structures (van der Post & Semmann 2011). This section 
explores a minimal set of human networks arranged in a nested hierarchy of 
four levels that range from the most intimate to the most distant. 
It is still not clear how many people a regular person can know and know 
about, or how much. Some estimates indicate that an average (Western) adult 
knows some 500 people (Kosse 1990:289)126 and may ‘know about’ up to 5000 
others, at least by name (Emler 1990:179). There are various ways to arrange 
the different scales at which people aggregate and interact, but here I use the 
scheme developed by archaeologist Clive Gamble, which is a simple and 
descriptive classification of human networks applicable to Pleistocene societies 
that includes four network levels: intimate, effective, extended, and global, all of 
which “are derived from the emotional, material, and symbolic resources 
available to individuals to produce their social lives” (1998:426) (Fig. 18).  
The first level is constituted by the so-called intimate group, which is 
basically a person’s core network, and usually includes 3 to 7 members (mean of 
5). We may think of the household, the task-group, the nuclear family, or circles 
of close friends as examples. Interestingly, the intimate group need not have a 
kin component, but is rather based on the frequency and intensity of interaction 
and mutual support among its members (Gamble 1998:434). At this level, all 
individuals are assumed to be familiar with each other’s virtues, relationships, 
and histories of interaction, and usually (in expectation at least) they protect and 
126 500 roughly coincides with the number of people that are recurrently said to constitute the 
maximum band in hunter-gatherer societies (Aiello and Dunbar 1993:185; Birdsell 1968; Gamble 
1999:63; Marlowe 2005:59; Wobst 1974:173). 
Chapter 6 
162 
promote one another’s reputation (Emler 1990:186). The next level of grouping, 
which Gamble calls the effective network (1998:434), is the social environment 
within which people carry out most of their day-to-day interactions and is mostly 
constituted by individuals who know each other and each other’s ‘business’. 
Although numbers differ, we may say that the effective network includes some 
50 individuals. Next is the extended network, which is constituted by 
acquaintances and distant contacts (Gamble 1998:435). This can go from 100 up 
to 500 individuals. This level encompasses ‘Dunbar’s number’ of 150, which 
according to psychologist Robin Dunbar is the average number of face-to-face 
relationships that a human is cognitively able to keep track of in detail. But, 
although less profoundly, human memory can easily surpass the 150 threshold 
(Haxby et al. 2002), so that we may think of the latter as a sub-level or ‘grey 
area’ between the effective and extended network levels. Perhaps, 150 may be 
thought of as a modal human social network size, (Dunbar 1992, 1995, 1996b, 
1998; Dunbar & Aiello 1993; Hill & Dunbar 2003; Roberts et al. 2009). Its 
recurrence across several human contexts – from hunter-gatherer bands (Wobst 
1976:50), to Christmas-card exchange networks (Hill & Dunbar 2003), to online 
social networks (Gonçalves et al. 2011) – does suggest that there may actually 
be cognitive constraints on human groups beyond this point “perhaps because 
the number or volume of neocortical neurons limits an organism’s information 
processing capacity, and hence the number of social relationships that an 
individual can monitor simultaneously” (Hill & Dunbar 2003:54). Alternatively, it 
may be due to spatial proximity constraints, which also play an important role in 
network formation and management (Apicella et al. 2012). In any case, the 
extended network level includes some maximum limit of personal relationships, 
it is therefore at this level that signalling identity becomes most relevant (Wobst 
1977). Beyond the extended network, lies the global network (Gamble 
1998:436), where identities, reputations, and histories of interaction become 
difficult to trace with accuracy due to both cognitive and spatial constraints.  
In very broad terms,127 an approximate equivalence for these networks 
among historical hunter-gatherers would correspond with the task-group or 
domestic unit as the intimate network; the minimum band, often described as 
local or family group, as the effective network; the maximum or regional band, 
which often shares a dialect and a territory – defined by Wobst as a “mating 
network” (1976) – as the extended network; and the so-called ethnolinguistic 
group, which can go up to a few thousand individuals, as the global network (c.f. 
Aiello & Dunbar 1993:185; Gamble 1998:436; Grove et al. 2012:197). 
127 The reported composition and size of hunter-gatherer local and regional groups varies 
tremendously (see: Marlowe 2005:57).  
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Figure 18. Nested hierarchy of four social network levels, suggested by Gamble. 
Despite the fact that, even in contemporary industrialized societies, a person’s 
intimate network remains relatively small in daily life (Emler 1990:180), people 
do interact and cooperate at a much larger scale (e.g. trade and exchange 
networks, information sharing networks, institutions, corporations, etc.), and 
often indirectly, which imposes pressure on memory because in a large group it 
is hard to identify and remember the reputation of each individual (Suzuki & 
Akiyama 2005). So humans, at some point, seem to have developed several 
strategies to economize cognitive processing in response to memory limits. One 
of these strategies may have been ‘thinking in categories’, as archaeologists 
Fiona Coward and Clive Gamble explain (2008:1975): 
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As the number of individuals in any group increases, there is of course 
an exponential increase in the inter-individual relationships that are 
possible. But these social ties take time and energy to maintain, and 
they are also cognitively demanding in terms of integrating the relevant 
social information. It is simply not possible for everyone to have the 
kind of strong, complex relationship that characterizes kin relationships 
with everyone else in the same society. In larger groups, therefore, 
individual relationships become simplified, reducing the potential 
‘overload’ of information, so that the relationships between people 
have fewer dimensions, being categorized according to a few key 
characteristics. Thus, knowledge of others whom you meet only in very 
particular contexts is categorical rather than simply biographical. 
Thinking in categories, on the one hand, relieves cognitive memory and allows 
large-scale cooperation, but on the other, makes social relationships ‘fuzzier’ 
because in larger groups it becomes increasingly difficult to trace interactions 
with others, and this in turn makes it harder to present oneself as a good 
reciprocator. This dilemma, however, may be solved by assuming the identity of 
a social category, for instance of one’s group. In such way, large-scale 
interactions are “not based on personal histories of individual with one another 
but rather on group membership alone” (Tomasello & Vaish 2013:239). In this 
context, displaying group membership, for instance through the use of social 
markers, acquires relevance, as suggested by Tomasello and colleagues 
(2012:681): 
The problem for the individual is to know who has the requisite skills 
and trustworthiness and, reciprocally, to make sure that others know 
that I myself possess these qualities. This is accomplished by individuals 
displaying various markers of group identity. 
So, beside cognitive operations such as categorization, humans also appear to 
have developed cultural strategies, like markers of group membership, to 
surmount memory constraints. These social markers – such as dialects (Nettle & 
Dunbar 1997), emblems (McElreath et al. 2003), or material culture styles 
(Wobst 1977), convey information about the identity of a person or a group, 
helping to recall and recognize social categories and social relations. In this 
manner, human memory becomes more than a capacity confined to the 
cognitive domain, “as a creative and culturally-shaped human process, 
potentially multisensory and open to many human modalities including the use 
of material objects” (Finnegan 2002:251). 
Accordingly, as the size of human cooperation networks increase beyond 
the close effective network, we can expect different ways of signalling identity 
(i.e. social markers) and investing in the good image of that identity (reputation) 
to become increasingly present and important. These markers can then act as 
‘tools’ for memory and guide decision-making in cooperation or conflict of 
interest. The emergence of social markers such as dialects or cultural styles need 
not be particularly enigmatic, and does not have to invoke agency or 
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intentionality. These properties can arise spontaneously as a side-effect of 
grouping; that is by simply being in a community, sharing a living space, doing 
things together, learning from and copying each other, individuals can generate 
patterned behaviour distinctive of their group (van der Post & Hogeweg 2008). 
In this sense, different animal populations and communities also develop 
different behavioural ‘styles’. For instance, bird populations develop regional 
song dialects (Catchpole & Slater 1995:196), and different populations of 
chimpanzees and orang-utans develop their own distinctive dietary and tool-use 
customs (Van Schaik et al. 2003). What is unique to humans, is that once certain 
patterns start being used in identical fashion by a group, they may become 
conventional and begin to serve for communication – they turn into a signal 
(Luria & Vygotsky 1992:57). That is, in our species, cultural styles tend to work as 
social markers and become traditions, passed down the generations, at times 
being normalized and institutionalized. The point is that, style or patterning in 
human material culture can be a reliable index of the people who make or 
display it, so it can easily become used as a strategy for individual or group 
recognition, i.e. identity (Rossano 2010; Wobst 1977).  
Social markers, however, have some minimum and maximum efficiency 
values: at the level of the intimate and effective networks of a person, where 
agents are engaged in long-term interactions, the information contained in 
social marking becomes redundant because its content is likely to be already 
known (Wobst 1977). In such a small and clustered system “identity is virtually a 
constant” (Dugatkin 2002:537) and interactions take place repeatedly, mainly 
with kin and individuals who are in close physical proximity. In contrast, as 
discussed above, when size grows, groups become less dense, recurring 
interaction with familiar individuals becomes less frequent, but brief interactions 
with strangers increase, and “the combination of increased numbers and less 
frequent encounters incurs significant cognitive costs” (Coward & Grove 
2011:119). So, social markers may become useful and necessary when the size 
of the cooperation network becomes too large for individuals to manage by 
direct personal interactions (Nettle & Dunbar 1997:98). However, there is also 
an upper limit to the functionality of social marking, because for an individual 
who is too far removed from the sender, the message becomes insignificant as 
the chances of receiving and decoding it will be very low. In sum, as Wobst 
suggested (1977:329), the relevance of the messages encoded in social markers 
should correlate with the size of the social networks that individuals participate 
in, so that the main communication target for social markers, are “strangers at a 
‘middle distance’ of social relations”, that is, individuals who share the same 
cultural background, or ‘codes’, but do not know each other personally 
(Gärdenfors et al. 2012:216; Kuhn & Stiner 2007a). In such context, social 
information becomes clearly important for deciding whether or not to interact 
and cooperate. 
In conclusion, by using cultural signals of identity, people became able to 
manage a larger number of interactions than allowed by their cognitive capacity 
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alone. In other words, “as knowledge based on face-to-face, regular contact 
declines, so this is replaced by the increased use of symbolic/stylistic signalling” 
(Gamble 1999:57). This allowed for new and more extensive forms of human 
cooperation to take place, which in turn created a niche for new ways of 
communicating social identity (Gärdenfors et al. 2012:216). Visual art probably 
arose as one of these novel communication strategies, a scenario that I 
elaborate with more detail in the following section.  
6.3 The borne identity: Visual art’s origins 
So far, I have outlined the proposal that visual art has all the characteristics of a 
visual communication signal, and I have suggested that it may have coevolved 
with human cooperation. In this section, I elaborate on the proposal that a shift 
in human social organisation towards cooperative systems of indirect reciprocity 
in the Late Pleistocene generated selection pressures to produce and invest in 
strategies of individual recognition and reputation-tracking in large non-kin 
groups. One of these strategies was the use of social markers, such as personal 
ornamentation, as signals of individual and group identity. These markers 
culturally extended human memory capacity, allowing the possibility of 
expanding cooperative networks, and helped manage emerging reciprocal 
relations by creating expectations of behaviour in cooperative interactions, 
particularly in the absence of previous experience. Following Wiessner (1983, 
1984), I suggest that the earliest forms of visual art functioned in this way, to 
signal social identity and help build a good reputation in reciprocity systems.  
Signalling in style 
Communication signals are always conventional, that is, they emerge from 
interaction between agents, but there is room for variation, although always 
within the ‘norm’ of convention in order for the signal to remain effective 
(Gambetta 2009:184). This variation in the general form of the signal, i.e. ‘style’, 
can add to the content to convey specific information about the signaller, such 
as provenience, affiliation, and status. For example, it may be customary for all 
the unmarried girls in a village to wear a flower in their hair, however, they may 
differ from one another in the type of flower they wear, its colour, or the 
manner in which they arrange it. In this case, the flower would be a collective 
sign, or emblem, of the village’s unmarried females. The variation in the flowers 
reflects personal preferences and supports the girls’ individual identities. 
Anthropologist Polly Wiessner (1983), has coined the terms emblemic 
(collective) style and assertive (individual) style, respectively, to refer to these 
two modes of signalling identity. ‘Assertive’ style refers to variability that is 
person-based and conveys information about an individual’s identity (status, 
affiliation, membership, etc.), and is generally displayed in intragroup contexts. 
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Note that both, assertive and emblemic, refer to the content of style. Items of 
material culture that better portray assertive style are visible personal utensils 
and body ornaments. The second type, emblemic style, for its part, 
corresponds to messages that typically refer to group norms, values, 
or attributes (can include messages of identification, territoriality, 
authorship, ownership, pre- and proscription, etc.), i.e. it refers to collective 
identity, and is generally useful in mediating intergroup relations. Flags, 
badges, tags, and all types of emblems and motifs associated with some 
specific social group are instances of emblemic style. 
As I already discussed (6.1), visual art is a signal that purposefully exploits 
visual features of material culture style (variations in artefact form such as 
shape, colour, order, texture, etc.) for communication. Style evidently pervades 
most of material culture (Wobst 1977:326) to the extent that it is made ‘in a 
certain way’ (Sacket 1986:270). But whereas in many cases style may certainly 
be seen as a passive side-effect of manufacture, in visual art, style is active and 
central. That is, visual artworks use and display style “by definition” (Wiessner 
1983:260), therefore they also implicitly convey information about the person 
who makes or bears them. And because people would want that information to 
be positive in the eyes of others, due to the importance of a good-image in 
reciprocal relations (discussed above), this will act as a strong motivation for 
investing in visual art, in which case this investment will be perceived as “an 
indicator of initiative and industry” (Wiessner 1983:258). Among the Kalahari 
San hunter-gatherers, Wiessner indeed found that the main stimulus for 
aesthetic investment in artefacts was to convey a positive image to partners in 
reciprocity and to members of the opposite sex (1983:258).128 For example, 
people would make a greater effort and spend more time in decorating artefacts 
when they were being watched or knew that the object would be recognized as 
of their authorship (1984:204). The extra investment of labour in these objects 
achieves two effects: it assigns them a signalling function, and it adds to both 
their aesthetic and affective appeal (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1988:52).  
The observation that, world-over people seem to be ‘inexplicably’ 
motivated to allocate time and effort to visual art, drove biologist Amotz Zahavi 
to suggest that art might be a ‘handicap’ or costly signal correlated to genetic 
fitness, i.e. a ‘good-genes’ indicator – like the infamous peacock tail (Zahavi & 
Zahavi 1997:224). 129 As I discussed in chapter 3 (3.3), I believe that visual art 
may well be a costly signal, however not necessarily related to good genes but 
rather to social status. That is, it may be a conspicuous signal in Thorsten 
Veblen’s sense, i.e. a social tool to obtain and convey prestige ([1899]2000). As a 
Veblenian signal, visual art could still have many of the effects suggested for 
128 Darwin already noted that among ‘savages’, “self-adornment, vanity, and the admiration of 
others, seem to be the commonest motives” for the production and display of bodily decorations 
([1879]2004:643). 
129 For an elaboration of this argument see: Dutton (2009:191). 
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visual art as a Zahavian signal (e.g. attract mates, impress rivals), except not for 
the indirect benefits of optimal offspring, but for the direct benefits of acquiring 
and conveying a good image and social status. 
As I pointed out earlier, certain criteria such as detectability, 
discriminability, and memorability guide the evolution of effective signals. The 
manipulation of visual properties to make objects more attractive, at the same 
time increases their affective value, making them more memorable, overall 
enhancing their effectiveness as signals. Wiessner, for instance, found a 
correlation between labour investment and esteem among the artefacts made 
by the San; items that were highly visible to others, and those with a long use-
life, were made with care, very often had decorations, and were more esteemed 
(1983:260). Visible and durable objects, then, seem to be “particularly suitable” 
as signals. Interestingly, Wiessner also noticed that, contrary to a view of visual 
art ‘as information’, the stylized patterns or decorations applied to objects by 
the San usually did not carry or encode any specific messages, most often they 
were unique and made spontaneously. The decorations were said to be made 
for beauty, luck or display, to show off one’s skills and dedication (i.e. for 
enhancing one’s social image or reputation). Thus, in this case, it was not a 
pattern of ornamentation which sent any particular message nor the objects 
which transmitted information per se but, the action of art-making and its effect 
which formed a signal of identity, and enhanced status and reputation ultimately 
affecting others’ behaviours (e.g. their opinion of the maker and their attitude 
towards him/her). This supports the premise that visual art “is important for 
what it does not for what it means” (Malafouris 2008b:408). I presume that it is 
due to this close relationship with individual reputation and social reciprocity 
that visual art forms reflect and produce not only aesthetic but also socio-
affective reactions: the maker will invest more in the signal to produce a positive 
effect on the receiver, and the receiver will pay more attention in order to 
accurately assess the social and ‘moral’ qualities of the maker or portrayer of the 
signal (cf. Dutton 2009). In this sense, we could argue that the 
aesthetic/affective experiences generated by visual art may be seen as ‘social 
emotions’ (like gratitude, pride, guilt, and shame), which presumably coevolved 
with human social behaviours and cooperative interactions. 
African Middle Stone Age origins 
Regarding the correlation of the origins of assertive modes of visual art with the 
emergence of the systematic practice of indirect reciprocity/ cooperation 
beyond the effective network among Pleistocene humans, the evidence from 
the MSA is not clear-cut, but it does suggest that there indeed may be a 
correspondence between the two, as I discuss below.  
One way to infer group movement and network interactions from the 
archaeological record is measuring the movement of raw materials across the 
landscape, which can be indicative of “action radii, boundaries of social units, 
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and long-distance contacts” (Hahn 1987:255). Spatial mobility patterns among 
hunter-gatherers are determined by the possibility of access to supplies such as 
fuel, raw material, water and food. Therefore, these groups are bound to move 
according to the natural seasonal distribution of the resources they exploit 
(Ingold 2000). So, as archaeologist Brooke Blades explains (1999:712):  
Organizational strategies are clearly indicated in the inverse 
relationship between the amount of material transported, which 
generally decreases with distance from the source, and the extent to 
which that material is utilized, which increases with distance. Lithic 
raw-material economy and faunal seasonality data provide 
perspectives on the extent of exploited territory and the degree of 
sedentism or seasonal mobility. 
There are various reports on the average territory size or home-range of small-
scale hunter-gatherer bands, and a great deal of variation within (e.g. Marlowe 
2005; Whallon 2006; Wobst 1976). However, estimates suggest that the home 
range of the hunter-gatherer equivalent of the extended network, i.e. the 
maximum band, often spans 120-300 km. Therefore, archaeological evidence for 
the transport of materials over longer distances than that suggests indirect 
procurement and may indicate the existence of exchange networks between 
neighbouring groups (Marwick 2003:73).  
For most of the African Middle Stone Age the pattern of material transfers 
rarely ever exceed 100 km, implying that groups probably moved locally and 
usually only interacted within the range of effective network, much in the way 
that primate troops do (Ambrose 2010). However, by the mid MSA, material 
transport beyond 100-120 km becomes more common, and there are even 
occasional cases of long-distance material transfer beyond 300 km, such as the 
transport of obsidian in East Africa at sites dated between 130-100,000 BP 
(Marwick 2003:72; McBrearty & Brooks 2000:531; Wilkins 2010:112). That 
material movement remained well within the range of 100-300 km elicits the 
conclusion that human populations may have started forming a new level of 
social organization beyond the smaller effective group, but within the limit of 
the extended network: known in anthropology as the maximum band, defined 
as “a loosely interlocking network of minimum bands maintained through ritual 
communication and exchange”, which “integrate them into a more or less 
coherent social unit” (Wobst 1974:152). Archaeologists Steven Kuhn and Mary 
Stiner have indeed suggested that the typical ethnographic hunter-gatherer 
band economy, based on the social division of labour and cooperation within 
and between units, might have originated at this point in the MSA (2006:961). 
This ‘troop-to-band transition’ was, then, mostly a change in social 
organisation (Ambrose 2010), in relation to the composition of the group. 
Whereas the primate troop is organized around intimate and effective groups, 
usually constituted by close kin, human band societies need not be based on 
blood relatedness (Gamble 1998; Hamilton et al. 2007:2196). The maximum 
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band is rather an assemblage of residential groups bonded by cultural rules of 
membership that give individuals an identity as members of that group; these 
cultural rules take the form of classificatory kinship systems (Barnard 2009:235). 
Not only does membership determine kin relations, language, and home-range, 
but also where people go, whom they are allowed to marry, whom they must 
help, and from whom they can expect aid. Therefore, the establishment of 
bands based on ‘social’ kinship must have borne large implications for 
cooperation, as Dwight Read explains (2002:7253):  
Kinship in human societies carries with it not only a constructed basis 
for transforming a group of individuals into a system of interconnected 
individuals, but also a commonly understood conceptual basis of 
expected, and expectable, behaviors. [...] Individuals may be expected 
to cooperate with one another simply by virtue of their kin 
relationship; that is, engaging in cooperative behavior is part of one’s 
understanding of what a particular kinship relation entails, 
independent of individual experience, traits, or attributes. 
Classificatory kinship could have also served as a cultural strategy for coping 
with the increase in the number of social relations that the emergent level of 
organization of the extended network brought about. It would have provided a 
way of categorizing all this new social information so that the cognitive 
constraints of memory would be overcome by the use of kin categories and 
terminologies (e.g. uncle, cousin, nephew, etc.) and kinship identities with 
specific obligations, rights and duties within the group (Barnard 2009:233). 
However, band affiliation among hunter-gatherers is highly fluid and permeable, 
meaning that people often freely change bands (Apicella et al. 2012; Aureli et al. 
2008:648). That is, band membership “is not permanent but fluctuates as people 
freely shift their affiliations from one group to another in response to 
environmental conditions and the rise and fall of personal reputations” (Ingold 
1999:402). So, the emergence of new social categories, imbued with social rights 
and obligations, coupled with individual mobility among networks could have 
been strong incentives to signal and support one’s identity visually, for instance 
through body ornaments.  
One of the benefits of signalling identity in the new extended network 
system was, possibly, reducing risk of aggression from strangers. That strange 
persons are perceived as a risk is suggested by the fact that the brain goes into a 
higher state of alert when perceiving an unfamiliar face (Haxby et al. 2002:64). It 
is therefore conceivable that humans would make use of cultural strategies to 
signal identity in advance in order to avoid dangerous encounters with 
strangers. As Ben Marwick has pointed out, among primates, social interaction 
with strangers often results in injury or death. In contrast, among humans 
encounters with strangers are mediated by symbol systems that build 
expectations of behaviour in the absence of personal information  (2003:74): 
The ability to express symbolic categorizations of social systems allows 
individuals to identify and interact with unrelated individuals in terms 
Art signals 
171 
of symbolic categories rather than as unique individuals. This allows for 
relationships based on mutual rights and obligations rather than the 
histories of interpersonal relations that require renegotiation at each 
encounter. 
Body decoration can indicate at a distance whether an unfamiliar individual is an 
ally or a foe, helping foresee and avoid potential conflict (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 
1988:51; Kuhn & Stiner 2007a). So, social markers of identity such as visual art 
may, on the one hand, help manage dangerous situations with out-groups, and 
on the other, they also can mediate social relations within the in-group, by 
reaffirming social roles. As a result, visual art signals potentially create 
expectations of behaviour, resulting in lower indices of conflict and enhanced 
cooperation (Ambrose 2010:141; Coe 2003). 
Within the extended network, or maximum regional band, social contacts 
and exchanges (of materials, mates, information, etc.) take place regularly. In 
these networks, there would not be a strong pressure for signalling collective 
identities, since at this level people are likely to know or know about each other 
and are bound to interact with a certain frequency,130 so that non-cooperation is 
generally not an option. So, “we would not expect to find evidence for social 
boundary processes in the archaeological record” – i.e. emblemic styles in 
material culture – but “a clinal distribution of stylistic variability without any 
marked discontinuities” (Wobst 1976:53). However, assertive style would be 
well developed (Wiessner 1983:258). As close effective groups (e.g. local group 
or minimum band), where everybody knows each other well, start interacting 
more frequently with other effective groups within the extended network, there 
would be pressure for signalling individual identity. The emergence of new social 
roles and categories would promote assertive modes of social marking, such as 
personal ornamentation, to support and manage intra-group interactions. In 
accordance with the expectations by Wobst’s and Wiessner’s model, the lithic 
industries of the MSA up to 75,000 BP are very homogeneous throughout the 
African continent, showing only expected gradual geographic variation 
characteristic of ‘passive’ style, resulting from formal reproduction (Wilkins 
2010:116). Likewise the earliest body ornaments, such as the MSA shell beads, 
seem highly standardized, suggesting that variation may have resided in 
particular ways of displaying them, in assertive fashion  (Kuhn & Stiner 
2007a:48). 
A final piece of evidence to support the idea that some important change 
had taken place by 100,000 BP among modern human populations is that there 
seems to have been a slight increase in brain power, perhaps “to deal with the 
complexities of living within a larger group” (Wilkowski & Chai 2012) and the 
cognitive pressure to track others’ reputations and behaviours in the emerging 
level of social organisation (Shultz et al. 2012). 
130 It is within the cognitive range of 500 people an adult can remember, according to Kosse (1990). 
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Taking everything into account, the transition in social organisation from a 
troop-type to band society is “considered to represent the establishment of 
intensive regional reciprocal information sharing, cooperation, and materials 
exchange systems” (Ambrose 2010:140). But the formation of band societies, as 
Wobst anticipated, “may not even extend back to early Homo sapiens” since, it 
“cannot have arisen before a certain population density threshold was reached 
over wide areas”, when residential groups were in reasonable proximity 
(1976:54). Recent research has certainly highlighted demography, in particular 
increasing population sizes, as a key force in the emerging modern human 
biocultural signature in the Pleistocene (Powell et al. 2009; Shennan 2001).131 
One suggestion is that the very dry climatic conditions in Africa before the onset 
of MIS 5, between 135-127,000 BP, may have driven human groups to occupy 
certain regions more intensely, for example along the coast (Barham & Mitchell 
2008:238; Marean et al. 2007:907). In consequence, populations would have 
become denser in these areas and interactions with distantly related peoples 
would have increased and intensified, potentially giving rise to extended 
network social structures. Cooperation at this higher network level would have 
not only prevented conflict between groups, but might have been a convenient 
economic strategy against resource shortages as well, by establishing ‘security 
systems’ based on indirect reciprocity, as explained by Robert Whallon 
(2006:261):   
The establishment and maintenance of regional and longer social ties 
has long been recognized as an important part of hunter-gatherer 
adaptations to uncertain environments. In fact, such social ties create a 
‘safety net’ of contacts and relations that can be critical to survival in 
time of local resource scarcity or failure. The connections people have 
within these networks allow them to move from their own area of 
scarcity to places where adequate resources are available to support 
them through such times of stress […] The regular maintenance of the 
social networks that create such ‘safety nets’ is essential and critical to 
the long-term survival of many hunter-gatherer groups. Such 
maintenance may entail the establishment of new social ties as well as 
the reaffirmation of existing ones, and it must take place often enough 
to keep both social relations and information solid and reliable.  
The implementation of these strategies during the Middle Stone Age “would 
also have acted to increase population” (McBrearty & Brooks 2000:532). 
Through exchange and reciprocity networks, these populations could have 
overcome ecological, demographic and technological deficiencies (Horan et al. 
2005). Long-distance contact and exchange systems are common risk-
management strategies which help maintain stable population numbers among 
historical hunter-gatherers. And by helping create and manage such networks, 
131 Whatever the scenario, it is clear is that a series of factors must be involved, and it would be 
naïve to attribute the set off of this process to a single cause (D’Errico & Stringer 2011). For sure, a 
combination of different ecological and social aspects and levels are implicated (Bunge 1997:417). 
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visual art may have been adopted by human populations, directly contributing 
to shape the modern human way of life.  
European Upper Palaeolithic developments 
In accordance to the proposal put forward in this chapter, changes in 
demography and social organisation, like increasing population densities and the 
formation of larger interaction networks, and their impact on technology and 
material culture, including visual art production, could potentially explain the 
‘explosion’ of visual art in the European Upper Palaeolithic. Furthermore, the 
figurative/representational art practices that emerged in that period, such as the 
Franco-Cantabrian cave painting traditions, would be understood as a historical 
development of emblemic art styles. Let us start by exploring the conditions of 
the Aurignacian period. 
In view of a colonisation scenario in which groups of modern humans 
started occupying Europe over 45,000 years ago, archaeologist William Davies 
(2001, 2007) has suggested a two-phase process where the earliest settlers 
would have been spread, mobile, low-density groups, in time increasing in 
number and becoming more regionalized. This would correspond with the Early 
and Developed phases of the Aurignacian period, respectively (cf. Hublin 2013). 
The archaeological evidence is somewhat consistent with the view that in the 
Early Aurignacian modern human groups had small population sizes (Forster 
2004:261; Wobst 1974:155). From then onwards, “the average rate of 
[population] increase, although very small, is always positive and rises 
continuously” (Bocquet-Appel & Demars 2000:551). Likewise, the earliest 
pioneering populations appear to have been highly mobile over the landscape, 
as indicated by the character and low intensity of occupation of Early 
Aurignacian sites (Gamble 1999:315). Finally, they relied mainly on local raw 
materials for their tool technologies (Hahn 1987; Gamble 1999:313).  
In the Early Aurignacian, it seems, material culture is not as highly stylized as 
in succeeding periods of the Upper Palaeolithic, e.g. the Developed or ‘classic’ 
Aurignacian and the Gravettian (Zilhão & D’Errico 2003). For instance, lithic 
artefacts are general-purpose and although there are some diagnostic lithic 
types, “the majority of its tool types are relatively unspecialized, and can also be 
found in many subsequent Upper Palaeolithic industries in Europe” (Davies 
2001:200). Body ornaments, such as beads and pendants, do occur with some 
frequency in the Early Aurignacian, particularly those of the ‘modified kind’, such 
as perforated shells and animal teeth (White 1992, 1993, 2001). However, these 
do not show strong conventional patterns of style, as later ornaments do (e.g. 
rgional styles of ivory beads). The stylization and regionalization of material 
culture starts unfolding in the Developed Aurignacian, by 34-33,000 (Gamble 
1999; White 1993). This period shows signs of population growth and increased 
intensity of occupation, as one would anticipate for an in-fill phase (Davies 
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2007:264). Mobility patterns also seem to have changed throughout the 
Aurignacian. On the one hand, sites show a less mobile, more intensive 
occupation, in which human groups presumably resided within defined ranges 
and specialized in exploiting local resources (Blades 1999:716; Davies 2001:212). 
On the other hand, raw material transfer distances increase steadily after 33,000 
BP (Gamble 1999:317). So, by this time there is an observable growth in the 
number of sites and the spatial extent and intensity of occupation of these, 
which indicates larger human residential groups (Mellars 1996:400), and 
probably more contact and trade between distant groups (Gamble 1999:365). 
Davies has hypothesized that, as modern human population increased 
(2007:272):  
The European landscape might have become more structured, with 
people retaining some high mobility, but within more restricted areas, 
e.g. circulating long-distance movements rather than open-ended 
migration across preferred terrain. Such a situation created the 
Developed Aurignacian phase, with higher population densities, at least 
in more productive areas. This combination of decreased and/or more 
structured, circulating mobility and higher relative population densities 
could have led to more acculturation, hence the social and symbolic 
developments in the Developed Aurignacian and then in the 
Gravettian. 
Population density not only became higher, but apparently communities fused 
into larger aggregates as well (Gilman 1984:117; Stiner & Kuhn 2006). The 
geography of Europe, the natural distribution of resources, and marked 
seasonality might have contributed towards the rapid establishment of regional 
extended networks (Wobst 1976:55), as indicated by the regionalization of tool 
styles and evidence for long-distance raw material transfers (Gamble 1999:365).  
During the course of the Aurignacian period there is an abrupt increase in 
the occurrence of personal ornaments, and by the Developed phase these start 
showing patterns of culturally transmitted material choices, manufacture 
processes, and regional styles (White 1993). This suggests that, by then, “the 
social mechanism for maintaining relationships between distant groups or 
individuals were already established” (Kuhn & Stiner 2001a:127). The emergence 
of well-defined regional collective identities related to increased inter-group 
interactions, in combination with higher population sizes probably provided the 
conditions for the emergence of highly conventionalized emblemic visual art 
traditions in some regions, such as the ivory carvings from German Swabia, and 
the cave painting in the French Périgord. These traditions, then, may be 
understood as local cultural developments (Bolus 2005; Jöris & Street 2008:797) 
– as opposed to cognitive transitions. These emblemic visual art forms also turn
more common and widespread in later periods, presumably as modern human 
populations became well established throughout the continent, and vary 
according to the changing conditions, particularly in response to the effects of 
the last Ice Age (Barton et al. 1994). So, the appearance of material culture 
Art signals 
175 
styles in the Upper Palaeolithic, as Wobst (1974) and Gilman (1984) suggested, 
may mean that population densities had become large enough for neighbouring 
groups to be in regular contact, and regional cooperation between extended 
networks to be formed and sustained. As the Upper Palaeolithic unfolds, the 
patterns of regionalization and stylization of material culture also become more 
marked and retain a positive correlation with overall demographic growth and 
site occupation intensity until the end of the Pleistocene (Stiner & Kuhn 
2006:706). 
The adaptive benefits of visual art  
I have argued that the constituent behaviours of visual art signals are likely to be 
ancestral traits, shared with other members of the Homo lineage. As noted by 
Mithen (1996b), minimally, the capacities for symbol comprehension and for 
making artefacts are derived traits involved in visual art-making. The 
convergence of these traits in the context of the social interactions of humans in 
the Late Pleistocene, likely propelled the emergence of visual art signalling 
systems. Consequently, visual art may not be a species-level ‘adaptation’, as 
suggested for example by Ellen Dissanayake, but more likely an exaptation, as 
most animal signals are (Otte 1974). But even if not a special adaptation, visual 
art could still have adaptive value. 
Some of the most successful strategies that have shaped human evolution 
often involve those “factors that would have acted to increase infant 
survivorship and decrease overall mortality rates (due to starvation, injury or 
conflict)” (McBrearty & Brooks 2000:532). Indeed, many of the characteristic 
traits of our lineage (e.g. technology, intelligence, sociality) increase fitness by 
means of either improving subsistence and resource acquirement (hence, 
survivorship) and/or diminishing the risk of death (e.g. lowering predation, 
avoiding conflict) (Kaplan et al. 2000). Thus, if visual art somehow contributed to 
the fitness of Pleistocene humans, perhaps its adaptive effects are to be found in 
these spheres, rather than in increasing mating opportunities, as suggested for 
example by Miller.  
I have suggested that visual art, as a signal of social identity, in fact could 
have enhanced the fitness of the humans who engaged in it by improving their 
chances of resource acquisition (e.g. facilitating cooperation) and by lowering 
risk of death (e.g. creating expectations of interaction, and conflict avoidance). I 
have also argued that visual art arises through convention and coordinated 
action between agents. Therefore, the adaptive benefits of visual art may not be 
strongly perceptible at the level of the single-individual, but should become 
more salient at the group level.  
As discussed, at the level of the individual and the intimate network, 
signalling identity through visual art does not make much of a difference in 
social interactions of cooperation or conflict. However, the advantages of such 
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signals start becoming apparent as small groups aggregate and interrelate with 
other, larger groups. In this sense we may speak of visual art as a trait that 
conveyed an ‘emergent fitness’ to the human populations of the Late 
Pleistocene, in their interaction with their changing ecological and social 
environments. Emergent fitness can be conveyed by “traits that may not exist as 
adaptive characters of the species, but may impart fitness by upward causation 
from lower levels” (Gould & Lloyd 1999:11908). As in the case of visual art, these 
traits often characterize the species and influence its differential rate of 
proliferation in interaction with the environment in a manner that is irreducible 
to the fitnesses of component organisms (Gould 2002:659). 
This is consistent with the topical view of cooperative behaviours and 
intergroup interactions as key elements in the construction of the human niche. 
Despite the apparent cost, “the impact of many individuals within a population, 
across groups, engaging in these behaviors may alter the patterns and contexts 
of environmental pressures such that they result in long-term benefits to offset 
short-term costs” (Fuentes 2004:716). So, visual art, as an exapted signal of 
identity in cooperation networks, could have had a long-term cumulative 
adaptive impact at the population level, at the same time altering the selective 
landscape for new forms of material culture and social organisation.  
6.4 Test against the archaeological record of visual art 
The account presented in this chapter for the emergence and incorporation of 
visual art as a recurrent human behaviour relies on three key aspects: a) In the 
Pleistocene, modern human populations became organised in networks of 
indirect reciprocal cooperation; b) Indirect reciprocity selected for cultural 
strategies of individual recognition, i.e. extended memory based on sign systems 
(social markers, such as visual art); and c) Visual art became a successful strategy 
to mediate and monitor social identities in cooperative contexts.  
The hypothesis is that the sort of extended indirect reciprocal relations that 
typify human societies require a high memory capacity for individual recognition 
and tracking past behaviour. Due to cognitive constraints, large-scale indirect 
reciprocity favoured ways to overcome these limitations. Some solutions were 
cognitive (e.g. ‘chunking’ information to remember), and others were cultural 
(e.g. sign systems). Visual art arose as one of these strategies. Because 
(assertive) forms of visual art became a manner of displaying individual identity 
through convention, it became relevant to a person’s positive social image, 
which is an important asset for engaging in cooperation. So, even if visual art 
turned out to be a costly strategy, its cost would have been compensated by 
pay-offs in future returns by reciprocity partners, hence this came to be a 
powerful motivation for people wanting to invest in it. Because recognition 
through visual art created expectations about behaviour, it helped manage 
interaction risks with out-group individuals, selecting for lower indices of stress 
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and conflict, and greater cooperation. As human populations became larger, 
more intensive interactions between social networks favoured the emergence of 
emblemic style forms and signalling collective identity. In turn, larger 
populations could support the specialization of visual art making, allowing for 
the development of increasingly complex and more labour-intensive artistic 
traditions. Two general predictions derive from this proposal:132  
1) Cultural practices directed to signalling personal identity (‘assertive style’)
will be the first to appear in the archaeological record, and their emergence
should correlate with the origins of regular, delayed, and unbalanced
reciprocal relationships; i.e. indirect reciprocity systems.
2) The emergence of emblemic modes of visual art should be linked with
population growth and an increase in the frequency and intensity of
interactions across extended networks.
Below, I examine whether these expectations correspond with the patterns 
inferred from the archaeological record of visual art.  
As I have argued above, evidence such as the expansion of raw material 
transfer patterns and the intensification of occupation sites during the mid MSA 
suggests that by 100,000 BP modern humans had become organised in band 
societies somewhat similar to those of historical hunter-gatherers, which are 
structured by systems of indirect reciprocity. So far, the earliest traces of visual 
art in the form of personal ornaments seem to co-occur with this development, 
for example the seashell beads from sites like Pigeons Cave and Blombos. 
Several scholars have suggested that these finds may be interpreted as symbols 
of emerging group identity. I have argued, however, that they are more likely to 
have signalled individual within-group social identity within an extended 
network, which was by then probably the highest level of social interaction. 
However, once the  hunter-gatherer way of life based on reciprocal cooperation 
among extended networks was established, there was further room for 
development. As mentioned in chapter 2 (2.1), the climatic period known as MIS 
5 (127-70,000 BP) presented challenging changing conditions for humans. It 
seems, for instance, that groups expanded and retracted at different times, 
occupying wetter regions such as the coast in drier periods, and going inland 
during warmer and wetter phases. These changes would have invariably had an 
impact in the way different populations interacted with each other. The 
behavioural innovations observed in the archaeological sites of that time may 
well represent the way in which “communities responded to fluctuations in 
resources” (Barham & Mitchell 2008:252).  
By the end of MIS 5 (70,000 BP), the Toba eruption brought about extreme 
arid conditions that may have driven human populations to congregate in the 
coastal regions (Henshilwood & Dubreuil 2011:379), perhaps increasing contact 
frequencies between previously distant groups, giving rise to cooperation across 
132 These have been formulated primarily after Wiessner (1983:258). 
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extended networks. Such a situation would have favoured the development of 
emblemic styles in material culture because there would have been a growing 
“need to signal or symbolize ethnicity or group affiliation, distinctiveness from 
neighbors, and aggression (or suppression of aggression)” (Wobst 1976:53).  
Certainly, whereas for most of the MSA lithic technology is relatively 
homogeneous, by the end of MIS 5, there are examples of cultural styles in 
stone tool production, such as the South African Still Bay and Howiesons Poort 
techno-traditions (Henshilwood & Dubreuil 2011:370). Also, “signs of long-
distance connections do become more common” (Barham & Mitchell 2008:271). 
The appearance of regional styles in stone tools and increased distances in raw 
material transfers, both of which indicate that people were mobilizing resources 
over larger territories, point towards the emergence of exchange systems 
between extended networks by this time (Henshilwood & Dubreuil 2011:371; 
Marwick 2003:74; McBrearty & Brooks 2000:531). The production of body 
ornaments seems to have declined in South Africa after 70,000 BP, and regional 
styles in lithic technology also seem to wean by 59,000 BP. This may also be 
related to demography, and a possible depopulation event due to the climatic 
aftermath of the Toba eruption (Ambrose 1998b) and the deterioration of global 
conditions due to a cold event between 67-61,000 BP (Borroughs 2008:86).  
Hence, the combination of denser populations and more contact among 
diverse groups may be key factors in understanding the proliferation of visual art 
production by the mid MSA (Kuhn & Stiner 2007a; Shennan 2001), and the 
discontinuous nature of its record could also be partially explained by 
consequent fluctuations in demography and the rupture and recovery of social 
networks at different points in time (Powell et al. 2009; Shennan 2001). 
The record of the European Early Upper Palaeolithic (EUP) also seems to 
show a two-stage development in visual art, from predominantly assertive 
towards emblemic forms. As suggested by Davies (2001, 2007), the earliest 
modern human populations to enter Europe probably were small groups of 
bands dispersed over the landscape. These probably interacted within an 
extended network level, among related or known allied groups. But as 
populations began to thrive and settle throughout the continent, interactions 
with unrelated bands probably became more frequent and intensive, giving rise 
to regional emblemic styles in material culture. Archaeologists have recurrently 
noted that an explosion of styles and forms in material culture during the 
Aurignacian-Gravettian seems to correlate with the intensification of group 
interactions across different regions, as suggested for instance by patterns of 
raw material transfer and site distribution (Gamble 1999:317; Wobst 1974). The 
competition and cooperation generated by these relations may have selected 
for internally cohesive groups, supporting collective identities manifested in 
emblemic forms of visual art (Stiner & Kuhn 2006:705). As described in chapter 2 
(2.3), this only seems to have happened in the mid-late Aurignacian. At this 
point, personal ornaments such as ivroy beads become very much regionalized 
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and semi-mass produced (Barth et al. 2009; Kölbl 2009; White 1993), which 
indicates both that they likely took on a collective identity and that their 
production had become a semi-specialized activity. The latter is symptomatic of 
a stable, ‘robust’ human populations (Stiner & Kuhn 2006:708). Changes in visual 
art towards emeblic forms in the European Upper Palaeolithic may then 
correlate with the stabilization of population numbers during an in-fill phase, as 
suggested by Davies. During this period we also have the first example of a 
distinct visual artistic tradition, in the ivory carvings of Swabia, which seem to 
reflect the collective artistic style of a regional population. Emblemic forms, 
highly conventionalized and structured, require specialized work and the 
corresponding group size and social institutions to support it (to manage and 
transmit knowledge). Work specialization arises and coexists with many social 
factors, mainly division of labour, population size and density, technology, 
exchange, the accumulation of knowledge, social stratification, political 
organization, and internal social institutions that manage the corresponding 
specialized knowledge and activities (Kuhn & Stiner 2006; Stymne 2009). This 
explains why complex, specialized activities like painting only emerge later in the 
Palaeolithic record, when social structure can provide the necessary supports. 
Elaborate painting traditions require arduous labour, skill and knowledge 
specialization, which is not the rule in small-scale groups with reduced 
population size and density (Conkey 1993). For example, the systematic 
production of standardized images such as observed in the Franco-Cantabrian 
cave paintings are characteristically themed, conventionalized, and stylised, and 
seem to have been made by one of few artists at a time (Clottes 1993; Lewis-
Williams 2002). This points to a social institution or a select group of people who 
possessed and could transmit the required knowledge to carry out this artistic 
tradition. Work specialization seems to be linked to population density, although 
it is not entirely dependent on it. Rather, specialization hinges on institutions. 
Even when population numbers fall, if the institutions that support it remain, 
specialized work and knowledge will survive. Conversely, if the social institutions 
collapse, specialization will likely be lost, to a great extent (Stymne 2009). This 
may account partially for the discontinuity of technological and artistic traditions 
in the archaeological record. For example, it may clarify why Franco-Cantabrian 
cave art dies out at the start of the Holocene, despite an increase of population 
size in the region during the epi-Palaeolithic and Mesolithic (Stiner et al. 1999). 
 In sum, the evidence discussed from the archaeological record of the 
African MSA broadly seems to support the premise that the assertive mode of 
visual art would have been the earliest to develop among Pleistocene modern 
human populations and that, in turn, this development correlated with the 
establishment of a social organisation based on indirect reciprocal relations  — 
— the ‘troop-to-band transition’ (prediction 1). Furthermore, the archaeological 
evidence from both the African Middle Stone Age and the European Early Upper 
Palaeolithic also appear to corroborate that emblemic modes of visual art and 
material culture systematically co-occur with stabilizing or growing population 
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densities and increased contact between distantly related groups — at the 
extended network level (prediction 2). Both predictions further support the 
hypothesis that visual art arose as a cultural strategy to support identity 
signalling in human cooperation networks.  
6.5 Conclusion 
Visual art seems to be a highly versatile form of material culture which may be 
used to attract mates, to bind social groups, to explain and exchange ideas, to 
invoke emotion, and to obtain and display social prestige. I have suggested that, 
instead of keep trying to come up with an evolutionary account for each of these 
effects, scholars should strive to formulate a more general hypothesis able to 
explain why visual art is precisely so widespread, but diverse and versatile at the 
same time.  
In this chapter, I have argued that one such hypothesis may be based on the 
premise that visual art is a communication signal and that, as many 
communication signals, likely emerged in the context of cooperative behaviour. 
In particular, I have argued that visual art arose as a cultural strategy to support 
reciprocal relations among Pleistocene humans by signalling social identity. The 
scenario I have elaborated suggests that the sort of extended indirect reciprocal 
relations that typify human societies promoted cultural strategies for individual 
recognition and monitoring of behaviour. Visual art arose as one of these 
strategies. Signalling through visual art, then, became relevant to a person’s 
social image, which is an important proxy for engaging in cooperation. As human 
populations became larger and more expanded, intensified interactions 
between extended networks favoured the emergence of emblemic style forms 
and collective identity. In turn, larger populations could support the 
specialization of visual art making, allowing for the development of complex 
artistic traditions like standardized image making in rock art. This two-stage 
development of visual art forms (assertive and emblemic modes) seems to be 
consistent with the late Pleistocene record, where personal ornaments are the 
earliest predominant form of visual art, whereas emblemic forms such as 
representational art appear only at a later stage.  
The proposal presented above has an immediate advantage over other 
origins-of-art models. It accounts for the issues of timing, uniqueness, and form. 
That is, by incorporating the Pleistocene archaeological record, it attempts to 
explain why visual art emerged when it did, between 130-100,000 BP, at a time 
when scholars believe modern humans adopted a social organization similar to 
the bands of historical hunter-gatherer groups (timing). In addition, by situating 
the emergence and development of visual art in the unfolding social interactions 
of modern humans, it can potentially explain the relative absence of visual art 
behaviour among the earliest members of Homo sapiens and also among our 
closest extinct relatives, the Neanderthals, without having to invoke great 
Art signals 
181 
cognitive differences between the two or scala naturae-type arguments 
(uniqueness). Recent research suggests that the main differences between these 
two human groups might lie precisely in demography and social organisation, 
rather than cognitive capacity (Hayden 2012:12). Neanderthals, as specialized 
hunters of large terrestrial herbivores, probably lived in foraging groups 
requiring large territories, which combined with their overall low population 
density (Snodgrass & Leonard 2009:229) would have precluded repeated contact 
between unrelated groups, beyond the effective network range. Data from raw 
material and artefact mobility also indicate that Neanderthals rarely engaged in 
long-distance exchange, meaning that they were unlikely to have formed the 
sort of extensive cooperation networks observed among historical hunter-
gatherers (Horan et al. 2005). These differences in group size and organisation 
would have acted as behavioural (not cognitive) constraints on the development 
of systematic visual art behaviours. I have earlier put forward interaction 
between extended social networks based on indirect reciprocity as a selective 
environment for visual art practices; in their absence, there is little chance that 
signalling in visual art would have had a significant role in Neanderthal society. 
The same seems to have applied to early Homo sapiens populations prior to 120-
100,000 years ago (Zilhão 2011). Finally, the proposal offers a possible answer to 
the issue of form or why visual developed into the varieties and media that we 
find in the archaeological record by suggesting a two-stage evolutionary 
development (assertive-emblemic) based on the unfolding social and 
cooperative interactions of modern humans (form). From its ‘humble’ 
beginnings in personal ornamentation, visual art eventually spanned into other 
media and incorporated various complex technical processes, such as sculpture 
and painting. This suggests that visual art practices became increasingly 
important for human groups and the individuals in those groups, who invested 
more and more time, effort, and resources into them. 
To conclude, the model sketched in this chapter suggests that visual art is an 
effective cultural strategy that potentially supports identity in human 
cooperative networks allowing us to interact with others at a large-scale. 
Perhaps, then, it should not surprise us that, since its origin, people have been 





If certain of man’s handiwork can be proved to be the result of a special human impulse of 
universal incidence, coeval with the earliest discovered human evidences; if it creates 
certain definable tendencies and explicit means of expression which, however varied their 
application, are identical in intention; and if these are peculiar to itself, it is essential to 
just and profitable conclusions to approach all works of art along the lines indicated by 
those conditions, if its place and significance in the evolutionary development of man are 
to be accurately comprehended.  
W. PAGE ROWE, 1930 
These last few pages briefly summarize the main points that have been made 
over the previous six chapters, indicate and describe the limitations of the 
research, and  point out some important directions for future research. 
General Summary  
Throughout this book I have described that for over a century researchers from 
multiple disciplines have enquired about the psychological and biological 
foundations of visual art. Chapter 1 looked particularly to archaeological and 
evolutionary perspectives and to recent developments in the understanding of 
human behavioural evolution. The review revealed that in archaeology, visual 
art has often been portrayed as a by-product of human cognitive abilities, 
namely language. Whereas evolutionary views, for their part, have frequently 
suggested that visual art may be an adaptive trait that ‘evolved for’ some 
specific function such as mate choice or social bonding. I suggested that 
conceiving of art as a communication signal can potentially synthesize these 
views, allowing to formulate questions about the cognitive and behavioural 
effects of visual art and of how these come about in phylogeny and ontogeny. 
Characterizing visual art as a communication signal also makes it possible to 
better understand its biological foundations, as we can draw parallels with 
animal signals and account for its great formal and cultural variability across 
time and space, since human communication is context-bound. 
The second chapter gave an overview of the current state of the 
archaeological record of Pleistocene visual art forms. It focused on evidence of 
pigment use, personal ornaments, incised objects, carvings and painting. I 
argued that the emergence of increasingly complex forms of visual art over the 
late Pleistocene may have to do with escalating labour investment in art 
practices and changes in the structure of social organization, rather than with 
growing cognitive capacity as has often been suggested in archaeology. 
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In chapters 3, 4, and 5 I carried out a critical assessment of three 
evolutionary models for the origins of visual art. Chapter 3 looked into Geoffrey 
Miller´s argument that visual art is a courtship display that evolved via sexual 
selection. Chapter 4 discussed the model of art as a ritualized behaviour whose 
purpose is to enhance social cohesion, suggested by Ellen Dissanayake. Chapter 
5 examined the work of Steven Mithen and his proposal that visual art is a result 
of human cognitive evolution, i.e. the ‘modern mind’. I pointed out that these 
have more in common with a communication framework than their authors 
have realized. Particularly, I have emphasized that in one way or another the 
three models somehow refer to visual art as a signal, but have been more 
concerned with reconstructing and interpreting the content and function of 
early artworks, rather than with accounting for their development as shown in 
the record.  
Drawing on the suggestions by anthropologists Martin Wobst (1977) and 
Polly Wiessner (1983, 1984), in particular, in chapter 6 I suggested a scenario 
that correlates the emergence of visual art forms with the establishment of 
reciprocal networks among Pleistocene hunter-gatherer groups. Along these 
lines, I proposed that visual art coevolved with typically human ways of social 
organization and cooperation strategies. My argument, in brief, was that Late 
Pleistocene human groups became organised in band societies that established 
networks of indirect reciprocal cooperation, which favoured cultural strategies 
of individual recognition such as social markers, e.g. styles of personal 
ornamentation. These early forms of visual art, by conveying information about 
social identity, became important in recalling and assessing individual 
interactions in cooperative networks, creating expectations of behaviour, as a 
result enhancing collaboration among allies and reducing conflict among 
antagonists. I also argued that, as a cultural strategy, visual art could have been 
adaptive by reducing risk of aggression and increasing resource acquisition 
through trade. As other culturally evolved traits, like tool-making and cooking, 
visual art too could have had an important impact on shaping human cognition 
and behaviour. Finally, I suggested that this model is more consistent with the 
archaeological record of the Late Pleistocene than other proposals and can 
potentially explain why visual art is apparently restricted to modern human 
populations of a certain minimal size. 
Furthermore, I indicated that visual art should not only be seen as a 
behaviour, or a cognitive ability, but as a “technological endeavour” (Gibson 
2011:385), that is as a human- made artefact that requires for its creation tools, 
techniques, skills and knowledge that have been culturally developed, 
accumulated and transmitted. I also suggested that the emergence of visual art 
practice probably did not evolve as an isolate trait or set of traits, but more 
probably arose by convergence and co-option of various ancestral hominin traits 
such as tool crafting and symbol use. So making art, either in the Pleistocene or 
the present, implies more than creativity, intelligence, and imagination, it 
literally requires making art, hence art is in the making. 
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Limitations of the research 
The greatest limitations of this research that I can so far identify refer to three 
issues common to archaeological research in general: a small sample size, 
reliability of the data, and lack of prior research within the suggested approach. I 
briefly discuss these problems below. 
As I have described, it is only in the last couple of decades that researchers 
have realized the potential chronological depth of visual art. Therefore, the 
corpus of the earliest visual art forms has only just begun to take shape. On the 
one hand, the number of sites and artefacts with indications of visual art dating 
between 100 and 50,000 years has increased greatly in recent years as 
researchers have become more aware of their presence. On the other hand, the 
overall available sample size might still be too small to infer significant 
relationships from it. For instance, the proposal elaborated in chapter 6 is based 
on our current (limited) understanding of Pleistocene human demography, social 
organisation, and interactions across groups. Changes in our knowledge of any 
of these aspects could then have great implications for the suggested scenario. 
Also, I have mentioned that researchers often describe the record of visual art as 
‘patchy’, but as the sample continues to become larger, the gaps may soon start 
to fill in and we might be able to acquire a clearer idea of the ways in which the 
different visual art forms occurred across sites and periods. 
Another potential problem is the reliability of the data. This is linked to 
issues such as geographical research biases and material preservation. In 
chapter 2 I have discussed, for example, that due to the history of research, 
some areas will generally be more available to archaeologists than  others. And, 
due to the history of deposition, older finds will be more scarce. Therefore, it is 
possible that the evidence we have are just indicative ‘pulses’ of the actual 
record, and that we are simply ‘drawing lines through dots’.  
Finally, I have discussed that often, researchers are more interested in 
interpreting the contents of visual art, or suggesting motivations for its 
production, than in accounting for its patterns of emergence and change. For 
this reason, there are few archaeology-based models that explore a possible 
correlation between the earliest patterns of visual art forms and other aspects 
of human activity that can be deduced from the record, such as population 
density, network interactions, resource acquisition strategies, etc. Hence, there 
are few specific hypotheses that this research could follow up on or be 
compared to. 




Suggestions for future research 
The general observations and proposals made in the previous chapters have the 
potential to be expanded and improved in terms of scope, testability, and 
definition. 
The first suggestion is regarding the chrono-geographical scope. The two-
stage model for the evolution of visual art, from assertive to emblemic mode, (as 
elaborated in chapter 6) may potentially be tested in various archaeological and 
historical contexts. In this book, I have focused  mainly on the mid- African 
Middle Stone Age, and the European Early Upper Palaeolithic. However, there is 
room to expand the scope to the Asian, Australian, and American records, for 
example, and to check for consistency in historical ethnographic cases.  
I also put forward some manners to further test the model suggested in the 
previous chapter. According to the prediction that the assertive and emblemic 
modes of visual art will be correlated with the incidence of interaction between 
and across human groups, there should be cases where, due to changes in either 
demography or social organization, the presence of collective forms of visual art 
(emblemic mode) will ‘revert’ to individual (assertive) forms. Identifying such 
cases could provide an interesting manner to test the model’s predictions. 
Looking in more detail at the whole record of the Upper Palaeolithic in Europe, 
with its great variability of styles and forms of visual art across regions and 
periods, might provide some opportunities to test these suggestions – following 
up on the study by Barton et al. (1994). Similarly, cases such as those of the 
historical hunter-gatherers of Tasmania and Baja California provide interesting 
possibilities. In both examples, the assumption is that at some point there was 
an interruption in the pattern of cultural transmission that produced a marked 
quantitative and qualitative decline in material culture. These patterns should 
also be reflected on visual art practices, if the assumptions of our model hold 
true. 
As for the more general suggestion that visual art should be understood as a 
communication signal, current research on the evolution of animal 
communication and studies of signalling systems should provide comparative 
material to better understand how visual art might have emerged and 
diversified, and the range of effects it has acquired. Signalling theory in biology 
and sociology should also provide a strong theoretical framework. 
 Finally, I suggest that future research on the origins of visual art needs 
to acquire better resolution. That is, researchers should be more specific about 
what they want to address, whether it is the emergence of a specific art form or 
technique (e.g. carving, painting), a content style (e.g. figurative, schematic), or a 
behavioural pattern (e.g. visuo-motor abilities, drawing skills). Also, studies 
should narrow down on the development and production of art forms over time, 
with all that this implies, such as changes in traditions, conventions, techniques, 
materials, styles, distribution, etc., trying to relate these to other aspects of the 
Concluding remarks 
187 
archaeological record. For instance, network perspectives in material culture 
and archaeology (Knappett 2011, 2013) offer an interesting approach with 
potential application to the early record of visual art. Moreover, research into 
the evolutionary origins of human behaviour, in general, should reassess the 
importance of exploring cooperation strategies as an important selective context 
for human cognition, culture and communication.  
Final reflections 
In a way, the conclusions of the present research do not defer much from Hirn’s, 
when he wrote (1900:304): 
And beyond the fact that art has been obliged to avail itself of media 
which have originally been called into existence by utilitarian, non-
aesthetic needs, there lies another fact. To these external ‘origins’ we 
can also trace some of the most important qualities which we 
appreciate in a work of art. In this way it is open to us to explain how 
several of the virtues of art, as we know it, may be derived from the 
primitive needs which it subserved; how, for instance, the lucidity of art 
may find its explanation in art’s use for conveying information; how the 
sensuous and attractive qualities of all art may be traced to the need 
for propitiating favour; how the power that resides in art to brace and 
stimulate the mind may be transmitted from the days when the artist 
was appointed to nerve his fellows for work or war.  
Despite the fact that Hirn’s observations are still very much valid today, I would 
like to think that we have made some progress in our understanding of the 
origins of visual art in the eleven decades since the publication of his enquiry. 
For one, a great archaeological corpus of Pleistocene visual art has been 
accumulated since then, going back over 100,000 years.  
This rich record has the potential to offer a yardstick with which to test 
hypotheses on the evolution of human culture. Therefore, archaeology is 
“capable of providing the direct evidence for the actual patterns of development 
of different aspects of behaviour over the course of human evolution” and 
through it we can “engage actively in evaluating the alternative hypothetical 
models of cognitive evolution against a (more or less) empirical data base” 
(Mellars & Gibson 1996:1). But in spite of its unique position to provide a 
“temporal backdrop against which the actual course of historical events have 
been played out”, researchers have not yet taken full advantage of archaeology 
and its potential to explain evolutionary patterns of human culture and 
behaviour and test evolutionary hypotheses (Eldredge 1989:173-4). In the same 
manner, scholars from all disciplines interested in the origins of visual art have 
to make better use of the archaeological data available to them. From this 
perspective, origins of art hypotheses may be evaluated according to two 
criteria: a) how well the main arguments agree with what we do know about the 
biological and cultural evolution of humans; and b) the extent to which the 
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empirical archaeological evidence for visual art meets the conditions that would 
be expected if the hypotheses were correct, i.e. their predictions. 
As I have reviewed in the previous pages, the frequent disregard for 
archaeological evidence is partly due to the scholarly tradition of putting 
forward explanations of behavioural evolution based on current function, and 
partly by clinging to a notion of visual art as a unique human achievement, as 
special as our own species. But as Gould remarked (2002:912): 
However much we may yearn to regard ourselves as the apotheosis of 
an inherent tendency in the unfolding of evolution, we must someday 
come to terms with our actual status as a discrete and singular item in 
the contingent and unpredictable flow of history. If we could bring 
ourselves to view this prospect as exhilarating rather than frightening, 
we might attain the psychological prerequisite for intellectual reform. 
Similarly, when we stop seeing visual art as an enigmatic product of human 
intelligence, and understand it within the framework of biological 
communication and hominin evolution, we open an exciting possibility to better 
understand the role that it has played in our history, without it losing sight of its 
remarkable aesthetic and affective qualities. 
To be sure, when we understand that much of our human ‘uniqueness’ is 
part of our hominin heritage and that those traits that ‘make us human’, like 
visual art, have been shaped by a long history of interaction between 
cooperation, cognition, communication, and culture, “light will be thrown on the 
origin of man and his history” (Darwin [1859]2006:306). 
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Kunst in de maak: De evolutionaire herkomst van beeldende kunst als een 
communicatiesignaal  
Dit proefschrift beschrijft hoe onderzoekers uit verschillende disciplines al meer 
dan een eeuw trachten de biologische en psychologische grondslagen van 
beeldende kunst te doorgronden. De auteur stelt dat de verschillende 
perspectieven bij elkaar gebracht kunnen worden door beeldende kunst als een 
vorm van communicatie te beschouwen. Deze studie biedt tevens een 
aannemelijk scenario voor de oorsprong van beeldende kunst door het te 
definiëren als een materieel signaal dat, samen met sociale identiteit, 
waarschijnlijk een belangrijke rol heeft gespeeld in de context van menselijk 
coöperatief gedrag.  
Het eerste hoofdstuk behandelt specifiek archeologische en evolutionaire 
standpunten en kijkt naar recente onderzoeksontwikkelingen op het terrein van 
de evolutie van het menselijke gedrag en de relevantie hiervan voor het 
verschijnsel kunst. Hieruit blijkt dat beeldende kunst binnen de archeologie 
vooral wordt uitgelegd als het bijproduct van de cognitieve vaardigheden van de 
mens, in bijzonder die van taal. Daarentegen bepleiten evolutionaire 
benaderingen dat het vervaardigen en gebruiken van beeldende kunst moet 
worden gezien als een adaptieve eigenschap, en dus evolutionair ontwikkeld is 
met een bepaalde functie. De auteur beargumenteert dat wanneer kunst als een 
communicatiesignaal wordt beschouwd, de afstand tussen deze twee 
standpunten kan worden overbrugd. Zoals alle signalen, is beeldende kunst 
afgestemd op de menselijke perceptie en cognitie, en kan het in verschillende 
contexten opereren. De uitleg van beeldende kunst als signaal verklaart zowel 
de relatie tussen beeldende kunst en cognitie, als de waargenomen diversiteit 
aan functies die beeldende kunst heeft aangenomen. Deze benadering stelt ons 
bovendien in staat om vragen te formuleren over de cognitieve en 
gedragsmatige effecten van beeldende kunst en hoe deze tot stand komen in 
fylogenie en ontogenie.  
Het tweede hoofdstuk geeft een overzicht van de huidige stand van 
archeologische vondsten van beeldende kunst uit het Laat Pleistoceen (ca. 
130.000 tot 10.000 jaar geleden). Het behandelt het gebruik van pigmenten, 
persoonlijke versieringen, graveringen, sculpturen en schilderingen. Er wordt 
beargumenteerd dat de opkomst van steeds complexere vormen van beeldende 
kunst gedurende het Laat Pleistoceen te maken heeft met een stijgende 
arbeidsinvestering in het maken van kunst en met veranderingen in de sociale 
structuur van de samenleving. Dergelijke veranderingen zijn bijvoorbeeld een 
toenemende groepsgrootte of de intensivering van interactie tussen groepen. 
De verklaring van arbeidsinvestering en veranderingen in sociale structuur wijkt 
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daarmee sterk af van de tot op heden gangbare archeologische verklaring dat de 
ontwikkeling van steeds complexere vormen van beeldende kunst het gevolg 
zou zijn van de groei in menselijke cognitieve vermogens.  
In hoofdstukken 3, 4, en 5, geeft de auteur een overzicht en een kritische 
weging van drie invloedrijke evolutionaire modellen die de oorsprong van 
beeldende kunst trachten te verklaren. Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt het model van 
Geoffrey Miller dat beeldende kunst als een vorm van hofmakerij ziet welke 
geëvolueerd zou zijn via het principe van seksuele selectie. Hoofdstuk 4 gaat in 
op het model voorgesteld door Ellen Dissanayake, waarin kunst als een vorm van 
geritualiseerd gedrag wordt beschouwd met als doel om de sociale cohesie van 
een groep mensen te bevorderen. Uiteindelijk behandelt hoofdstuk 5 het werk 
van Steven Mithen en zijn voorstel dat beeldende kunst het resultaat is van 
menselijke cognitieve evolutie, oftewel het resultaat van de ‘moderne geest’. De 
weging van de drie modellen komt onder meer tot stand door voorspellingen uit 
deze modellen te toetsen aan het archeologisch bewijsmateriaal dat in 
hoofdstuk 2 is gepresenteerd. De conclusie is dat, hoewel zij alle drie 
nauwkeurige beschrijvingen geven van bepaalde specifieke effecten van 
beeldende kunst, de modellen geen bevredigende verklaring bieden voor haar 
ontstaan en ontwikkeling door de tijd. Desondanks hebben alle drie op een of 
andere wijze beeldende kunst wel in verband gebracht met 
communicatiesignalen.  
Gebaseerd op de theorie van stijl in materiële cultuur als een signaal, 
ontwikkeld door de antropoloogen Martin Wobst (1977) en Polly Wiessner 
(1983, 1984) in het bijzonder, stelt hoofdstuk 6 een scenario voor dat de 
opkomst van beeldende kunst verbindt met het ontstaan van wederkerige 
netwerken onder jager-verzamelaar groepen in het Laat Pleistoceen. Er wordt 
geponeerd dat beeldende kunst co-evolueert met archetypische menselijke 
samenwerkingsstrategieën en wijzen van sociale organisatie. Het argument is 
dat groepen mensen zich tijdens het Laat Pleistoceen organiseerden in 
bandsamenlevingen met netwerken van indirecte wederkerige samenwerking, 
waar culturele strategieën belangrijk zijn om aan de hand van sociale markers 
(zoals persoonlijke versiering) een individu te herkennen. Door informatie te 
verstrekken over de sociale identiteit vervulden deze vroege vormen van 
beeldende kunst een belangrijke rol bij het herinneren en beoordelen van 
individuele interacties in samenwerkingsverbanden. Het gebruik van beeldende 
kunst als sociale marker verschafte hiermee bepaalde verwachtingen ten 
aanzien van het gedrag van de ander (zonder deze noodzakelijkerwijs 
persoonlijk te kennen), en vergemakkelijkte zo een intensievere samenwerking 
tussen bondgenoten en zorgde voor een vermindering van conflict tussen 
potentiële tegenstanders. Vanuit het beperkte veld van persoonlijke versiering 
breidde beeldende kunst zich uiteindelijk uit naar andere media en omvatte 
steeds complexere technische processen, zoals het maken van sculpturen en 
schilderingen. Dit wijst erop dat beeldende kunst door de tijd heen belangrijker 
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werd voor groepen mensen, en de individuen binnen de groepen, waardoor zij 
steeds meer tijd, moeite en middelen in beeldende kunst staken.  
Als culturele strategie, stelt de auteur dat beeldende kunst adaptief zou 
kunnen zijn geweest door het verminderen van het risico op agressie en het 
vergemakkelijken van uitwisseling van middelen in het netwerk. Evenals ander 
cultureel geëvolueerde eigenschappen, zoals het maken van gereedschap en 
koken, heeft beeldende kunst een belangrijke rol gehad op hoe menselijk gedrag 
en cognitie zich heeft vormgegeven. Dit alternatief model is veel meer in 
overeenstemming met het complex aan archeologische vondsten uit het Laat 
Pleistoceen dan andere modellen en kan beter verklaren waarom beeldende 




Larissa Mendoza Straffon was born in 1977 in Mexico City. In 1997 she started 
her studies in archaeology at the National School of Anthropology and History in 
Mexico. During her study, she carried out extensive anthropological and 
archaeological fieldwork in the Mexican states of Oaxaca, Hidalgo, Estado de 
México, Querétaro and Baja California Sur, and did an internship at the National 
Museums Organisation. In 2004 she graduated with honours for her thesis on 
the Archaic Great Mural rock art tradition of the Baja California Peninsula, 
obtaining a licentiate degree in archaeology. The same year she entered the 
Human Origins master at the Faculty of Archaeology of Leiden University in the 
Netherlands. She took on the Aurignacian art of Swabia, Germany, as her thesis 
topic and obtained her master’s degree in 2005. In the summer of that year she 
participated in the archaeological excavations at the site of Hohle Fels, Germany. 
In 2007 she began her PhD research on the evolutionary origins of visual art at 
Leiden University Centre for the Arts in Society (LUCAS). From 2008-2011 she 
was a board member of the Dutch Postgraduate School for Art History. In 2013 
she was visiting researcher at the Applied Evolutionary Epistemology Lab 
(AppEEL) at the Centre for Philosophy of Science in the University of Lisbon, 
Portugal. In 2007 she planned and coordinated the international workshop 
‘Complexity Perspectives on the Origins of Art, Creativity and Culture’ at Leiden 
University. In 2013, at AppEEL, she co-organised two graduate schools on 
current issues in Evolutionary Theory, and the ‘International Conference on 
Evolutionary Patterns’ in Lisbon, Portugal. She has lectured three BA courses at 
Leiden University, has presented her research at various international 
conferences (ICOM, IFRAO, EAA, AAA, UISPP), and has authored and co-authored 
several academic publications. Currently she is editing a volume on cultural 
phylogenetics for the Springer series ‘Interdisciplinary Evolution Research’. 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I am grateful to my promoters Kitty Zijlmans and Wilfried van Damme for having 
accepted my research proposal into the the World Art Studies programme at the 
Leiden University Centre for the Arts in Society (LUCAS), and to my co-promoter 
Katharine MacDonald ,of the Faculty of Archaeology of Leiden University, whose 
insights and guidance were crucial to the completion of this manuscript. 
I extend my appreciation to the managerial and secretarial body of LUCAS, 
Korrie Korevaart, Viola Stoop, Lenie Witkam, and in particular Lia ten Brink, for 
their kind help with all administrative issues during the course of my 
appointment as PhD researcher, and for the financial support towards the 
printing of this book. 
My gratitude to Boudewijn Peters, of Leiden University, and Szabolcs 
Számadó, of the Center for Network Science at the Central European University, 
Hungary, for proofreading previous versions of some chapters. 
I also thank everyone who generously gave me permission to include their 
images in this work. Especially: Tom Gauld for his cartoon Hunter and Painter for 
the cover. Prof. Christopher Henshilwood and Lisa Hulett, of the Evolutionary 
Studies Institute at the University of the Witwatersrand, for the image of the 
engraved ochre from Blombos Cave. Prof. Stanley Ambrose, of the University of 
Illinois, for the image of ostrich eggshell beads from Kenya. Dr. Kurt Wehrberger 
of the Ulmer Museum, for the image of the Hohlenstein-Stadel lion man. Dr. 
Stephanie Kölbl of the Blaubeuren Prehistory Museum and Dr. Sibylle Wolf of 
Tübingen University, for their help in acquiring images of the Hohle Fels Venus, 
the Hohle Fels lion man, and the Vogelherd beads. Dr. Marian Vanhaeren of the 
University of Bordeaux, for the image of the Blombos Cave seashell beads. Prof. 
Randall White of the Centre for the Study of Human Origins at New York 
University, for the images of Aurginacian beads. And finally, Prof. Jean Clottes, 
for the wonderful picture of the horse panel at Chauvet Cave. 
Over the past years, the interdisciplinary nature of my research topic led me 
to pursue various interests and questions that would have remained 
unanswered had it not been for the goodwill of the professors that allowed me 
to sit in their courses and lectures, and exchange views with them and their 
brilliant students. Specifically, Raymond Corbey, Wil Roebroeks and Alexander 
Verpoorte of the Faculty of Archaeology of Leiden University, Liesbeth Sterk  of 
the Faculty of Biology of Utrecht University, Arie Verhagen of the Leiden 
University Centre for Linguistics. 
I am thankful to anyone who has been somehow involved in the realisation 
of this project. Above all, my colleagues of the art history department who at 
any point shared an office space or a lunch table with me, and were always quick 
to lend me an ear, a shoulder, a friendly word of advice, and even a roof in 
Leiden whenever I needed it: Jenny Boulboullé, Marieke Hendriksen, David 
Louwrier, Marrigje Rikken, Sun Jing, Minou Schraven, Elsje van Kessel, Joris van 
Gastel, Ita Jansen, Maureen Warren, Erin Downey, Leonor Veiga, Amalia Kallergi, 
and especially Hieke Huistra, Elisa Goudriaan and Anna Grasskamp. Thanks, too, 
to Adam Jagich and Araceli Rojas, of the Faculty of Archaeology, and Max van 
Duijn and Barend Beekhuizen, of the Centre for Linguistics, for sharing their 
thoughts and experiences with me whenever we had the opportunity to meet.  
My fellow rock art enthusiasts Ramón Viñas of the University of Tarragona, 
Roberto Martínez of UNAM, and Leslie Zubieta of the University of Western 
Australia, have been a constant source of inspiration, may we work together 
many more times in the future. 
Finally, a loving thank you goes out to my dear friends Carlotta Tavormina, 
Priscilla Schoondermark, Vincent Verschoor, Paul Gibbels, Marlies de Bont, Joris 
Gravensteijn, Cruz Pacheco, Eduardo García, Tere García, Carlos Arriola and 
Azucena Cervantes, for their endless encouragement. To my ‘Dutch family’ Leo, 
Carla, Ferry and Dayenne Wijnhoven for their incessant support. To my parents 
Enrique Mendoza and Doris Straffon, and my sister Miriam for their 
unconditional love and backing. And last but not least, to my partner Martijn A. 
Wijnhoven for standing by me throughout this remarkable journey. 
©Tom Gauld
